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1 General Introduction 
 
This doctoral thesis consists of three empirical papers on the influence of taxes on acquisi-
tions, investment decisions and asset pricing. All three studies pursue the goal to enhance the 
understanding of the interaction of taxes and economic decision making. In all essays a wide 
variety of econometric models is applied to gain further insights into the economic meaning 
of taxes and quantitatively test theoretical predictions of the influence of taxes on investment 
behavior and asset prices. 
 
Investment defined as the accumulation of new capital in a business is the fundamental source 
of firm value and the driver of economic growth. Taxes play a major role for investment deci-
sions as they directly affect an investment project’s profitability. Companies, policy makers 
and private investors devote considerable attention to taxes and their consequences for in-
vestments. Asset prices convey information on market expectations and market risk, drive 
economic fluctuations and help allocating resources. In recent years we have witnessed ex-
treme developments in asset prices including strong boom and bust periods in security mar-
kets and historically low interest rates. As a result, it has become more important to under-
stand the influence of taxes on asset price movements in order to incorporate their effects into 
policy decisions and portfolio considerations. Ultimately, what the effects of taxes on invest-
ments and asset prices are is an empirical question. 
 
The three essays cover different fields of corporate and individual investments as well as the 
area of security pricing. The first essay “Tax Avoidance as a Driver of Mergers & Acquisi-
tions?” tests if acquirers systematically implement tax planning strategies at target-level. The 
second paper “Restricted Tax Loss Transfer and Business Cycle Effects” examines the ques-
tion how limitations to passing on losses through acquisitions adversely affect investor behav-
ior. The last study “Capital Gains Taxes and Long-term Return Reversal: Evidence from Pole 
to Pole” extends the scope of the previous two essays by focusing on shareholder-level taxa-
tion. It investigates the link between capital gains taxes and anomalous stock price changes. 
All papers are based on sound underlying economic theories and serve the mere purpose to 
provide empirical evidence of analytical expectations. That way, theoretical predictions are 
either statistically validated or might have to be reconsidered in the light of unexpected empir-
ical results. 
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The Empirical findings presented in this thesis are equally interesting for different groups of 
market participants. They could help investors to understand how M&A-tax planning is real-
ized and what the consequences of tax-driven corporate takeovers are. They could also pro-
vide guidance for policy makers on the design of anti-avoidance rules and help to reconcile 
the objective of revenue sufficiency with the need to set investment incentives. In addition, 
they might serve as blueprints for tax-efficient trading strategies and enhance the understand-
ing of tax-driven price reactions.  
 
Every paper is an independent scientific study with its own research question, systematic out-
lines, descriptive statistics and empirical results. In order to set a common conceptual frame-
work for all three essays this thesis is extended by three additional components.  
The first component presents a concise overview of the different databases that are used 
throughout this thesis. It presents descriptive statistics of key data elements to ensure the 
comparability and validity of the various data sources.  
The second element comprises a literature review of the different areas of tax research cov-
ered by the three papers. It outlines the historical development of the different strands of liter-
ature, distinguishes between various fields of empirical tax research and briefly describes the 
individual contributions of the three empirical studies to those research areas.  
The third component is a concise summary of the main results of all three papers and presents 
thoughts for future research.  
  
For the construction of the numerous datasets I made use of five commercial databases and 
gathered information from a broad range of other freely-available data sources. All datasets 
are combinations of comprehensive micro-level data and additional macroeconomic variables. 
Every dataset is individually structured to meet the specific data requirements of each re-
search project. Those datasets enable me to explore various sources of variation in order to 
draw inferences from time-series and cross-sectional changes. 
 
Empirical research consists to a considerable extent of data preparation and statistical pro-
gramming to be able to draw meaningful economic inferences. All statistical results presented 
in this thesis are based on extensive programming codes in the statistical software package 
Stata. The programming codes are not included since their full length would be outside the 
scope of this thesis. But I gladly provide all programming codes upon request. 
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Empirical research is a challenging and rewarding discipline. It requires considerable time and 
effort to identify economic effects and interpret the corresponding results. I am grateful that I 
got the opportunity to work on interesting research projects in an interdisciplinary field with a 
group of excellent scientists. I hope that I was able to make a little contribution to economic 
research in general and to empirical tax research in particular.  
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2 Introduction to Databases 
 
This chapter gives a broad overview of the five different databases that were used to collect 
the data and to construct the different datasets which are the fundamental groundwork for all 
three studies. Most of the freely-accessible or commercial databases are offered by private or 
public data providers in cooperation with many institutional, governmental or other infor-
mation vendors. Despite related data sources or similar methods of data collection, most of 
these databases differ with respect to data type, data items, data availability and data structure.  
 
Most databases commonly used in empirical tax research or related fields focus on the same 
data types such as financial accounting data, security prices or data on firm transactions. In 
addition, some databases also provide data on other closely related topics such as corporate 
structures, analysts’ forecasts or market research.  
Databases that in principle offer the same informational content often differ with respect to 
the number and the definition of data items that contain the information.1 The more precise 
the definitions are and the finer the subdivisions of the variables are set the more reliable 
econometric conclusions can be drawn.  
Despite the growing number of data sources that have constantly improved data availability 
over the last two decades, no database can offer a universal coverage of all available data. 
Data is mostly limited by data type, geographic coverage, the time period covered or the 
preservation of historical observations. As a consequence, mostly a combination of various 
data sources is necessary to construct a comprehensive and powerful dataset. 
In order to provide data that can be easily accessed, searched and retrieved, databases usually 
convert the collected data into a standardized format that ensures the comparability of the 
same data items across different categories e.g. countries, currencies or time periods. Howev-
er, almost every database applies its own individual data structure, which leads to major dif-
ferences in search criteria, download modes and identification variables. Those database-
specific mismatches impede the construction of combined datasets from different databases. 
Considering the existence of a wide variety of databases and the large number of inconsisten-
cies and missing common links between them, the database choice can significantly affect the 
final empirical results.2 
                                                 
1
 For instance, the Amadeus database offers the item “taxes paid” which contains “cash taxes paid” and “de-
ferred taxes”. In contrast, Compustat North America offers the same information subdivided into two separate 
tax variables. The same can be observed for various other balance sheet or income statement items.  
2
 Several studies examine the suitability of databases for academic research and identify possible database bias-
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The three empirical studies are based on data from the Zephyr M&A database, the Amadeus 
database, the Orbis database, Thomson Reuters’ Datastream and the Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) database.   
 
The Zephyr database provided by Bureau van Dijk offers information on corporate mergers 
and acquisitions, IPOs, private equity deals and venture capital deals with pan-European 
transactions dating back to 1997 and U.S. deals starting in 2001. Zephyr is updated on a daily 
basis and currently contains over one million worldwide transactions for both public and pri-
vate companies. The database contains information on pending, withdrawn, rumored, an-
nounced as well as completed deals. The individual deal records describe the acquiring firm 
and the target company along with descriptive information on the deal itself. Transactions are 
categorized by companies involved in a deal (i.e. bidders, targets and vendors), geography, 
time period, deal status, deal type and deal structure. Furthermore, Zephyr offers a value-
based classification that includes deal value, bid premium and target value. Zephyr is used as 
data source for numerous scientific M&A reports and indices (e.g. The ZEW-Zephyr M&A 
Report, the ZEW-Zephyr M&A-Index, the Zephyr Annual M&A Report). 
 
Figure 2-1: Global Deals by Volume and Value 
 
Figure 2-1 is based on a Zephyr download from May 2013. It shows all worldwide completed 100 % acquisi-
tions. Deal value is in billions of US Dollar.  
 
 
Figure 2-1 shows the development of worldwide completed 100 % acquisitions in terms of 
deal value and number of deals for the last 10 years. The total number of transactions and the 
overall deal values are below common levels found in aggregated studies because Figure 2-1 
                                                                                                                                                        
es. Among others, Lara, Osma and Noguer (2006) analyze whether the choice of database has an effect on the 
results of empirical studies in general. Ince and Porter (2006) evaluate Thompson Reuters’ Datastream for the 
use in studies involving large numbers of individual equities. Rosenberg and Houglet (1974) compare different 
return data available from the CRSP database and the Compustat database.   
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only displays a subpart of all available deal types. In comparison to the Zephyr Annual M&A 
Report 2013 my dataset contains on average about 30 % of the total deal values and roughly 
25 % of the overall number of deals. However, the general evolvement over time is very simi-
lar to the trends described by the report. All in all, the dataset can be viewed as a representa-
tive sample of international M&A activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-2 is based on the years 2003 to 2012 from a Zephyr download from May 2013. The top five acquirer 
countries and top five target countries refer to the overall deal values of worldwide completed 100 % acquisi-
tions. 
 
 
Figure 2-2 shows that companies based in the U.S. were with a relative share of 60 % the 
most important worldwide acquirers. At the same time the U.S. with a portion of 63 % was 
the most favorable target country in the last 10 years. The U.K. with a relative share of 19 % 
of all acquirers and 18 % of all targets is ranked second in a worldwide context but clearly 
tops the European ranking in terms of buyers and targets. France, Canada and Germany are 
traditionally also very active M&A markets. This accumulated overview largely corresponds 
to other M&A reports for the last decade.3    
 
The Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database contains standard financial accounting information, 
general descriptive information, industry classifications and ownership information on over 
21 million European companies including various legal forms and size categories. The data-
base further distinguishes between listed and unlisted firms and provides unconsolidated as 
well as consolidated accounts. The Amadeus database predominantly covers private limited 
companies and the coverage varies largely by country with a focus on Eastern and Central 
                                                 
3
 The alternative ranking based on the number of worldwide acquisitions shows similar results. 
Figure 2-2: Top Five Global Acquirer Countries and Target Countries by Deal Value 
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European companies.4 Financial institutions and insurance companies are not included in 
Amadeus database but are available from the Orbis database. All financial accounting infor-
mation is provided in a standardized format for 26 balance sheet items, 26 profit and loss ac-
counting items and 32 standard ratios to ensure comparability across companies and coun-
tries. The database includes up to ten years of historical financial statement information for 
every active company. Earlier information on financial accounts is not preserved. Historical 
information on inactive firms is deleted from the database after five years of non-reporting. 
However, this time span can increase due to a time lag in the updating process of the data-
base. 
 
Figure 2-3: Development of ETR, Leverage and Profitability over Time 
 
Figure 2-3 is based on an Amadeus download from September 2011. It only considers unconsolidated account 
data for corporations. The effective tax rate (ETR) is calculated as tax expense divided by pre-tax income. Lev-
erage is calculated as total liabilities over total assets. Profitability is calculated as earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) over total assets. All variables are averaged over all companies and countries in the dataset.   
 
All three variables move on a fairly stable level and follow a constant trend over time almost 
without any noticeable ups and downs. The effective tax burdens with respect to European 
corporations move between 27.6 % in 1996 and 32.7 % in 2010. The steady decline in the 
average statutory corporate tax rate for European companies over the last twenty years is not 
reflected as the reduction in tax rates has usually been accompanied by a broadening of the 
                                                 
4
 Overview of countries covered by the Amadeus Database: Albania, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Rep. of Macedonia, Malta, Rep. 
of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Ser-
bia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom. 
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national tax bases.5 In addition, a large portion of the sample consists of U.K. companies that 
face a relatively large effective tax burden compared to other European firms. The average 
level of debt financing is about 64 % and corresponds to the average leverage documented in 
other studies using the Amadeus database.6 Any rapid changes in the average capital structure 
would not be expected as a firm’s composition of debt and equity is traditionally sticky and 
not instantly adjusted in the short-run. The average profitability remains between values of 
9.8 % and 14 % at a rather conservative level. The generally low volatility implies a constant 
and reliable data collection process. The limited preservation of historical data does not cause 
major inconsistencies within the database. Moreover, possible outliers or false reporting do 
not appear to drive the variables over time.  
 
The Orbis database is also provided by Bureau van Dijk and basically shares the same data 
attributes and data items as the Amadeus database. In contrast, the data coverage of the Orbis 
database is not limited to European companies but contains a worldwide sample of firms. It 
provides information on roughly 120 million worldwide companies including the U.S. and 
Asia. The database includes public and private firms, listed and unlisted companies, and also 
covers financial institutions. 
 
Figure 2-4: Development of Entry and Exit Rates over Time 
 
Figure 2-4 is based on an Orbis download from December 2013. Entry rate is defined as all newly founded cor-
porations over all existing corporations. Exit rate is defined as all newly inactive loss corporations divided by the 
sum of all active corporations.   
 
                                                 
5
 See “Taxation Trends in the European Union” 2014 edition by Eurostat for descriptive statistics on the devel-
opment of corporate tax rates. 
6
 Compare: Huizinga and Leaven (2008); Huizinga, Leaven and Nicodeme (2008). 
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In contrast to the Amadeus database, basic company information of inactive companies is 
permanently preserved in the database which ensures full historical coverage of all business 
activities. 
The level of firm entries and firm exits remains constant over time until 2007. The annual 
average entry rates revolve around an overall average of 8.8 % and are comparable to entry 
rates in the literature for similar time periods.7 The average exit rate is significantly below 
commonly found exit rates due to a data-related clearing process.8 The financial crisis in 
combination with certain data restrictions can be identified as a possible driver of the sudden 
decrease in firm entries and at the same time as an explanation for the steep rise in firm exits 
after 2007.9  
 
In general, firm-level information from all three Bureau van Dijk databases can be linked via 
a specific Bureau van Dijk company identification number (BvD ID Number). This code al-
lows the combination of M&A data, group structure information and financial accounting 
information across European and worldwide companies within the closed BvD system. Unfor-
tunately, some companies have been subject to BvD ID Number changes and the BvD ID 
Number is not applicable to other databases. These limitations considerably restrict the practi-
cal use of the identification code. 
 
Thomson Reuters’ Datastream is a global financial database covering equities, stock market 
indices, company financials, interest rates, exchange rates and economic data for 215 coun-
tries and 60 markets. The database provides current and historical time series data. Datastream 
is updated daily and historical equity information goes back to 1973. Datastream exclusively 
covers listed firms and maintains prices, returns, trading volumes, market capitalizations and 
dividend data for approximately 100,000 active companies and 103,000 inactive companies. 
Delisted firms are kept in the database and the last valid data point is constantly repeated. For 
the main developed markets Thomson Reuters claims full coverage of all traded equity securi-
ties by the Datastream database.  
 
 
                                                 
7
 Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011); Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006). 
8
 OECD Entrepreneurship at a Glance Report 2013. 
9
 The database is continuously updated but observations in recent years tend to be underrepresented for some 
time until the new data is added to the database. As a consequence, new firms are not recorded yet and the small-
er number of overall observations in later periods magnifies the increase in exit rates at the end of the sample 
period. 
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The CRSP database provides security-level data on current and historical prices, market capi-
talizations, outstanding shares and trading volumes of more than 29,000 companies traded on 
the NYSE, the NYSE Arca, the NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX) or the NASDAQ. Time series 
data goes partly back to 1925 for monthly and daily stock data depending on the stock ex-
change.10 CRSP includes information on actively traded and currently inactive shares. 
 
Figure 2-5: Average Annual Returns for the U.S. and the other OECD Countries 
 
Figure 2-5 is based on a CRSP download from September 2014 and a Datastream download from March 2014. 
The CRSP returns are the annual averages of the average monthly returns for all U.S. companies. The 
Datastream returns are the annual averages of the average monthly returns for all OECD companies excluding 
the U.S. and including Hong Kong.  
 
Figure 2-5 depicts the evolvement of the average annual stock returns of U.S. companies and 
other OECD companies over time. Both average return rates follow the same global market 
trends. Despite the two different data sources the final return data shows parallel trends over 
almost the entire sample period. The Figure clearly shows the latest major stock market 
crashes: The early 1990s recession, the burst of the internet bubble in 2002 and the financial 
crisis in 2008. Correspondingly, the following periods of recovery of the worldwide stock 
markets are also reflected in both datasets.  
 
To confirm the validity of my return data I compare the trajectories of both return trends to 
the development of three representative world stock indexes. The average annual stock returns 
of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index, the Euro Stoxx 50 Index and the Nikkei 225 In-
dex in comparison to my return data are shown in Figure 2-6 and Figure 2-7. I can find the 
same global market movements in all three major stock return indexes. However, my compa-
ny based stock returns show more volatility and more extreme peaks and low points than the 
                                                 
10
 Information on securities traded on the NYSE goes back as far as December 1925. NYSE MKT coverage 
begins in July 1962. NYSE Arca daily and monthly data begins in March 2006 and NASDAQ data goes back as 
early as December 1972.  
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respective indexes. Those differences in fluctuations are mainly driven by the different sets of 
companies used to calculate the stock return averages. The self-constructed datasets most like-
ly contain a larger number of smaller companies that are active in more volatile markets or 
more risky industries with a higher degree of fluctuation in their stock returns relative to the 
hand-picked sample of companies represented by the three indexes. 
 
Nevertheless, the different indexes broadly follow the same trends as the microlevel-based 
return data. Overall, the two datasets seem to be reliable samples of international stock price 
changes over time. 
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Figure 2-6 is based on a CRSP download from September 2014 and monthly price data of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Return Index from Datastream.  
Monthly returns are averaged on an annual basis.   
 
Figure 2-7 is based on a Datastream download from March 2014 and monthly price data of the Euro Stoxx 50 Index and the Nikkei 225 Index from Datastream.  
Monthly returns are averaged on an annual basis.   
Figure 2-6: Average Annual Returns for the U.S. and Dow Jones Industrial 
Figure 2-7: Average Annual Returns for the OECD, Euro Stoxx 50 and Nikkei 225 
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3 Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a chronologically as well as systematically structured overview of pre-
vious empirical tax research in all the different fields that the three papers touch upon.  
The literature review covers the areas of taxes and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) in gen-
eral, the acquisition of tax loss-carrying targets, and the effects of capital gains taxes on stock 
prices.  
Its purpose is twofold. First, it presents and categorizes a number of selected empirical studies 
that all have substantially contributed to the academic discussion on the interaction of taxes 
with investment decisions and asset prices. It outlines the development in these different areas 
from the first walking attempts of empirical tax research to the current state of the literature 
today. This overview does not simply recite an exhaustive list of earlier empirical studies but 
rather introduces the essential corner stones of quantitative tax research.      
Secondly, it briefly describes how the three papers fit into the different strands of literature 
and what their individual contributions are.  
3.1 Taxes and M&A Activities 
 
In general, mergers and acquisitions (M&A) lead to a reallocation of ownership and control 
rights over companies. However, market frictions such as taxes, agency problems or infor-
mation asymmetries may affect or even distort an economically desirable change in control. 
The empirical literature on the effects of taxes on M&A activities is well established and for 
the purpose of this doctorial thesis can be broadly divided into three different categories. First, 
taxes are viewed as determinants of the magnitude and the direction of M&As. Thus, they not 
only influence the location of the target but also affect the choice of the acquirer. Second, 
taxes affect acquisition premiums and at the same time have implications for the value crea-
tion through company reorganizations. Third, certain attributes of a tax system might enhance 
M&A tax planning activities. In addition, acquisitions themselves can create new tax planning 
opportunities through artificial deal structures or specific deal types.   
This conceptual overview of empirical research covers national transactions as well as inter-
national M&As as one form of business investments but does not focus on the impact of taxa-
tion on foreign direct investments (FDI) in general.11 
                                                 
11
 By definition FDI consist of international mergers and acquisitions, green field investments, retained earnings 
by foreign subsidiaries and loans granted from domestic parent companies to their foreign subsidiaries. Feld and 
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3.1.1 Taxation as a Determinant of M&A 
 
Early empirical work on the impact of taxation on the acquisition decision solely concentrates 
on potential tax benefits associated with acquiring a target company and provides rather 
mixed evidence for tax savings being motives underlying an acquisition.12  Auerbach and 
Reishus (1987, 1988a) provide first insights into the role of taxes for M&As. Their descriptive 
analyses find tax benefits in about 20 percent of all acquisitions in their samples.13 Their find-
ings do not indicate that potential tax savings drive the acquisition decision. Consequently, 
they draw the conclusion that their results cannot be interpreted as unambiguous evidence of 
the importance of taxes for M&As in general. In a third study, Auerbach and Reishus (1988b) 
compare tax benefits of U.S. mergers with the counterfactual benefits of non-taken place 
“pseudomergers”. Again they only find mixed evidence of the relevance of taxes for the mer-
ger decision. In all their studies Auerbach and Reishus strictly distinguish between either tar-
get-based or acquirer-based tax effects and restrict their samples to purely national transac-
tions. These first empirical studies do not allow comprehensive causal inferences but serve as 
starting point for subsequent research.  
 
Scholes and Wolfson (1990) decisively extend prior empirical literature by including the in-
terplay of domestic taxation and foreign tax systems in their analysis of international reorgan-
izations. They present evidence that the increase in the U.S. effective tax burden caused by 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) induced acquisitions by investors from worldwide tax 
regimes.14 Thus, investors from credit countries benefit from a competitive advantage relative 
to U.S. or territorial investors. As a consequence, later studies broaden the scope of their in-
quiries and examine the determinants of cross-border M&As including a wide variety of do-
mestic and international tax-related aspects.15  
 
An important strand of this literature focuses on the influence of the investor’s home country 
tax system. Collins, Kemsley and Shackelford (1995) challenge Scholes and Wolfson’s 
                                                                                                                                                        
Heckemeyer (2011), de Mooij and Ederveen (2003) and de Mooij and Ederveen (2008) provide comprehensive 
surveys of the literature on the impact of taxation on FDI.  
12
 The academic discussion of tax motivations of mergers and acquisitions can be traced back to Lintner (1971) 
Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Gilson, Scholes and Wolfson (1987). 
13
 Auerbach and Reishus (1987, 1988a) focus on three types of potential tax benefits: increased utilization of tax 
losses and tax credits, increased depreciation deductions and increased interest deductions. 
14
 In his pioneering work, Hartman (1984) already describes the influence of international taxation on FDI.  
15
 Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012) and Rossi and Volpin (2004) provide comprehensive overviews of non-tax 
determinants of international mergers and acquisitions.  
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(1990) conclusions and test if the necessary conditions for their “tax-hypothesis” are valid. 
They do not find supporting empirical evidence that differences between investors from 
worldwide tax regimes and from territorial countries explain the surge of M&A activities in 
the U.S. after the TRA 86.  
 
Di Giovani (2005) considers the effect of target host country taxes. In his gravity model of 
international M&A flows he explicitly controls for the existence of bilateral tax treaties and 
other common variables between target and acquirer country.16 He finds that the existence of 
such tax treaties increases M&A activities which he primarily attributes to the elimination of 
international double taxation as impediment to cross-border M&As.   
 
Herger, Kotsogiannis and MacCorriston (2011) consider the combined effect of target host 
country taxation and the U.S. credit system on U.S. outbound acquisitions. Their results sug-
gest that accounting for international aspects such as foreign tax credits and international 
double taxation reduces the adverse effect of high foreign tax rates on U.S. outbound acquisi-
tions. 
 
Arulampalam, Devereux and Liberini (2012) also take into account the acquirer’s home coun-
try tax system and pay particular attention to the role of corporate tax rates in the target coun-
try. Their findings generally suggest a negative relation between a country’s corporate tax rate 
and its likelihood of hosting acquisition targets. But according to their results the magnitude 
of this negative impact of corporate tax rates varies with deal type, the tax system and struc-
tural characteristics of the acquirer.  
 
Feld, Ruf, Scheuering, Schreiber and Voget (2013) examine how a tax credit system through 
additional repatriation taxes potentially impedes international acquisitions. They use the Japa-
nese and U.K. tax reforms as natural experiments to show that worldwide tax systems lead to 
a competitive disadvantage in acquiring a foreign firm.17 
   
Other studies explicitly consider the different components of FDI. Swenson (2000) disaggre-
gates overall FDI activities and shows that higher U.S. state taxes exert a more adverse effect 
                                                 
16
 Gravity models are regularly used in economics to analyze bilateral trade statistics. Its implications are based 
on the simple intuition that trade flows between two countries should be inversely related to the distance between 
the two countries and other common variables.  
17
 See Musgrave (1969), Desai and Hines (2003) and Becker and Fuest (2010) for the theoretical background on 
the discussion of international tax systems and their efficiency implications.  
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on greenfield investments than on M&A activities. But this effect exists for both territorial 
and residential investors. Hebous, Ruf and Weichenrieder (2011) use German firm level data 
and also find (from the perspective of a territorial country) that greenfield investments re-
spond more sensitively to higher taxes than acquisitions. 
 
The combined results of these empirical studies strongly suggest that tax considerations play a 
major role in the acquisition process and that higher taxes impede possible transactions. It 
becomes obvious that the analysis of taxes as a determinant of firm acquisitions should not 
only consider national tax consequences but also take into account the interaction of domestic 
and foreign tax rules. 
3.1.2 Taxes and M&A Pricing 
 
As part of the acquisition process, the buying side and the selling side both consider all value-
reducing and value-enhancing elements of a deal including the effect of taxes. Therefore, po-
tential tax costs as well as tax benefits should be reflected in the acquisition price. Empirical 
studies attempt to detect those tax-related pricing implications.  
 
Henning, Shaw and Stock (2000) examine the impact of deal-related tax liabilities generated 
from different types of taxable acquisitions, imposed either on the acquirer or the target and 
its shareholders. Their findings suggest that additional taxes lead to higher purchase prices 
consistent with the acquirer bearing the tax costs of an acquisition. Thus, higher prices can 
include a compensation for target shareholders’ additional tax burden but do not reflect higher 
tax costs imposed on the acquirer.  
In a tax planning model Erickson and Wang (2007) demonstrate that the acquisition of an S 
corporation is ideally completed using a step-up in the target’s tax basis. In order to benefit 
from the additional tax savings an acquirer is willing to compensate the target firm’s share-
holders for their cooperation in the acquisition process through a higher purchase price. A 
comparable tax structure would not be beneficial in case of a C corporation because the in-
cremental tax costs of a step-up would exceed the potential tax savings. In line with these the-
oretical deal structures their empirical analysis shows supporting evidence of S corporations 
gaining a tax-driven acquisition price premium relative to comparable C corporations. 
From the target shareholder’s perspective Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) compare 
the acquisition premiums of taxable cash-for-stock acquisitions to those of tax-free stock-for-
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stock acquisitions across time. They find capital gains taxes to increase the cost of acquisi-
tions as shareholders require compensation for giving up the option to defer capital gains tax-
es.18   
In sum, the results of all these studies imply that the tax incidence of a deal remains at the 
acquirer level.  
  
Huizinga, Voget and Wagner (2012) use international M&A deals to estimate the effect of 
international taxation on bid-premiums and on acquiring-firm excess stock returns to deter-
mine who finally carries the weight of the additional tax layer. In contrast to the above stud-
ies, they find that takeover bid-premiums are adjusted downwards reflecting a complete capi-
talization of the increased tax burden whereas excess returns remain unchanged. Consequent-
ly, target-firm shareholders bear the entire burden of the increased tax costs. 
 
Further studies analyze if and how taxes contribute to M&A value creation. Those wealth 
gains through potential tax benefits should also be reflected in acquisition prices.   
 
Kaplan (1989) examines the importance of tax benefits as part of the overall wealth gain in 
management buy outs. He shows that non-debt tax shields such as higher depreciation deduc-
tions and tax benefits from employee stock option plans represent a substantial portion of the 
acquisition premiums.  
In contrast, Devos, Kadapakkam and Krishnamurthy (2009) test if financial synergies in the 
form of interest tax shields are part of an overall gain to stockholders from mergers. They 
conclude that tax savings due to interest deductibility cannot be seen as a major source of 
merger gains relative to enhanced production efficiency or increased market power.  
 
Latest research examines the link between wealth gains from M&As and tax planning activi-
ties. Chow, Klassen and Liu (2013) test how an acquirer’s tax aggressiveness relative to the 
target’s tax aggressiveness may be a driver of value creation in M&As. They show that tax-
related acquisition gains vary depending on the different levels of tax aggressive behavior 
between the acquirer and the target. Col and Errunza (2014) explore the valuation conse-
quences of presumably tax motivated acquisitions. They measure announcement period re-
turns of acquirers of tax haven targets to evaluate the market reactions to assumed future tax 
                                                 
18
 This relationship between the mode of acquisition and capital gains taxes has already been pointed out by 
Brown and Ryngaert (1991). 
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avoidance strategies. They find that acquirers of tax haven targets have lower returns relative 
to acquirers of non-tax havens targets which they attribute to potential agency costs and tax-
payer backlash.  
 
As a result, taxes seem to be a value-relevant factor in the pricing process of M&As. They 
affect prices on the demand-side and the supply-side. Several studies confirm that taxes as a 
cost factor matter for M&A pricing. Whereas the question of how the overall tax burden of an 
acquisition is shared among the deal participants cannot be unambiguously answered. In addi-
tion, studies that test if tax benefits are also part of the aggregate wealth gain in an acquisition 
show only mixed evidence. 
3.1.3 M&A Tax Planning 
 
Real world M&A patterns suggest that tax planning may directly influence mergers and ac-
quisitions and that company reorganizations are used to take advantage of tax saving strate-
gies. 
 
The relevance of tax planning considerations in deciding on the deal type and on the financing 
method is analyzed by Erickson (1998). He combines various tax characteristics of the ac-
quirer firm and the target firm to test their impact on the transaction structure and financing 
method. Consistent with predicted tax incentives at the acquirer level, he finds that high-tax 
acquirers are more likely to choose debt-financed cash-deals in comparison to tax-free stock-
deals. Whereas target’s tax attributes turn out to be negligible. Dhaliwal, Newberry and 
Weaver (2005) also test for the acquirer’s financing method but in addition control for inter-
nal funding. Their results suggest that debt-financing increases in the marginal tax benefits 
received from borrowings. Scheuering (2013) extends previous studies by explicitly examin-
ing cross-border European acquisitions. His results suggest that the probability of a debt fi-
nanced deal increases in the acquirer’s home country tax rate.   
 
Given the above results, empirical evidence indicates that tax incentives affect an acquirer’s 
preferred acquisition structure and the financing choice.  
 
In addition, acquisitions can be viewed as another vehicle that increases tax planning oppor-
tunities. Huizinga and Voget (2009) provide empirical evidence that the organizational form 
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of cross-border mergers is chosen to minimize the repatriation tax burden of dividends. They 
consider withholding taxes on dividends and the tax system of the home country to show that 
countries that impose a higher tax burden on distributed profits are less likely to become the 
host country of the parent company of the newly created multinational firm.  
  
Several papers deal with the related issue of corporate inversions. An inversion describes the 
expatriation of a company’s headquarter in order to move its legal domicile to a foreign coun-
try for tax purposes. Empirical studies provide evidence that this special case of an interna-
tional acquisition is mainly tax driven. Desai and Hines (2002) show that U.S. inverting firms 
face relatively low foreign tax rates which corresponds to the desire to avoid additional taxes 
on repatriated income due to the U.S. worldwide tax system. Furthermore, they identify capi-
tal gains taxes at the level of the shareholders as possible counterbalance to the perceived tax 
benefits and find that capital gains realizations are taken into account in the inversion deci-
sion.  
 
Seida and Wempe (2004) suggest that the elimination of U.S. taxes on U.S. earnings is a more 
important source of U.S. inversions relative to the elimination of U.S. taxes on foreign in-
come. They find that U.S. inversions generally result in considerable reductions in the ETR 
and attribute those tax savings to stripping of U.S. earnings via intercompany debt. In their 
study of market reactions to inversion announcements Cloyd, Mills and Weaver (2003) do not 
find any empirical evidence that suggests price increases in response to planned inversions. 
Their results imply that the market does not perceive future tax benefits to outweigh potential 
tax cost and non-tax costs associated with these transactions.19 
 
Voget (2011) extends the prior literature by testing an international sample of headquarter 
relocations. His results show that specific tax attributes such as the existence of a CFC rule or 
the type of tax system influence a company’s likelihood to relocate its headquarter.  
 
In sum, it can be concluded that empirical research shows that tax characteristics of the ac-
quirer can affect deal structure and deal financing in order to minimize the overall tax burden. 
Differences between worldwide and territorial systems and other attributes of international tax 
                                                 
19
 All three U.S. studies face a paucity of data. Seida and Wempe (2004) use a set of 12 corporate inversions, 
Desai and Hines (2002) identify 26 corporate inversions and Cloyd, Mills and Weaver (2003) establish a dataset 
of 20 inversions. This lack of sufficient data and the limited focus of those studies make it difficult to draw uni-
versal conclusions with respect to the effect of taxes on firm relocations. 
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systems have been shown to lead to artificial acquisition structures that predominantly aim at 
reducing or avoiding taxes on repatriated profits. At the same time, (international) company 
reorganizations seem to facilitate new tax planning opportunities.  
 
The study “Tax Avoidance as a Driver of Mergers and Acquisitions?” is primarily a contribu-
tion to empirical tax research on tax planning. I identify and test three specific tax planning 
channels at the level of the target. Different types of acquisitions are used as external events to 
test if an ownership change causes the targets’ effective tax burden to decrease.20  
I also add to the literature on determinants of M&A activities. My results suggest that an ac-
quirer’s ability to effectively apply tax planning strategies at the level of the target can be un-
derstood as a potential driver of acquisitions.  
In addition, I provide a possible explanation for how acquisitions can lead to an overall gain 
in value through effective tax planning. Furthermore, acquirers’ varying ability to reduce the 
potential target’s tax burden should also be reflected in negotiations and the price building 
process. 
3.2 M&A and Tax Loss Carry-Forwards 
 
The acquisition of unutilized tax shields in the form of tax loss carry-forwards can be seen as 
one of the most frequently discussed tax synergies of a business combination.  
 
In this respect, empirical research considers the utilization of tax losses as one factor that 
could motivate an acquisition. In a series of studies Auerbach and Reishus (1987, 1988a, 
1988b) analyze if tax benefits through the increased use of tax losses are possible drivers of 
acquisitions. Their overall findings suggest that tax losses may not be an important factor in 
the acquisition decision relative to other tax related factors.    
 
However, most empirical papers concentrate on the value implications of tax loss carry-
forwards. These studies either examine the meaning of tax losses for target prices from the 
market perspective or investigate the valuation of a target’s tax loss carry-forward from the 
participating firms’ perspectives.  
                                                 
20
 In a related study, Blouin, Collins and Shackelford (2005) using a dataset of actual U.S. corporate tax returns 
test if the domicile of an acquirer has a direct impact on the post-acquisition taxable income of its target. They 
find no evidence that the taxable income of a target of a foreign acquisition declines more compared to the taxa-
ble income of a target of a purely domestic transaction. 
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With respect to market pricing, there have been several event studies of stock returns around 
the announcement of a pending acquisition that provide partly conflicting results. Haw, 
Pastena and Lilien (1987) show that the cumulative abnormal returns around the acquisition 
announcement of financially distressed firms with a tax loss carry-forward exceed the acquisi-
tion premiums for firms without a tax loss carry-forward. They interpret their results as em-
pirical evidence of an excess premium for future tax savings. For tax-free acquisitions Hayn 
(1989) also finds that potential tax benefits stemming from unused tax losses positively affect 
the abnormal returns of the acquiring company and the target company during the announce-
ment period.  
Plummer and Robinson (1990) directly compare firms carrying a tax loss with firms not hav-
ing any loss carry-forwards and do not find a significant difference in announcement period 
returns. Furthermore, Crawford and Lechner (1996) apply a two stage model to disentangle a 
direct and an anticipated effect of the target’s tax attributes on the acquisition premium. They 
find a negative association between a loss carry-forward and the premium.21 
 
Comparable to the conclusions drawn from a market perspective, the findings based on partic-
ipating firms’ perspectives reveal similarly inconsistent empirical evidence. On the one hand 
Henning, Shaw and Stock (2000) use actual purchase prices to determine how the acquirer 
compensates target shareholders for the potential use of a target’s tax loss. They conclude that 
there is only little evidence that an acquirer pays for the value of a loss carry-forward. Chiang, 
Stammerjohan and Englebrecht (2014) confirm the findings by Henning, Shaw and Stock 
(2000) to some extent as they do not find acquirers to assign a particular value to a target’s tax 
loss carry-forward. However, they demonstrate that an acquirer is willing to pay more for a 
tax loss that could be used in the near future than for a tax loss that is only usable in the long-
run.   
 
Despite the broad range of literature on the valuation of loss carry-forwards in M&A activities 
the price implications of a limitation to loss transfers have been mostly neglected. Among the 
previously introduced papers only the studies by Plummer and Robinson (1990) and Chiang, 
Stammerjohan and Englebrecht (2014) indirectly consider the pricing effect of a restriction to 
the transfer of tax losses through acquisitions. The event study by Moore and Pruitt (1987) 
                                                 
21
 By dividing the estimated effect, Crawford and Lechner (1996) take into account the probability of a target 
being subject to an acquisition. If the market anticipates the announcement of an acquisition, it already impounds 
the value of a loss carry-forward in the pre-announcement price. Consequently, as the likelihood of a take-over 
increases the eventual response of the price in the announcement period becomes less pronounced.   
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directly tests for the value-relevance of a limitation to loss transfers. They present two key 
finding: First, in line with parts of the aforementioned literature they show that tax losses rep-
resent a portion of a loss firm’s market value. Second, the tightening of the U.S. anti-loss 
transfer legislation (Section 382 IRC) during the Tax Reform Act 1976 significantly reduced 
the present value of loss firms.22  
 
Possible other economically relevant consequences of limitations to the transfer of tax loss-
carry-forwards have not been subject to serious empirical research yet. 
 
With my paper “Restricted Tax Loss Transfer and Business Cycle Effects” I intend to fill that 
void. I examine the impact of “anti-loss trafficking” restrictions on the entry and exit behavior 
of firms by combining investors’ risk considerations with the value-implications of a restrict-
ed utilization of tax losses.  
First, I test for the effectiveness of those limitations before I study their economic conse-
quences for investments. I examine if the introduction of a limited transfer of tax losses dis-
courages firm entries and at the same time accelerates market exits of loss firms by devaluing 
loss carry-forwards.  
The paper is the first study that directly examines how loss trafficking restrictions affect the 
frequency of deals involving loss-carrying targets. Thereby, it contributes to the broad litera-
ture on mergers and acquisitions in general and to research on the value relevance of tax loss 
compensation rules in particular. 
The paper also adds to current research on investment incentives and how tax loss legislation 
directly or indirectly impacts on investment behavior.23  
Moreover, the paper extends the scope of the current literature on firm exits by considering 
tradable tax losses as valuable assets that may help to defer or even avoid firm terminations.    
 
 
                                                 
22
 Moore and Pruitt (1987) present early empirical indications of the meaning of loss limitation rules which is 
supported by anecdotal evidence. Examples of actual business transactions underline the importance of these 
rules in the pricing process. The unexpected lifting of some of the loss limitation rules for financial institutions 
in the U.S. after the financial crisis in 2008 lead Wells Fargo as the eventual acquirer of Wachovia to offer a 
much higher price than the previously announced price by Citigroup. See Crowell Moring Financial Services 
Alert dated October 6, 2008 “Tax Notice Drives Wachovia Takeover Turmoil”.    
23
 Empirical literature dealing with the impact of tax loss treatment on investment behavior is still rare. See 
Dreßler and Oversch (2013) and Edgerton (2010) as examples of empirical research.   
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3.3 Capital Gains Taxation 
 
Capital gains taxation influences investor behavior as individuals rationally respond to tax 
provisions in order to minimize the tax burden of investment income.24 Taxes on capital gains 
decisively influence investors’ trading strategies and eventually affect stock prices. The over-
all effect of capital gains taxation on share prices can be broadly divided into a supply-side 
effect and a demand-side effect.  
 
On the supply-side, shareholders of appreciated shares must decide to either hold on to their 
shares and postpone taxation until realization or to sell the shares and trigger the taxation of 
embedded gains.25 From this perspective, capital gains taxes are viewed as transaction costs 
that impose a disincentive to sell a stock. Consequently, shareholders require a higher price to 
sell the assets. This effect of capital gains taxes on the supply-side is referred to as the “lock-
in effect”. It implies that a cut in current capital gains tax rates will lead to a corresponding 
decline in share prices. 
 
On the demand-side, buyers of shares demand a lower price as an indirect compensation for 
anticipated taxes on future gains from selling the acquired shares. This impact is referred to as 
the “capitalization effect” since future tax costs are considered in the bidder’s current price. 
Thus, the “capitalization effect” predicts that share prices will rise when expected future capi-
tal gains taxes are reduced.  
 
The net effect of the “lock-in effect” and the “capitalization effect” on asset prices is ambigu-
ous as both effects operate in opposing directions. But it is important to note that both effects 
are characterized by a timing difference. While the “capitalization effect” refers to an antici-
pated future tax burden, the “lock-in effect” is based on the realization of current capital 
gains.     
 
 
                                                 
24
 The following overview only focuses on capital gains with respect to stocks. I do not cover the literature on 
the taxation of capital gains of other types of property. Moreover, I also neglect possible effects on the trading 
volume of shares. 
25
 There is also a third option: Avoiding paying capital gains taxes at all. This can be achieved either through 
death, donation to charity, setting off capital gains with capital losses or benefiting from a tax free roll-over of 
capital gains from the sale of qualified stocks. 
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3.3.1 Capitalization effect 
 
Empirical evidence of how the “capitalization effect” influences stock prices is still scarce. 
One of the main problems of empirical research regarding the distortionary effect of capital 
gains taxes is the determination of the taxable base. Guenther and Willenborg (1999) take 
advantage of information provided in the course of an initial public offering (IPO) in order to 
examine stock price changes after a U.S. tax law amendment in 1993. They show that U.S. 
IPO issue prices of small business stocks that qualify for the newly introduced preferential 
capital gains tax treatment are relatively higher than stock prices of a “tax-neutral” compari-
son group. The result implies that companies can directly benefit from a decrease in capital 
gains tax rates through lower costs of capital.26  
 
Lang and Shackelford (2000) apply a capital market event study around the U.S. capital gains 
tax cut in 1997 to assess the impact of capital gains taxes on U.S. stock prices. Their analysis 
is the first study to control for the value-relevance of capital gains taxes by including the divi-
dend-yield. Companies with a higher dividend-yield leave less taxable base to the reduced tax 
rate and therefore should be less affected. Consistent with a reduced impact on share prices, 
they show for the week of the budget accord that mean returns for non-dividend paying firms 
significantly exceed mean-returns for dividend-paying firms, which corresponds to a “capital-
ization effect” of an expected decrease in capital gains taxes.  
 
Sialm (2009) investigates the relation between equity prices and the aggregated effective tax 
burden of investment income including capital gains taxes and dividend taxes for the U.S. 
stock market. Over the period 1913 to 2006 he documents a statistically significant capitaliza-
tion of effective tax rates in stock valuation.  
 
Huizinga, Voget and Wagner (2013) study the impact of capital gains taxes on takeover prices 
in cross-border M&As. They show that acquirers in countries with a higher capital gains tax 
rate tend to pay lower acquisition prices. They estimate that acquirer capital gains taxes lead 
to a reduction in target prices of approximately 5 %. There results suggest a capitalization of 
future capital gains taxes in equity prices.   
 
                                                 
26
 The downside of this approach is that papers taking advantage of IPOs are difficult to generalize because IPOs 
are very unique settings to investigate. Compare Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) for reasons why a gener-
alization of such results is not possible. 
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3.3.2 Lock-in effect 
 
Research on the supply-side “lock-in effect” seems to be more developed. Theoretical models 
as well as empirical research draw a clearer picture of how sellers’ considerations of capital 
gains taxes affect trading behavior and assets prices.  
           
Feldstein, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1980) document in a pure cross-sectional analysis for the 
year 1973 that the likelihood of stock sales decreases in the capital gains tax burden. Similar-
ly, Landsman and Shackelford (1995) use the RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout as case study to 
show that shareholders with a lower stock basis and thus with higher potential capital gains 
tender their shares later at a higher price.  
 
Later studies apply more advanced research settings by specifically exploring differences be-
tween short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates, by taking into account the personal 
capital gains tax liabilities and by including capital losses in their analyses.  
 
Reese (1998) is among the first studies that documents that differences between long-term 
and short-term classifications of assets can affect share prices and trading volume. He finds 
that the group of IPO stocks that appreciated prior to long-term qualification experience a 
significant reduction in returns and a clear increase in trading volume after the long-term 
qualification date. These findings are consistent with initially boosted share prices by higher 
short-term capital gains tax rates that defer the realization of capital gains and a following 
surge in selling pressure at the lower long-term rate.  
 
Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) develop a three period model in which the difference be-
tween short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates (“intertemporal tax discontinuity”) 
forces investors to choose between an optimal tax strategy and an optimal risk strategy. Intui-
tively, investors can either reduce the overweight position in an appreciated stock today and 
pay the higher short-term capital gains tax or delay the sale and pay the lower long-term capi-
tal gains tax at a later point in time. They show that holding period incentives constrain the 
supply of equity and induce price pressure in the market. They explicitly exclude capital loss-
es from their model. 
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Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) build on the work by Shackelford and Verrecchia 
(2002) and show that the described price and volume movements for appreciated stocks can 
be detected empirically. They examine share prices and trading volume around quarterly earn-
ings announcements and additions to the S&P 500 as independent events that provide new 
information to the market and that are generally associated with substantial portfolio rebalanc-
ing. They find an increase in prices and a corresponding decline in trading volume. The re-
duction of the trading volume is understood as a “seller’s strike” by holders of appreciated 
stocks. They do not find any evidence of accelerating the sale of depreciated stocks though.  
 
The studies by Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) and Jin (2006) consider the personal 
capital gains tax liability of company owners and investors to identify possible price reactions 
to locked-in capital gains. Comparable to the dividend-yield as an indirect measure of the 
magnitude of the “lock-in effect” on share prices, Ayers, Lefanowicz and Robinson (2003) 
take into account the ownership structure of a target. They include the level of institutional 
ownership of an acquisition target to more precisely capture any tax-driven price pressure. 
They present empirical evidence for a positive association between capital gains taxes and 
acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. This relation is weaker for targets that are more 
heavily owned by tax-exempt institutions.   
Jin (2006) uses information on institutions’ client bases to construct treatment and control 
groups. He expects especially institutions that serve primarily tax-sensitive clients to exhibit 
tax-sensitive selling behavior.27 He finds evidence for tax related underselling of appreciated 
stocks by institutions that predominantly serve tax-sensitive clients. For tax-insensitive inves-
tors he cannot identify a comparable effect. 
 
The only attempt so far to reconcile the supply-side “lock-in effect” with the opposing de-
mand-side “capitalization effect” is the study by Dai, Maydew, Shackelford and Zhang 
(2008). They find evidence of both a “capitalization effect” and a “lock-in effect”. In an event 
study based on the U.S. tax reform in 1997 it can be shown that in the week before the effec-
tive capital gains tax rate cut the “capitalization effect” dominates the “lock-in effect” as in-
vestors already anticipate the future tax benefits and drive up stock returns. In contrast, in the 
week after the rate reduction, the “lock-in effect” outweighs the “capitalization effect” as 
sellers with embedded capital gains are more likely to sell shares and simultaneously depress 
stock returns.  
                                                 
27
 Compare Jin (2006, p. 1403 to 1406) for further insights on the classification procedure.  
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They conclude that both effects coexist and vary with respect to the timing around a capital 
gains tax change. Beyond the scope of the aforementioned literature, there are several papers 
that examine the link between capital gains taxes and financial market anomalies.  
 
Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) examine if tax-motivated year-end security sales can be an 
explanation for the turn-of-the-year effect.28 Intuitively, investors have an incentive to realize 
capital losses before year-end to ensure the realization of tax benefits in the current tax year 
and to take advantage of a higher short-term capital gains tax rate. After the turn of the year 
the selling pressure abates and prices start rising again. They explore the difference between 
long-term and short-term capital gains tax rates across three different U.S. tax regimes from 
1963 to 1996.29 Their results suggest that tax-loss selling also contributes to the turn-of-the-
year return anomaly. 
 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) examine changes in the maximum short-term capital gains 
tax rate across different U.S. tax regimes to analyze December and January returns. Their 
findings also point to year-end tax-loss selling as a potential explanation for the relation be-
tween past and future returns.         
  
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004) use a dataset on all stock trades and stock holdings of all Fin-
ish households and institutions to analyze the patterns of selling and repurchase of stocks 
around the end of the year. They argue that tax-motivated year-end selling of loss shares 
should be associated with a disproportionally large number of wash sales at the end of the 
year.30 Their empirical results show that Finnish investors realize a relatively large portion of 
their embedded capital losses at the end of the calendar year. In addition, they observe many 
immediate repurchases of the same stocks by these investors in December. In contrast to other 
studies, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004) provide a direct link between return patterns and in-
vestor behavior while explicitly controlling for window dressing as an alternative explana-
tions. 
                                                 
28
 The turn-of-the-year effect (also called “January effect”) refers to the phenomenon of (depreciated) stocks 
trading at lower prices at the end of the calendar year followed by rising prices and abnormally high returns in 
January.   
29
 Their identification strategy is based on the theoretical work by Constantinides (1983, 1984) who derives ex-
plicit trading strategies to optimally realize capital losses. In his timing option model he shows that in the pres-
ence of a short-term capital gains tax rate that exceeds the long-term capital gains tax rate, it is optimal for an 
investor to realize the loss as short-term and realize gains as long-term.   
30
 The term „wash sales“ refers to sales with the intention to repurchase in the immediate future. The Finish tax 
law does not contain an explicit wash sales restriction. Ritter (1988) first hypothesized that wash sales should be 
directly tied to tax-motivated sales.   
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Klein (1999, 2001, 2004) develops a general equilibrium model of asset pricing including 
capital gains taxes. He shows that capital gains taxes on appreciated stocks drive share prices 
up which eventually leads to lower expected returns. He argues that the “lock-in effect” can 
be viewed as a possible explanation for the long-term return reversal anomaly.31 George and 
Hwang (2007) use a U.S. panel to test this lock-in hypothesis against an alternative explana-
tion for long-term return reversal. They present empirical evidence that is in line with capital 
gains taxes being the driver of negatively serially correlated stock returns.  
 
The study “Capital Gains Taxes and Long-term Return Reversal: Evidence from Pole to 
Pole” examines the relationship between capital gains taxes and negative autocorrelation of 
stock returns in the long-run. In this respect, my study contributes to a growing literature in 
three ways:  
First, the study provides further (indirect) empirical evidence for increased share prices due to 
locked-in embedded capital gains.  
Second, the study builds on prior research analyzing capital gains tax rate differences and 
examining the effects of capital losses to find robust empirical evidence for tax-motivated 
trading strategies leading to unusual return patterns. 
Third, I test the theoretically predicted effect of capital gains taxes on stock price changes 
from a multinational perspective considering cross-country investment relations. Thereby, the 
paper goes beyond the scope of all single country analyses or former multinational studies on 
the link between capital gains taxes and stock return reversal.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31
 Long-term return reversal describes the negative autocorrelation of stock returns over a three to five years 
investment horizon.  
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Working Paper I 
 
4 Tax Avoidance as a Driver of Mergers and Acquisitions?32 
 
 
Abstract: Following a merger or acquisition, a target firm’s effective tax rate decreases on 
average by 3 percentage points. This decline is as high as 8 percentage points when the ac-
quiring firm is tax aggressive. Further, target firm profitability decreases, particularly in the 
case of targets having a higher statutory tax rate than the acquirer. These results point to ac-
quiring firms’ ability to more effectively lower target firms’ tax burdens after the deal takes 
place being a potential driver of the deal. On the contrary I do not find a change in target lev-
erage post deal. The latter finding I attribute to the existence of group taxation regimes in 
many countries, which makes it more efficient to use a highly levered holding company to 
acquire the target instead of altering the leverage of the target itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Tax accounting, mergers and acquisitions, tax management, propensity score 
matching 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: M41; G34; H25 
 
                                                 
32
 This paper is joint work with Prof. Dr. Martin Ruf (Tübingen University), Prof. Leslie Robinson Phd (Tuck 
School of Business at Dartmouth)  and Thomas Belz (Mannheim University). 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Mergers and acquisitions are an increasingly important form of business investment. The val-
ue of cross-border deals rose by 53 percent in 2011 to $526 billion, compared to cross-border 
Greenfield investment projects valued at $904 billion during that same year (UNCTAD 
2012). Thus, understanding the drivers of mergers and acquisitions is a key part of under-
standing the drivers of business investment in general. 
 
Mergers and acquisitions take place primarily because of ‘ownership advantages’. Ownership 
advantages arise when a change in ownership of the target firm is expected to provide a 
source of value creation, either by increasing the target’s expected future cash flows or de-
creasing risk. For instance, the acquirer may believe that it is able to manage the target better 
than the seller. Such ownership advantages are expected to improve future cash flows, ena-
bling the acquirer to outbid the reservation price of the initial owner and increase the likeli-
hood that the deal takes place. 
There are many possible sources of ownership advantages. While there is an extensive litera-
ture on the change in operating performance following mergers and acquisitions (see 
Martynova and Renneboog (2008) for a survey), the potential importance of tax management 
has been ignored. Lowering the target firm’s tax burden is one important way that an acquir-
ing firm can generate ownership advantages. The average firm-level effective tax rate in my 
sample is around 34 percent, suggesting governments lay claim to one third of pre-tax profits. 
If the acquirer believes it is able to minimize the target’s taxes more efficiently than the initial 
owner, it will expect to generate a higher after-tax cash flow. 
 
I investigate changes in the tax avoidance of targets in a sample of European mergers and 
acquisitions taking place between 1996 and 2009, using propensity score matching to estimate 
the average treatment effect. As a unique feature of my analysis I observe operating and fi-
nancial data of the ‘stand-alone’ target firm before and after the deal by using unconsolidated 
accounting data. Since I focus on European mergers and acquisitions the new tax basis of the 
corporation’s assets post-acquisition is identical to the tax basis of the corporation’s assets 
pre-acquisition. A step-up in the acquired assets is impossible and cannot bias my results. 
This is not true in the United States, since the Section 338 election allows to treat share deals 
as taxable asset purchases resulting in a step up. However, regulations comparable to Section 
338 are not available in any of the countries I consider in my sample.  
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Specifically, I compare three indicators of tax avoidance at the target – effective tax rate, prof-
itability, and leverage – before and after the deal. My results generally show that target tax 
avoidance improves, resulting in lower tax payments post deal. Thus, more efficient tax man-
agement by acquirers could be a driver of mergers and acquisitions.  
 
I first examine the potential role of acquirers in target tax avoidance following both national 
(acquirer and target are resident in the same country) and international (acquirer and target are 
resident in a different country) deals. The indicator of tax avoidance that I examine is the tar-
get firm’s (accounting) effective tax rate (ETR), or tax expense divided by pre-tax income. 
This measure reflects tax management that generates permanent book-tax differences in the 
target firm.33 I find an average decrease in a target’s ETR post-deal of 3 percentage points. 
Moreover, this decrease is especially pronounced – around 8 percentage points – following 
deals by tax aggressive acquirers having themselves a relatively low ETR. Thus, acquirers 
appear to play a significant role in determining the level of tax avoidance that a target under-
takes once it becomes part of the group. 
 
I also examine the potential role of acquirers in target tax avoidance that is only possible fol-
lowing international deals. While reductions in a target firm’s ETR imply more efficient tax 
management at the target firm by the acquirer, ownership advantages also arise if the target 
firm enjoys new opportunities to reduce its tax burden by being part of a multinational group. 
I examine two prominent international tax planning strategies – transfer pricing and debt 
shifting. Here, I do not focus on the target firm’s ETR because these strategies would not im-
pact such a measure.34  
 
To examine the use of transfer pricing, I investigate changes in target profitability. Consistent 
with Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Clark and Ofek (1994) I find a decrease in target 
profitability post deal in general. Splitting the sample between high tax and low tax targets 
(targets facing a higher or lower statutory tax rate than the acquirer, respectively), I find a 
decrease in profitability only in high tax targets. This result points to international tax plan-
ning (i.e., transfer pricing) by the acquirer contributing to the observed decrease in target prof-
itability following mergers and acquisitions. 
                                                 
33
 Permanent differences arise when a transaction affects taxable income but not book income, or vice versa. A 
favorable tax planning strategy would be one that lowers taxable income without lowering book income.  
34
 If a multinational firm uses transfer prices or debt shifting to re-allocate target profits to other members of the 
group, this affects both the target’s book and taxable income. While these strategies may impact the consolidated 
ETR of the multinational firm, they will not impact the individual target firm’s ETR. 
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To examine the use of debt shifting, I investigate changes in target leverage. While I do not 
find a significant change in target leverage post deal, I find empirical evidence consistent with 
use of ‘debt push-down’ strategies being the possible reason for this finding. In countries of-
fering group taxation, a promising tax strategy related to mergers and acquisitions is to load a 
holding company with debt in order to acquire the target. As a result, the leverage of the hold-
ing company increases, while the leverage of the target remains unchanged. Group taxation 
then allows for consolidation when computing taxable income such that the interest expense 
of the holding company offsets the earnings of the target (see Section 4.3.1 for further discus-
sion).35  
 
My study is related to three distinct strands of literature. First, there is a growing literature 
that considers the role of tax avoidance in mergers and acquisitions.36 Kaplan (1989) and 
Devos, Kadapakkam, and Krishnamurthy (2009) estimate the extent to which tax savings are 
responsible for merger gains. Blouin, Collins, and Shackelford (2005) examine changes in 
taxable income of U.S.-domiciled firms after being acquired by foreign firms. Martin, Wang, 
and Zou (2012) examine the link between target tax aggressiveness and acquisition premiums. 
Chow, Klassen, and Liu (2013) and Col and Errunza (2014) examine announcement returns 
of targets and acquirers to determine whether anticipated (future) tax avoidance is an underly-
ing source of merger gains. These last two studies are most closely related to mine, though 
neither study examines the precise channel through which tax avoidance occurs post-deal. My 
study documents increased tax avoidance of targets post deal with respect to the target’s ETR 
and international profit shifting.  
 
Second, there is extensive literature evaluating the operating performance following mergers 
and acquisitions as reviewed in Martynova and Renneboog (2008). The empirical evidence is 
mixed – 14 out of 26 studies report a post-merger decline in the operating returns of merged 
firms, 7 papers show insignificant changes in profitability and only 5 papers provide evidence 
of a significantly positive increase. Only two studies – Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and 
Clark and Ofek (1994) – focus on the post-merger operating performance of the target as I do. 
I find a decrease in target operating performance following takeovers (consistent with their 
results) and provide tax motivated transfer pricing as a partial explanation for this finding. 
                                                 
35
 See “Kastljós: Álverin koma sér hjá skattgreiðslum“ by Helgi Seljan, Icelandic National Television Commen-
tary, March 2013, for a discussion of this strategy in Iceland by large U.S. multinational firms. 
36
 There is also a literature that considers taxes as a source of value creation in mergers and acquisitions, howev-
er, it focuses on taxes at the transaction-level (e.g., Auerbach and Reishus, (1987); Erickson, (1998)). 
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Third, there is a large literature on tax planning, e.g. Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin (2010) 
with respect to ETRs, Desai, Foley, and Hines (2004) with respect to international debt shift-
ing and Huizinga and Laeven (2008) for international transfer pricing. I contribute to this lit-
erature by using mergers and acquisitions as a new setting in which to identify tax motivated 
international profit and debt shifting. 
 
My study points to the economic importance of tax avoidance as a driver of mergers and ac-
quisitions. Aside from improving a firm’s after-tax profit, effective tax management may be 
important for a firm looking to prevent a hostile takeover. Potential acquirers with more effi-
cient tax management may be able to competitively bid for target firms. My results also give 
rise to tax policy concerns. If some types of tax avoidance are only available to multinational 
groups (e.g., transfer pricing), then international acquirers may enjoy an exclusive ownership 
advantage with respect to national targets. As a result tax systems could force national firms 
in international takeovers. 
 
Section 2 develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and 
the data. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
4.2 Tax avoidance as a driver of mergers and acquisitions 
 
The initial owner of a firm will sell the firm if the offer price exceeds his reservation price 
(see Hansen 1987). The initial owner’s reservation price is equal to the capitalized earnings 
value    of the expected cash   from keeping the firm, where   is the discount rate. The ex-
pected cash    of a potential acquirer may differ due to non-tax reasons (e.g. synergies, see 
Weston et al. (2004), p. 130, for potential non-tax reasons for such differences) or due to tax 
reasons. Regardless of the reasons, if a potential acquirer expects to generate a greater cash 
flow from owning the firm than the initial owner (    ) he has an ownership advantage (see 
Becker and Fuest (2010); Desai and Hines (2003)). The resulting capitalized earnings value of 
the acquirer is     , the maximum offer price the acquirer is willing to bid. If a potential acquir-
er has an ownership advantage the offer price of the acquirer exceeds the reservation price of 
the initial owner, implying that the deal will take place when       .  
There are several economically significant tax reasons that a potential acquirer would expect 
higher cash flows than those generated by the initial owner. First, both national and interna-
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tional deals may provide an acquirer with the ability to lower a target’s ETR through more 
effective tax management at the level of the target itself. Second, in the case of international 
deals, an acquirer may be able to re-allocate the income of a target facing a relatively high tax 
rate to another member of the multinational group where the income is taxed at a lower rate. 
This is typically accomplished through transfer pricing or debt shifting. I next describe each 
measure of tax avoidance in turn. 
4.2.1 Effective Tax Rate (ETR)  
 
Accounting ETRs are widely employed to measure the tax avoidance of firms (see summary 
provided in Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) and as examples the studies of Chen et al. (2010); 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010); Phillips (2003); Rego (2003); Mills, Erickson, and 
Maydew (1998)).37 An accounting ETR is impacted by tax planning strategies that generate 
permanent book-tax differences. Examples (see Chen et al. (2010)) of such tax planning are 
investments in tax-exempt or tax-favored assets, participation in tax shelters that give rise to 
losses for tax purposes but not for book purposes, the use of tax credits or the use of favorable 
depreciation schemes available for tax purposes only. Scholes et al. (2009), pp. 39-40, provide 
a comprehensive overview of possible book-tax differences. Moreover, I rely on a three-
period average measure to mitigate the effects of transitory changes in annual ETRs.38 Such 
tax avoidance is possible for national as well as multinational firms. If a target’s tax avoid-
ance improves after an acquisition, I expect to observe a drop in the target’s ETR. 
 
If the target’s effective tax rate ETR* post-deal is lower than the target’s ETR pre-acquisition, 
and a potential acquirer and initial owner are equally capable of generating the same pre-tax 
book income (denoted BI) at the level of the target, then the expected after-tax cash flow for a 
potential acquirer is x* = (1-ETR*)BI and for the initial owner is x = (1-ETR)BI . Due to the 
lower ETR (ETR* < ETR) the deal will take place because                               . 
Empirically, if I find a lower target ETR post deal, then improved target tax avoidance by the 
acquirer could be a driver of the deal. 
 
                                                 
37
 My ETR measure comes from Amadeus (see Section 3.1 for a discussion of my data source) and is defined as 
tax expense (TAXA) divided by pre-tax book income (PLBT). 
38
 Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew (2008) and Klassen and LapLante (2012) recognize that multi-year measures of 
ETRs are an improvement over single year measures. I settle on a three-year measure in my study to avoid a 
significant reduction in my sample size though, in some analyses, those authors consider longer periods.  
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Moreover, acquiring firms differ in their tax aggressiveness. Since acquirers will benefit from 
their tax planning experience when restructuring the target’s affairs in a tax efficient man-
ner39, I expect to observe a larger decrease in a target’s ETR following acquisitions by tax 
aggressive acquirers. I thus differentiate acquirers with respect to their ETR pre-acquisition. I 
consider acquirers having an ETR below the country specific sample average as especially tax 
aggressive.  
4.2.2 Transfer pricing  
 
The ability to set transfer prices on intra-firm trade provides multinational firms with flexibil-
ity as to how to allocate income across national jurisdictions imposing different tax rates (see 
Huizinga and Laeven, (2008)). The possibilities to shift profits potentially increase substan-
tially following an international deal.40 For instance, firms can alter prices charged on in-
tragroup services or deliveries, or even create new intragroup services or deliveries. There is 
no data available on intragroup services and deliveries, or their pricing in Amadeus. So, I fol-
low the literature on tax-motivated transfer pricing and relate a firm’s profitability to its tax 
incentives to shift income via transfer pricing.  
 
Profit shifting generates tax savings when income is shifted from high-tax locations to low-
tax locations. International deals offer the possibility to shift profits out of the target’s taxing 
jurisdiction for the first time. The resulting tax savings of the acquirer may constitute the 
ownership advantage necessary to acquire the target. The target’s book income is reduced by 
profits shifted away     , while the book income of another multinational group member  
offering a lower tax rate     is increased. If the resulting new capitalized earnings value of the 
firm is higher than the reservation price, the deal takes place                                 . 
 
First, I compare the effect of national versus international takeovers on a target’s profitability. 
In order to separate changes in target profitability arising from transfer pricing (as opposed to 
debt shifting), I focus on profitability defined as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
over total assets (see Huizinga and Laeven (2008)). If the opportunity to shift profits out of 
                                                 
39
 The argument in Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2010), that top executives have effects on their firms’ tax 
avoidance, is similar. Also see Chow, Klassen, and Liu (2013), Col and Errunza (2014). 
40
 I recognize there may be opportunities to shift profits after a national deal in order to take advantage of various 
sub national rates. However, profit shifting is a significant source of tax savings in multinational firms, and 
hence, more likely to motivate an international deal.   
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the target motivated the deal, I expect to observe a decrease in the target’s profitability. This 
decrease should be especially pronounced following international deals.  
 
Next, I differentiate with respect to the statutory tax rate of the acquirer versus the target. If 
the acquirer faces a lower statutory tax rate than the target, I expect a decrease in target profit-
ability (if instead the target’s tax rate is lower, the acquirer may locate additional profits 
which would increase target profitability). I also examine whether target profitability decreas-
es when any member of the acquirer’s multinational group (and hence new group of the tar-
get) faces a lower statutory rate than the target. 
4.2.3 Debt shifting  
 
Firm owners may choose to finance their operations with either debt or equity. For tax pur-
poses dividends paid on equity in general do not lower taxable income, while interest paid on 
debt is tax deductible. From the tax perspective of the debtor, greater interest payments would 
be expected to reduce its tax burden. Thus, the use of debt finance at the level of the target as 
a debtor is tax advantageous (see Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodeme (2008)). 
On the contrary this conclusion may reverse at the level of the creditor. Taxes due on divi-
dend earnings at the level of the firm owner are frequently lower than taxes due on interest 
earnings. Overall the use of debt finance is thus only a worthwhile policy, if the tax rate on 
the resulting interest earnings is sufficiently low or even zero. 
 
Internally41 debt financing a target will not result in a lower ETR but instead in a reduction of 
book income and an increase in interest income    available to the firm owner. If the tax rate 
on interest income    at the level of the creditor is lower than the firm’s statutory tax rate42  , 
the tax load on the firm’s earnings decreases and the resulting new capitalized earnings value 
of the target is                        . If the new capitalized earnings value of the firm exceeds 
the reservation price of the initial owner                                , the deal will take 
place. 
 
                                                 
41
 It is easier to illustrate the argument relying on internal debt finance. However, using external debt financing 
gives similar results: Replacing equity with external debt finance in the target allows the acquirer to use the re-
leased equity in a tax-favored location instead. This results in similar tax savings. 
42
 To simplify the argument I assume that book income is equal to taxable income. I can thus use the firm’s 
statutory tax rate (which is relevant for debt and profit shifting incentives) in the formulas instead of the ETR.  
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In a domestic setting the available tax rate on interest income typically is not lower than the 
corporate tax rate. On the contrary multinational groups benefit from the set of available cor-
porate tax rates worldwide in establishing group members in low tax countries (see Huizinga 
et al. (2008)), including many zero taxed tax havens (see Hines and Rice (1994)). Figure 4-1 
illustrates the argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If a firm uses debt instead of equity to finance its operations, the resulting interest expenses 
will affect book as well as taxable income. Thus nominator and denominator of the ETR are 
likewise affected. The ETR will not or at least incompletely reflect the use of debt finance. 
Instead I investigate this issue considering the change in a target’s leverage (total debt over 
total assets) following an acquisition. 
 
If a target’s tax avoidance improves after an acquisition, I expect to observe an increase in the 
target’s leverage. This increase should be more pronounced following international mergers 
and acquisitions. Then a purely national target without the opportunity to debt shift income to 
group members in low tax countries becomes part of a multinational group due to the acquisi-
tion. Within the group of international mergers & acquisitions I expect to observe an especial-
ly pronounced increase in the target leverage, if the acquirer or any group member of the ac-
quirer’s multinational group has a lower tax rate than the target. 
 
Figure 4-1: Illustration of Debt Shifting 
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The latter two channels for tax avoidance following an international deal may give rise tax 
policy concerns. Since in most cases purely national firms or groups can neither use debt 
shifting nor transfer pricing to significantly lower their tax burden (or the costs of doing so are 
prohibitively high), international acquirers have a systematic tax driven ownership advantage 
allowing them to acquire such targets. This may contribute to the empirical finding of multi-
national networks trading at a premium relative to a benchmark portfolio of purely national 
firms (see Creal, Rogers, Robinson and Zechman (2014)). 
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
4.3.1 Data  
 
I extract all mergers and acquisitions taking place between 1996 and 2009 from the Bureau 
van Dijk Zephyr database that result in a 100 percent ownership change in the target firm. I 
then merge the resulting targets with the Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database containing un-
consolidated financial data for European firms, allowing me to evaluate changes in the tar-
get’s ETR, profitability and leverage both before and after the deal.  
 
I then delete targets with unlimited liability, since such firms are typically organized as part-
nerships, leaving as my focus target corporations only. Pursuant to an acquisition a partner-
ship’s assets may be stepped up resulting in higher depreciation and lower tax payments, pos-
sibly distorting my results (see Erickson and Wang (2000)). In the United States it is possible 
to structure an acquisition as an asset deal even if shares in a corporation are acquired follow-
ing Section 338. However, this is not the case for my study since I focus on a sample of Euro-
pean mergers and acquisitions excluding the United States from the sample of target coun-
tries. In none of the target countries in my sample it is possible to structure a share deal as an 
asset deal for tax purposes as in the United States (see KPMG Taxation of Cross-Border Mer-
gers and Acquisitions and IFBD Country Analysis). Since I restrict my sample to 100 % ac-
quisitions of shares in corporations the new tax basis of the corporation’s assets post-
acquisition is identical to the tax basis of the corporation’s assets pre-acquisition. A step-up in 
the acquired assets is thus impossible and cannot bias my results.  
After these steps I am left with 1,440 targets for which I observe financial statements three 
years before and one year after the deal.  To these I add all firms available in Amadeus be-
tween 1996 and 2009 offering at least five consecutive financial statements as potential 
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matches. I then delete all firms showing losses, since the tax planning incentives of loss firms 
are less clear-cut (see De Simone and Seidman (2014)). Out of the remaining 1,078 targets 
only 832 offer information on all regressors of the selection equation, thus 832 targets and 
1.97 million potential matches enter the selection equation. Table 4-1 provides descriptive 
statistics for all variables used in the selection equation. Out of the 832 targets entering the 
selection equation, only 529 offer information on the outcome variables – the 3-year averag-
es43 of ETR, profitability and leverage after the deal. 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
ETR (av) 1970957 0.338 0.217 0.000 1.000 
Profitability (av) 1970957 0.102 0.123      -0.367 0.620 
Leverage (av) 1970957 0.683 0.255 0.051 1.692 
Cash (av) 1970957 0.121 0.141 0.000 0.698 
High Growth 1970957 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 
Log (Total Assets) (av) 1970957    14.389 1.763 8.685       19.038 
Research Intensity (av) 1970957 0.024 0.061 0.000 0.462 
Tangibility (av) 1970957 0.299 0.243 0.000 0.951 
Inventories (av) 1970957 0.207 0.216 0.000 0.939 
Capital Expenditures 1970957 0.064 0.174      -0.519 0.752 
Stocks Traded 1970957    81.741      64.947 0.035     367.043 
Log (Labor Force) 1970957    16.652 0.964     12.019       18.121 
Exports 1970957    35.682      14.300     24.414       99.145 
Log (GDP) 1970957    10.017 0.508 8.471       10.896 
Spending on Education 1970957 4.732 0.964 2.400 7.635 
Inflation Rate 1970957 0.044 0.045      -0.011 0.456 
Note: For the definitions and the sources of the variables see the Appendix. 
 
Since in some cases, I anticipate especially pronounced changes in tax avoidance after inter-
national deals, I group the mergers and acquisitions in my sample into national and interna-
tional. I start with information on the identity and residence of target, acquirer and vendor 
from Zephyr as far as available. I then identify any group members of the vendor or acquirer 
using the Amadeus owner database44.  
                                                 
43
 Thus, I consider only outcomes of targets for which I observe financial statements three years before and three 
years after the deal. 
44
 Firms are identified as group members, if the group parent has a total ownership in the firm exceeding 90 
percent. Unfortunately the Amadeus owner database is incomplete and I am not able to observe all group mem-
bers of the acquirer and the vendor. I thus may classify deals erroneously as national in some cases. I use infor-
mation on the vendor to identify the group structure of the target, since the Amadeus owner database does not 
provide historical ownership data. Group members of the target identified using the Amadeus owner database are 
members of the new group established following the acquisition of the target.  
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This leaves me with the following four cases: (1) International - International (target belong-
ing to an international group was acquired by an international group); (2) National - National 
(stand-alone target or target belonging to a national group was acquired by a stand-alone ac-
quirer or by a national group); (3) National - International (stand-alone target or target belong-
ing to a national group was acquired by an international group); (4) International - National 
(target belonging to an international group was acquired by a stand-alone acquirer or a nation-
al group). 
In case (1) and case (2) following my arguments in section 2 there is no change in tax incen-
tives with respect to transfer pricing or debt shifting. Since case (2) is by far more frequent, I 
classify this kind of deals as national. In case (3) I expect increased tax incentives for transfer 
pricing and debt shifting. I classify these deals as internationals. Finally in case (4) I expect 
decreased tax incentives. However, since I observe only 19 deals of this type I ignore case (4) 
for the empirical analysis. 
Figure 4-2 gives an overview of the regional origin of acquirers in my sample. By far the most 
acquirers come from the U.K. Interestingly, U.S. acquirers are important, even though I con-
sider a sample of European targets only. This is consistent with other studies on international 
mergers and acquisitions, where typically the U.S. and the U.K. are the countries with the 
most acquirers (see e.g. Huizinga and Voget (2009)). 
 
Figure 4-2: Regional Origin of Acquirers of European Target Firms 
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4.3.2 Econometric Approach  
 
If I observe a change in any of my variables of interest (ETR, leverage or profitability) after a 
deal, I would like to attribute those changes to changes in target tax avoidance carried out by 
the acquirer. To rule out the possibility that the change would have otherwise occurred re-
quires a counterfactual framework. That is, I observe the change in my variables of interest 
after the deal and I would like to compare this to the change, if the deal had not taken place. 
Since it is not possible to observe this counterfactual outcome, I employ propensity score 
matching to construct a counterfactual control group.  
The idea of propensity score matching is to identify firms being ideally identical to the target 
firms besides for the fact of not being sold. This is an econometric effort to replicate as close 
as possible the laboratory conditions available in natural sciences: There is a population of 
identical examination units out of which one part receives a treatment and the others not. The 
observed difference in the outcome variables of interest is then due to the treatment. The 
treatment in question here is the sale of the target firm. 
Matching based on the propensity score works in two steps (see e.g. Wooldridge (2002), 
Chapter 18). First, I run a probit regression evaluating the probability to become a target con-
ditional on a vector of observed covariates (selection equation). Based on the regression re-
sults I predict the probability to become a target for each firm in my sample. 
Second, there are four matching methods (nearest neighbor matching, radius matching, caliper 
matching and kernel matching) available in order to match each treated firm with one or sev-
eral control firms using the results of the selection equation. The idea is to match each target 
with a non-sold firm having the same probability of becoming a target based on the results of 
the selection equation. 
Nearest neighbor matching matches to each treated firm the control firm with the closest pro-
pensity score. Caliper matching is a variation of nearest neighbor matching. It matches treat-
ment firms with control firms only if the propensity score of both firms is within a predefined 
radius. By imposing a maximum tolerance level of the distance between treated and control 
firms, caliper matching attempts to improve the overall matching quality. Instead of matching 
one of the treated firms with its closest control firm within a radius, radius matching selects 
all the firms that fall within the predefined caliper. Kernel matching uses all available controls 
as matches, but uses weights inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity 
scores of treated firms and available controls. In order to make use of my large set of potential 
matches, I focus primarily on radius and kernel matching. 
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For a given propensity score, exposure to treatment is supposed to be random and therefore 
treated and control units should be on average observationally identical. I check this balancing 
property and compare the difference in the regressors of the selection equation between the 
sold (treatment group) and the non-sold (control group) firms. If the balancing property holds, 
the difference in these regressors should be considerably smaller after matching than before. 
Since I control for all variables typically employed for predicting targets in the literature, I 
expect to fulfill this condition. 
Formally (see Wooldridge (2002), pp. 604-621), I am interested in measuring the average 
treatment effect of the treated                     Variable    denotes the outcome 
(in my case the change in the ETR, the leverage or the profitability) with treatment and    the 
outcome without treatment.  is a binary variable indicating participation       in treat-
ment (in my case being acquired) or not      . 
A simple approach to estimate      would be to compare the mean of the outcome variable 
between sold and non-sold firms. However, such an approach is only possible if there is no 
self-selection into treatment:                 and                . Self-
selection into treatment in my case could e.g. occur if firms having a low leverage or a high 
ETR are especially attractive targets. Starting from low leverage an increase in leverage is 
more likely to occur. Equivalently starting from a high ETR a decrease is more likely to oc-
cur. Then the observed change is not actually due to treatment but instead due to specific 
firms selecting into treatment. It is thus crucial that I eliminate this possibility to interpret my 
results. 
While due to self-selection mean independence typically does not hold (                 and                  ), the core idea of matching is to assume mean independ-
ence conditional on a vector of covariates  :                   and                    . If selection into treatment is determined by the covariates  , then control-
ling for these covariates allows for a meaningful comparison of outcomes between treat-
ed and non-treated firms. 
I follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and predict the likelihood of being a target using a 
probit regression (selection equation) for all firms in my sample. The predicted probability for 
being acquired (the propensity score) is then the basis for finding actual targets versus non-
targets with statistically identical covariates  . The balancing property shows whether this 
procedure is successful or not. 
Table 4-2 presents the results of the selection equation and the variables appearing in the 
model are defined in the Appendix. I use a probit estimation where the dependent variable is 
  
49 
 
one if a firm becomes a target and zero otherwise. Targets involved in international deals 
could systematically differ from targets involved in national deals. I thus consider internation-
al and national takeovers as separate treatments. The matching procedure then guarantees the 
comparability between targets and matches irrespective of their involvement in international 
or national takeovers. In the second column and third column of Table 4-2 I present the re-
spective probit regression results. Similarly, I consider the takeovers of tax aggressive vs. 
non-tax aggressive acquirers as separate treatments. 
 
In the selection equation I use a profitability measure to proxy for a firm’s management effi-
ciency as proposed in Palepu (1986). Profitability is earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
over total assets and has a positive effect on takeover probability. Further I follow Palepu 
(1986) in using the log of total assets as a measure for the size of the firm. I find an increase 
in the likelihood to become a target with size.   
Following Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) I use the firm’s leverage (total debt over total assets) 
and capital expenditures (change over three periods in fixed assets over total assets) as con-
trols. While Dietrich and Sorensen (1984) find no significant effects for these controls, I find 
leverage to have a positive, and capital expenditures to have a negative, effect on takeover 
probability. I further find a firm’s cash holdings as a share of total assets to have a negative 
effect.  
High growth is a dummy for firms with an above sample mean increase over three periods in 
total assets and affects takeover positively. Research intensity is intangible assets over total 
assets and only affects the international takeover probability. Tangibility defined as fixed as-
sets over total assets has a negative effect. In addition I use inventories as a share of total as-
sets as an indicator for firms active in trade, and find a negative effect. I include a dummy for 
listed firms, since listed firms may be more difficult to acquire. 
All target specific controls besides for high growth and capital expenditures enter as the aver-
age over the three years preceding the takeover and are marked by (av.). Thus the value of the 
controls should not yet be influenced by the takeover. I control for the target’s macroeconom-
ic environment (see Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012)) using stocks traded, log labor force, 
target country exports, log GDP, spending on education and the inflation rate. All macroeco-
nomic controls are lagged. I additionally control for the effective tax rate (ETR), but I do not 
find a significant effect. In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, I use country, in-
dustry and time specific effects. 
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Table 4-2: Selection Equation 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VARIABLES All International National 
    
ETR -0.098 -0.045 -0.108 
 
(-1.34) (0.43) (-1.14) 
Profitability 0.502*** 0.742*** 0.168 
 
(4.84) (5.61) (1.11) 
Leverage (av) 0.073 0.082 0.032 
 
(1.61) (1.34) (0.51) 
Cash  (av) -0.156* -0.191* -0.117 
 
(-1.88) (-1.77) (-1.02) 
High Growth 0.100** 0.050 0.155** 
 
(2.26) (0.86) (2.52) 
Log (total Assets) 0.150*** 0.147*** 0.128*** 
 
(23.29) (17.07) (14.75) 
Research Intensity 0.280** 0.375** 0.208 
 
(1.98) (2.07) (1.08) 
Tangibility (av) -0.217*** -0.334*** -0.095 
 
(-4.29) (-4.93) (-1.40) 
Inventories (av) -0.303*** -0.316*** -0.248*** 
 
(4.29) (-3.50) (-2.93) 
Capital Expenditures -0.293*** -0.156* -0.368*** 
 
(-4.67) (-1.88) (-4.34) 
Listed -0.458*** -0.549** -0.650** 
 
(-2.95) (-1.98) (-2.30) 
Stocks Traded 0.001*** 0.001* 0.001* 
 
(2.66) (1.93) (1.94) 
Log (Labor Force) 2.392*** 3.264*** 1.345 
 
(3.22) (3.21) (1.33) 
Exports 0.021** 0.021 0.019* 
 
(2.25) (1.48) (1.78) 
Log (GDP) 1.141*** 0.618 1.330*** 
 
(3.35) (1.23) (2.96) 
Spending on Education 0.036 -0.008 0.052 
 
(0.55) (-0.10) (0.51) 
Inflation Rate -2.904*** -4.326*** -1.197 
 
(-3.12) (-3.40) (-0.88) 
    
    
Country Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Year Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations 1,970,957 1,896,339 1,951,755 
    
Note: Results from probit regressions. The dependent variable is one if a firm becomes a target and zero other-
wise in the column labeled ‘All’. The dependent variable is one if a firm becomes a target due to an international 
takeover and zero otherwise in the column labeled ‘International. The dependent variable is one if a firm be-
comes a target due to a national takeover and zero otherwise in the column labeled ‘National’. For the definition 
and the sources of the variables see the Appendix. T-statistics based on robust standard errors in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-3 shows the balancing property based on radius matching taking all deals as treat-
ments. Through the matching I achieve a significant reduction in bias. Thus, I believe the 
matching procedure works fairly well in my case. 
 
Table 4-3: Balancing Property - All 
 Mean   t-test 
Variable Treated Control Bias in % Bias  
Reduction 
in % 
t-stat p-value 
       
ETR (av) 0.284 0.283 0.5 98.4 0.09 0.924 
Profitability (av) 0.103 0.113 -7.6 -352.6 -1.25 0.213 
Leverage (av) 0.646 0.640 2.7 83.5 0.44 0.661 
Cash (av) 0.115 0.127 -8.5 -251.8 -1.33 0.184 
High Growth 0.165 0.166 -0.4 98.0 -0.06 0.950 
Log (Total Assets) (av) 15.952 15.760 11.6 88.6 1.92  0.055*  
Research Intensity (av) 0.030 0.027 3.8 52.9 0.57 0.571 
Tangibility (av) 0.350 0.335 5.9 69.3 0.93 0.352 
Inventories (av) 0.153 0.153 -0.1 99.5 -0.03 0.979 
Capital Expenditures 0.044 0.051 -3.6 74.7 -0.55 0.579 
Listed 0.006 0.006 -0.6 -195.5 -0.09 0.927 
Stocks Traded 80.994 82.158 -2.1 92.0 -0.33 0.744 
Log (Labor Force) 16.182 16.175 0.7 98.4 0.10 0.920 
Exports 39.14 39.637 -3.2 87.5 -0.47 0.636 
Log (GDP) 10.108 10.114 -1.3 96.0 -0.25 0.806 
Spending on Education   5.415 5.439 -2.2 96.3 -0.33 0.744 
Inflation Rate 0.027 0.027 0.6 98.8 0.12 0.902 
       
Note: For the definition and the sources of the variables see the Appendix. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Evidence  
 
I start by providing some descriptive evidence on changes in indicators of a target’s tax 
avoidance behavior following a takeover. Figure 4-3 shows the evolution of the mean target 
ETRs (defined as tax expense divided by pre-tax income) starting from five periods pre-deal 
to five periods post-deal.45 Zero is defined as the point of time where the deal is completed. 
Pre-deal the ETR fluctuates around 28 percent.  
 
 
                                                 
45
 For calculating the mean target ETR I consider all target observations available. The mean is thus based on 
fewer observations e.g. for the period five pre deal. I do not show the 3-year average here, because e.g. the peri-
od -1 result would already be affected by the deal. 
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Post-deal the level of the ETR decreases and fluctuates around 20 percent. This holds for both 
national (solid green line) and international (dashed red line) mergers and acquisitions. Figure 
4-3 provides some evidence for a decreased ETR following mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Note: The effective tax rate (ETR) is tax expense (Amadeus: TAXA) divided by pre-tax income (Amadeus: 
PLBT). The figure shows the mean ETR across all target observations available in a certain period. Period -5 is 5 
years pre deal and period 5 is 5 years post deal. In an international deal, the acquirer and target are resident in a 
different country. In a national deal, the acquirer and target are resident in the same country. Source: Bureau van 
Dijk Amadeus database. 
 
Figure 4-4 shows in the same manner the evolution of target profitability (defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes over total assets) starting from five periods pre-deal to five periods 
post-deal. There is some initial evidence for a drop following the acquisition at point of time 
zero. This holds for national as well as international mergers and acquisitions. Target profita-
bility fluctuates around 9 percent pre-deal and 5 percent post-deal. 
 
Figure 4-5 shows the evolution of target leverage (defined as total debt over total assets). Tar-
get leverage decreases steadily from five periods pre-deal to five periods post-deal for interna-
tional mergers and acquisitions. There is no clear trend for national takeovers. 
Figure 4-3: Target Effective Tax Rate (ETR) pre and post Deal 
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Note: Profitability is earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. The figure shows the mean profit-
ability across all target observations available in a certain period. Period -5 is 5 years pre deal, and period 5 is 5 
years post deal. In an international deal, the acquirer and target are resident in a different country. In a national 
deal, the acquirer and target are resident in the same country. Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database. 
 
Note: Leverage is total liabilities divided by total assets. The figure shows the mean leverage across all target 
observations available in a certain period. Period -5 is 5 years pre deal and period 5 is 5 years post deal. In an 
international deal, the acquirer and target are resident in a different country. In a national deal, the acquirer and 
target are resident in the same country. Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus database. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4: Target Profitability pre and post Deal 
Figure 4-5: Target Leverage pre and post Deal 
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All these figures provide suggestive evidence on the evolution of a target’s ETR, profitability 
and leverage post-deal. However, it is not possible to conclude on mergers and acquisitions 
being causal for the observed evolution. It may well be the case that the observed evolution of 
a target’s ETR, profitability and leverage post-deal would have occurred irrespective of the 
target being sold to a new owner. To interpret such a causal relationship I employ more so-
phisticated econometrics as described above in Section 3.2. Using propensity score matching, 
I separate the change post-deal of a target’s ETR, profitability and leverage caused by mergers 
and acquisitions from the change that most likely would have occurred irrespective of the 
transaction. 
Since I include the average effective tax rate in the selection equation, the starting level of the 
ETR is identical for targets and non-targets as a result of the matching procedure as reported 
in Table 4-3. The reported coefficients in Table 4-4 and 4-5 of the average treatment effect on 
the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the 
change in ETR (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The same argument holds 
for the other outcome variables in Table 4-6 to 4-11. 
4.4.2 Main Results  
 
Table 4-4 shows the average effect of treatment on a target’s average ETR in the three years 
following the takeover based on propensity score matching. Comparing targets and similar 
non-targets, I find a decrease in the ETR. This result holds irrespective of the matching algo-
rithm – radius or kernel – and irrespective of whether treatment is defined as all, only interna-
tional or only national takeovers. The reduction is around 3 percentage points for all takeo-
vers. 
A target’s tax avoidance increases post-deal. The resulting reduction in tax payments is able 
to generate an ownership advantage. The observed decrease of the ETR cannot be due to a 
step up of the target’s assets, since I focus exclusively on corporations as targets. If at all with 
corporations as targets a step up should occur with respect to the shares at the level of the 
shareholder (see Erickson and Wang (2000)), which would not affect the ETR. 
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Table 4-4: Average Effective Tax Rate 
Matching Algorithm All International National 
    
Radius -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.025** 
 (-4.30) (-3.27) (-2.52) 
Kernel -0.037*** -0.049*** -0.042*** 
 (-5.23) (-4.94) (-4.18) 
    
Number of Treated 529 249 262 
Number of Untreated 1,180,076 1,142,988 1,169,431 
    
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in 
parentheses. The outcome variable average effective tax rate (ETR) is defined as a firm’s average ETR in the 
three years following the takeover. Since I include the average effective tax rate in the selection equation, the 
starting level of the ETR is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the 
change in ETR (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The ‘All’ column reports the coefficient based 
on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeovers as treatments, the ‘International’ column re-
ports the coefficient based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers only international takeovers as 
treatments, and the ‘National’ column reports the coefficient based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that 
considers only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 
0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4-5 presents the average effect of treatment on a target’s average ETR in the three years 
following the takeover, depending on the acquirer’s tax aggressiveness. Tax aggressive ac-
quirers are acquirers with a 3-year mean ETR below the acquirer country specific sample 3-
year mean ETR in the same time period. I find a larger decrease in a target’s ETR following 
an acquisition by a tax aggressive acquirer. While the decrease is around 8 percentage points 
(radius matching) or even 10 percentage points (kernel matching) following an acquisition by 
a tax aggressive acquirer, it is insignificant following an acquisition by a non-tax aggressive 
acquirer in the case of radius matching and only around 4 percentage points in the case of 
kernel matching. Acquirers appear to use their tax planning expertise to restructure the tar-
get’s affairs in a tax efficient manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56 
 
Table 4-5: Average Effective Tax Rate: tax vs. non-tax aggressive Acquirer 
Matching Algorithm Tax aggressive Acquirer Non-tax aggressive Acquirer 
   
Radius -0.075*** -0.012 
 (-3.09) (-0.56) 
Kernel -0.104*** -0.040* 
 (-4.29) (-1.84) 
   
Number of Treated 50 57 
Number of Untreated 1,091,839 1,107,403 
   
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in 
parentheses. The outcome variable average effective tax rate (ETR) is defined as a firm’s average ETR in the 
three years following the takeover. Since I include the average effective tax rate in the selection equation, the 
starting level of the ETR is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treat-
ment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the 
change in ETR (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The column tax aggressive acquirer gives the 
coefficient considering only takeovers by tax aggressive acquirers as treatments, the column non-tax aggressive 
acquirers gives the coefficient considering only takeovers by non-tax aggressive acquirers as treatments. Tax 
aggressive acquirers are acquirers with a three-year mean ETR below the acquirer country specific sample three-
year mean ETR in the same time period. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4-6 presents the results with respect to the change in average target profitability in the 
three years following the takeover. Consistent with Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989) and Clark 
and Ofek (1994) I observe a decrease in target profitability. I find a systematic larger decrease 
following international takeovers in comparison to national deals as I would expect from a tax 
perspective.  
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Table 4-6: Average Profitability 
 
Thus, I further differentiate takeovers with respect to the relative tax rates of the target versus 
the acquirer in Table 4-7. Targets facing a higher statutory tax rate relative to their acquirer 
are high-tax targets, and they are low-tax targets otherwise. Only in the case of a high-tax 
target is shifting profits out of the target an advisable strategy for the acquirer. Consistent with 
this expectation, I observe a decrease in target profitability for high-tax targets, while I do not 
find any significant change for low-tax targets. Finally, acquirers do not appear to shift profits 
into low-tax targets.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46
 This result may also be due to noise in the data. I precisely identify the group of high tax targets. However, 
due to incomplete information on the acquirer’s group structure I may erroneously classify targets as low tax.   
This makes the correct identification of tax planning more difficult in this case. 
Matching Algorithm All International National 
    
Radius -0.015*** -0.018** -0.012* 
 (-2.73) (-2.08) (-1.67) 
Kernel -0.014** -0.015* -0.010 
 (-2.50) (-1.70) (-1.42) 
    
Number of Treated 530 249 262 
Number of Untreated 1,180,076 1,142,988 1,169,431 
    
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in 
parentheses. The outcome variable average profitability is defined as a firm’s average EBIT over total assets in 
the three years following the takeover. Since I include average profitability in the selection equation, the start-
ing level of average profitability is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect 
to the change in average profitability (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The ‘All’ column re-
sults are based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeovers as treatments, the ‘Interna-
tional’ column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers only international takeo-
vers as treatments, and the ‘National’ column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that con-
siders only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 
and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4-7: High-tax and Low-tax Targets 
Matching Algorithm High-tax Targets  Low-tax Target 
  Average Profitability  
    
Radius -0.052***  -0.006 
 (-3.59)  (-0.60) 
Kernel -0.047***  -0.003 
 (-3.27)  (-0.33) 
    
Number  of Treated 65  184 
Number of Untreated 1,142,988  1,142,988 
  Average Leverage  
    
Radius 0.045*  0.030* 
 (1.77)  (1.72) 
Kernel 0.027  0.016 
 (1.06)  (0.92) 
    
Number  of Treated 65  184 
Number of Untreated 1,142,988  1,142,988 
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in
parentheses. The outcome variable average profitability is defined as a firm’s average earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) over total assets in the three years following the takeover. The outcome variable average leverage is
defined as a firm’s average total liabilities over total assets in the three years following the takeover. Since I in-
clude average profitability and average leverage in the selection equation, the starting level of average profitabil-
ity and average leverage is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the average treatment
effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect to the change in 
average profitability and average leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The column high tax
gives the results for high tax targets, the column low tax the results for low tax targets. Targets having a statutory 
rate above the acquirer’s tax rate are defined as high tax targets. They are low tax targets otherwise. Results are 
based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and
* denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4-8 alternately uses information on the acquirer’s group structure obtained from the 
Amadeus owner database to differentiate between high-tax targets and low-tax targets. Tar-
gets having a statutory tax rate above the minimum tax rate faced by any member of the ac-
quirer’s group are now defined as high-tax targets. They are low-tax targets otherwise. 
Again, I find a significant decrease in target profitability for high-tax targets only. For legal 
(e.g. because of controlled foreign corporation rules) as well as practical reasons (e.g. be-
cause of established business relationships between the acquirer and the target) it is easier to 
shift profits from the target to the acquirer directly instead of shifting profits to a low-tax 
group member of the acquirer. I thus observe a lower point estimate for the decrease in prof-
itability in Table 4-8 compared to Table 4-7. 
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Table 4-8: High-tax vs. Low-tax Target - Minimum Tax Rate of the Group 
Matching Algorithm High-tax Targets  Low-tax Target 
  Average Profitability  
    
Radius -0.027***  -0.007 
 (-2.67)  (-0.53) 
Kernel -0.024**  -0.004 
 (-2.33)  (-0.32) 
    
Number  of Treated 130  119 
Number of Untreated 1,142,988  1,142,988 
  Average Leverage  
    
Radius 0.027  0.041* 
 (1.50)  (1.79) 
Kernel 0.008  0.030 
 (0.48)  (1.32) 
    
Number  of Treated 130  119 
Number of Untreated 1,142,988  1,142,988 
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in
parentheses. The outcome variable average profitability is defined as a firm’s average earnings before interest 
and taxes (EBIT) over total assets in the three years following the takeover. The outcome variable average 
leverage is defined as a firm’s average total liabilities over total assets in the three years following the takeo-
ver. Since I include average profitability and average leverage in the selection equation, the starting level of 
average profitability and average leverage is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of
the average treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated 
with respect to the change in average profitability and average leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-
deal level). The column high tax gives the results for high tax targets, the column low tax the results for low 
tax targets. Targets having a statutory rate above the acquirer’s tax rate are defined as high tax targets. They
are low tax targets otherwise. Results are based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeo-
vers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respec-
tively. 
 
 
Table 4-9 finally presents the results with respect to changes in the 3-year average leverage 
in the years following the takeover. While I find some evidence for an increase in leverage 
based for all deals, I do not find a systematically larger increase following international take-
overs, as I would expect from a tax perspective. I neither find significant changes if I differ-
entiate between high tax and low tax targets as in Table 4-7. Thus, Table 4-9 provides no 
evidence for a tax-motivated increase in target leverage. 
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Table 4-9: Average Leverage 
 
4.4.3 Sensitivity Analyses 
4.4.3.1 Group taxation  
 
It is difficult to load a target with additional debt post-deal. While it is in general possible to 
load such debt on a target’s books, the critical issue is what to do with the excess liquidity 
generated in doing so. Raising debt to finance the deal would be a natural candidate. Howev-
er, such debt cannot enter on the books of the target, since these financial means are employed 
to acquire the target itself. The only feasible possibility is to distribute the retained earnings of 
the target and replace them with debt. This may however cause taxes on the distributions. Fur-
ther, pre-deal creditors of the target may oppose to such a strategy, since it worsens their posi-
tion in the case of default. My results finding no significant change in target leverage post 
deal indicate that this strategy is not employed on a large scale due to such costs of debt fi-
nance 
A more tax efficient and widely applied (see Ruf (2011)) strategy is to acquire targets not 
directly, but instead via a holding set up in the same country as the target (debt push-down). 
Figure 4-6 illustrates such a strategy.47 As the advantage of this strategy it is possible to load 
                                                 
47
 See also Delauriere (2011), Brincker (2008), and 
http://www.mondaq.com/x/539/Audit/Dutch+Debtpushdown+Structures for a discussion of the use of debt push-
Matching Algorithm All International National 
    
Radius 0.031*** 0.034** 0.031** 
 (3.02) (2.34) (2.03) 
Kernel 0.025** 0.019 0.015 
 (2.42) (1.31) (0.99) 
    
Number of Treated 530 249 262 
Number of Untreated 1,180,076 1,142,988 1,169,431 
    
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in 
parentheses. The outcome variable average leverage is defined as a firm’s average total liabilities over total 
assets in the three years following the takeover. Since I include average leverage in the selection equation, the 
starting level of average leverage is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect 
to the change in average leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). The ‘All’ column reports 
the coefficient based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeovers as treatments, the ‘In-
ternational’ column reports the coefficient based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers only 
international takeovers as treatments, and the ‘National’ column reports the coefficient based on the selection 
equation in Table 4-2 that considers only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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the holding with debt in order to acquire the target. After the transaction the holding’s interest 
expenses on the debt to acquire the target are consolidated with the target’s earnings making 
use of group taxation regimes. The debt of the holding acts as if it were target debt. This re-
duces the incentive to load the target with debt itself and could be an explanation for me not 
finding clear evidence for an increase in target leverage following mergers and acquisitions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to test this possibility, I consider targets located in countries offering no group taxa-
tion separately.48 In such countries the debt push down strategy does not work. Since it is not 
possible to load an acquiring holding tax efficiently with debt in such countries, there should 
be a stronger incentive to load the target itself with debt. Indeed – when focusing on targets in 
countries with no group taxation regime only – I find evidence for target leverage to increase 
after the takeover as presented in Table 4-10. Target leverage increases by around 8 percent-
age points. Acquirers loading holdings instead of targets with debt in countries offering group 
taxation could thus be an explanation for me finding no effect on target leverage above. I am 
not able to split up the results in national and international mergers and acquisitions in Table 
4-10, since the sample of targets in countries without group taxation regimes is too small to 
do so. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
down structures. 
48In my sample these are (101) targets located in Belgium (60), Bulgaria (5), Czech Republic (14), Estonia (5), 
Lithuania (4), Romania (10) and Slovakia (3). 
Figure 4-6: Debt Push Down Strategy in Group Tax Regimes 
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Table 4-10: Average Leverage - Countries without Group Taxation Regimes 
Matching Algorithm All 
  
Radius 0.082*** 
 (3.32) 
Kernel 0.075*** 
 (3.07) 
  
Number of Treated 101 
Number of Untreated 166,499 
  
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in 
parentheses. The outcome variable average leverage is defined as a firm’s average total liabilities over total 
assets in the three years following the takeover. Since I include average leverage in the selection equation, the 
starting level of average leverage is identical for targets and non-targets. The reported coefficients of the aver-
age treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect on the treated with respect 
to the change in average leverage (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). Results are based on the 
selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeovers as treatments and on a sample including only coun-
tries without a group taxation regime. In my sample these are Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 
 
4.4.3.2 Exact Matching  
 
As a robustness check I employ three exact matching procedures: for countries, for industries 
and for country-years. I thus only match targets and controls from the same country in the 
first case, from the same industry in the second case and from the same country and year in 
the third case. Table 4-11 shows the radius matching results. Results do not materially change 
compared to section 4.2. I still observe evidence for a decreased ETR following mergers and 
acquisitions. I find some evidence for a decrease in profitability and an increase in leverage. 
However, I neither find a systematic larger decrease in profitability nor a larger increase in 
leverage following international takeovers as I would expect from a tax perspective. 
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Table 4-11: Exact Matching 
Matching Algorithm    
 Country-specific 
 ALL International National 
    
Average ETR Radius -0.033*** -0.036** -0.027* 
 (-3.26) (-2.54) (-1.83) 
    
Average Profitability Radius -0.016** -0.019 -0.010 
 (-2.17) (-1.63) (-1.00) 
    
Average Leverage Radius 0.033** 0.031 0.035 
 (2.24) (1.52) (1.62) 
    
 Industry-specific 
 ALL International National 
    
Average ETR Radius -0.029*** -0.033** -0.025* 
 (-2.93) (-2.33) (-1.72) 
    
Average Profitability Radius -0.014* -0.018 -0.011 
 (-1.93) (-1.56) (-1.15) 
    
Average Leverage Radius 0.032** 0.034 0.033 
 (2.17) (1.62) (1.53) 
    
 Country-Year-specific 
 ALL International National 
    
Average ETR Radius -0.032*** -0.036** -0.027* 
 (-3.18) (-2.50) (-1.89) 
    
Average Profitability Radius -0.016** -0.016 -0.011 
 (-2.08) (-1.39) (-1.10) 
    
Average Leverage Radius 0.032** 0.032 0.035 
 (2.20) (1.55) (1.61) 
    
Note: I report coefficients that correspond to the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT); T-statistics in 
parentheses.  Results are propensity score matching results after exact matching according to country, industry or 
country-year. The outcome variable average ETR is defined as a firm’s average ETR in the three years following 
the takeover. The outcome variable average profitability is defined as a firm’s average EBIT over total assets in 
the three years following the takeover. The outcome variable average leverage is defined as a firm’s average 
total liabilities over total assets in the three years following the takeover. Since I include all outcome variables in 
the selection equation, the starting level of outcome variables is identical for targets and non-targets. The report-
ed coefficients of the average treatment effect on the treated are thus equivalent to the average treatment effect 
on the treated with respect to the change in outcome variables (comparing the average pre- and post-deal level). 
The ‘All’ column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers all takeovers as treat-
ments, the ‘International’ column results are based on the selection equation in Table 4-2 that considers only 
international takeovers as treatments, and the ‘National’ column results are based on the selection equation in 
Table 4-2 that considers only national takeovers as treatments. The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 64 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
More tax avoidance within targets post-acquisition increases the cash flow available to ac-
quirers, allowing acquirers to outbid initial owners. Tax avoidance is one possible driver of 
mergers and acquisitions. I investigate the change in the tax avoidance of targets post-
acquisition using a sample of European mergers and acquisitions taking place between 1996 
and 2009.  
I consider three aspects of tax avoidance: First, a target’s effective tax rate (ETR) as a meas-
ure reflecting aggressive tax planning through permanent book-tax differences; second, target 
profitability as a proxy to measure tax induced profit shifting; third, target leverage as an indi-
cator for tax induced debt shifting. 
A target’s ETR decreases by 3-percentage points post deal and even by 8 percentage points if 
the acquirer is particularly tax aggressive. Further target profitability decreases following 
mergers and acquisitions. This decrease is especially pronounced for targets having a higher 
statutory tax rate than the acquirer. Tax induced profit shifting is one explanation for the em-
pirical finding of decreased target profitability. 
I do not find evidence for changes in target leverage post deal in general. However, I find em-
pirical evidence for group taxation being an explanation for this finding: Restricting my sam-
ple to targets from countries without group taxation regimes results in a significant increase in 
leverage post deal. In countries offering group taxation regimes acquirers may prefer to load 
the acquiring holding instead of the target itself with debt. This results in similar tax savings, 
but is easier to achieve. 
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4.6 Appendix 
 
Table 4-12: Appendix - Variable Definition 
 
Variable Name Definition 
  
ETR (av) A firm’s tax expense (TAXA) divided by 
pre-tax income (PLBT) (3-year average; for 
targets defined for the three years pre-deal 
(selection equation) and the three years post-
deal (outcome variable)). The ETR is 
winsorized into the (0,1) interval. Source: 
Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database. 
  
Profitability (av) A firm’s Earnings before interest and tax 
(EBIT)/Total assets (3-year average; for tar-
gets defined for the three years pre-deal (se-
lection equation) and the three years post-
deal (outcome variable)); Source: Bureau 
van Dijk Amadeus Database. 
  
Leverage (av) A firm’s Total liabilities/Total assets (3-year 
average; for targets defined for the three 
years pre-deal (selection equation) and the 
three years post-deal (outcome variable)). 
Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Database. 
  
Cash (av) A firm’s (Cash + Cash equivalents)/Total 
assets (3-year average). Source: Bureau van 
Dijk Amadeus Database. 
  
High Growth Dummy variable that takes on the value 1 for 
a firm whose annual growth rate of "Total 
assets" is above the average growth rate and 
0 otherwise. 
  
Log (Total Assets) (av) Natural logarithm of a firm’s Total assets (3-
year average). Source: Bureau van Dijk 
Amadeus Database. 
  
Research intensity (av) A firm’s Intangible assets/Total assets (3-
year average). Source: Bureau van Dijk 
Amadeus Database. 
  
Tangibility (av) A firm’s Fixed assets/ Total assets (3-year 
average). Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus 
Database. 
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Table 4-12 – continued 
 
Variable Name Definition 
  
Inventories (av) A firm’s Inventory/Total assets (3-year aver-
age). Source: Bureau van Dijk Amadeus Da-
tabase. 
  
Capital Expenditures Difference in a firm’s fixed assets between 
one year and three years preceding the acqui-
sition / Total assets. Source: Bureau van Dijk 
Amadeus Database. 
  
Listed Dummy variable that takes the value 1 for 
listed stocks and 0 otherwise. Source: Bu-
reau van Dijk Amadeus Database. 
  
Stocks Traded Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP 
of the target country. Source: World Deve-
lopment Indicators, Worldbank Database. 
  
Log (Labor Force) Total labor force comprises people aged 15 
and older who meet the International Labour 
Organization definition of the economically 
active population (logarithm). Source: World 
Development Indicators, Worldbank Data-
base. 
  
Exports Ratio of Exports of goods and services to 
GDP of the target country. Source: World 
Development Indicators, Worldbank Databa-
se. 
  
Log (GDP) The natural logarithm of the target’s country 
purchase price parity (ppp) converted GDP 
per capita. Source: Penn World Tables. 
  
Spending on Education Ratio of Public expenditure on education to 
GDP of the target country. Source: World 
Development Indicators, Worldbank Databa-
se. 
  
Inflation Rate Inflation as measured by the consumer price 
index of the target country. Source: World 
Development Indicators, Worldbank Databa-
se. 
  
Note: All averages (avg.) are calculated for the three years preceding the acquisition. All macroeconomic varia-
bles refer to the year preceding the acquisition. All financial data is winsorized at the 1% level. 
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Working Paper II 
 
5 Restricted Tax Loss Transfer and Business Cycle Effects49 
 
 
Abstract: Tax loss compensation rules serve as a mechanism of risk-sharing between the gov-
ernment and the tax payers and are usually subject to various restrictions. “Anti-loss traffick-
ing” rules that limit the indirect transfer of tax losses in the form of mergers and acquisitions 
can be especially harmful as they might render all taxable losses completely useless. They 
negatively affect the risk-return relation of potential investors and at the same time lead to a 
devaluation of existing tax losses. I study whether the introduction of a limitation to loss 
transfers has an adverse effect on firm entries and if it increases the rate of firm exits. My re-
sults suggest that such rules are not viewed as considerable entry barriers by investors as the 
rate of newly incorporated companies remains largely unaffected. But I find supporting evi-
dence that transfer limitations spur market exits of loss carrying firms.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: loss trafficking, mergers and acquisitions, investments, firm entry, firm exit 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: L26; G11; G33; G34; H25; H26  
                                                 
49
 This paper is based on a joint research idea with Prof. Dr. Johannes Voget (Mannheim University) and Thom-
as Belz (Mannheim University).  
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5.1 Introduction 
 
The amount of worldwide reported corporate tax losses has been constantly rising over the 
last decade. According to the latest OECD Report on corporate losses, reported tax losses 
nearly doubled between the years 2000 and 2009. In 2009 loss carry-forwards among OECD 
countries reached up to 21 percent of the annual GDP.50 These alarming figures underline the 
vast economic meaning of the treatment of tax losses for investors, corporations and fiscal 
authorities. The questions of how and when losses are considered for tax purposes have sev-
eral economic implications. The treatment of tax losses not only influences ongoing business 
decisions such as the place of investment or the choice of legal form but is also considered at 
both ends of the business life cycle as it affects firm entries and firm exits.  
 
I examine the question if the imposition of a limitation to loss transfers for tax purposes has 
an adverse effect on the entry rate of new firms and at the same time increases the rate of firm 
exits.  
 
Since Schumpeter’s theory on creative destruction (Schumpeter (1911)) the important role of 
firm entries and firm exits as crucial determinants of economic growth is widely recognized. 
Recent studies have focused on the direct effects of several economic, institutional, legal or 
firm-specific variables on firm entry rates and firm exit rates (see Dunne, Roberts and Samu-
elson (1988), Bertrand and Kramarz (2002), Djankov, LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer 
(2002), Johnson, MacMillan and Woodruff (2002),  Scarpetta, Hemmings, Tressel and Woo 
(2002), Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003),  Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006), Djankov, 
Ganser, MacLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2010), Kaplan, Piedra and Seira (2011), Da Rin, Di 
Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011)). Among all those empirical studies the tax treatment of 
losses has received surprisingly little attention. 
In general, most corporate tax systems share common features regarding loss compensation 
rules such as the asymmetric treatment of taxable profits and losses. Profits are taxed as 
earned while an immediate tax refund in the case of losses is usually not granted.51  
 
                                                 
50
 The 2011 OECD report on “Corporate Loss Utilization through aggressive tax planning” provides statistics on 
the size and development of corporate losses among OECD countries. For further evidence and potential expla-
nations for the U.S. compare Auerbach (2007) and Altshuler, Auerbach, Cooper and Knittel (2008). 
51
 The asymmetric tax treatment of profits and losses is subject to a broad range of analytical as well as empirical 
studies such as Auerbach (1986), Altshuler and Auerbach (1990), Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994), 
Cooper and Knittel (2010). 
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Instead, losses can be carried-over to previous (carry-back) or subsequent (carry-forward) 
periods. In most countries tax loss carry-overs are subject to further restrictions. Many nation-
al tax codes contain sections that limit the indirect transfer of tax losses in the form of a mer-
ger or an acquisition. These limitations aim at counteracting aggressive tax planning schemes 
on losses so called “loss trafficking” and are commonly triggered by a change of ownership or 
a change in activity. “Trafficking” in losses describes transactions that merely take place for 
targets’ net operating losses (NOL) and not for legitimate business purposes. But restricting 
the transfer of tax losses may also indirectly affect the entire business life cycle of an econo-
my.  
 
As first noted by Domar and Musgrave (1944) loss-compensation rules serve as a mechanism 
of risk-sharing between the investor and the government (see also Tobin (1958)). The gov-
ernment either benefits from an investor’s profits or participates in its losses. Any limitation 
to the use of NOL reduces the risk the state has to bear but leaves its share in taxable profits 
unchanged. This is especially true if NOL are expected to expire in the future unused and yet 
cannot be transferred. This would completely devalue the NOL for the investor.  
I argue that the potential threat of ultimately losing possible tax savings exerts two detri-
mental effects. First, it worsens the ex-ante risk and return relation for an investor and makes 
potentially profitable business activities less attractive. Second, it devalues the existing NOL 
of an ongoing business. Loss-carrying firms’ chance to recover is reduced as the limitation 
renders tax losses ultimately useless for further business purposes. Consequently, the proba-
bility of an earlier discontinuance of a company’s activities increases. Based on these grounds 
I expect that the introduction of a limitation to passing on losses after a change in ownership 
decreases entry rates and at the same time increases the rate of firm exits. 
 
The identification strategy follows a two-step approach: I first test for the effectiveness of the 
restrictions. I analyze if the introduction of such a restriction makes the acquisition of loss 
firms less attractive and therefore reduces the number of acquisitions of loss-carrying targets. 
In the second part, I study the investment effects of the newly introduced limitations. I try to 
answer the question how firm entry rates and firm exits rates are influenced by restricted tax 
loss transfers. 
 
I use a comprehensive panel dataset that covers the rate of acquisitions of loss-carrying tar-
gets, entry-rates and exit-rates of 17 countries across 72 industries in the period 1995 to 2012. 
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Such a cross-country investigation allows me to apply time-series analyses of the effects of 
the new restrictions. This enables me to disentangle the tax effects from many potentially con-
founding country- or year specific factors.   
 
Based on my first tests, none of the newly introduced transfer restrictions proves to be espe-
cially effective. Further results do not suggest an adverse effect on entry rates neither at the 
aggregated level nor do I find solid supporting evidence at the level of individual countries. 
Regarding exit rates, my base case results suggest a significant increase in the average exit 
rates. I report extensive robustness tests for my results. First, as tax legislation is extremely 
country-specific and often complex to model in econometric analysis I subdivide the overall 
effect of the different tax reforms into individual country-specific components. I also change 
the sample period of my analysis to show that data availability is not the driver of my results. 
I complement these checks by controlling for other country-specific loss compensation rules. 
Second, I run regressions in which I consider industry-specific loss probabilities to account 
for variation in investment behavior across different industries. Third, the choice of an appro-
priate control group is crucial for any comparative study. In order to rule out the possibility of 
any biased conclusions based on poor comparisons I check the robustness of my results by 
assigning customized control groups to the different treatment countries. I further validate the 
quality of these especially designed control units by a battery of placebo studies.  
 
The above mentioned checks confirm my initial findings. Limitations to loss transfers do not 
seem to negatively influence entrepreneurial activities. However, firm exits appear to be 
spurred to some extent by newly imposed transfer restrictions.  
 
My study contributes to the current literature in three ways: First, to the best of my knowledge 
this is the first paper that examines whether limitations to the transfer of tax losses are effec-
tive in reducing the frequency of loss acquisitions.  
Second, empirical studies on the economic meaning of tax losses on investment decisions are 
still rare. Dreßler and Overesch (2011) show that in industries which are relatively likely to 
encounter losses the treatment of NOL for tax purposes is considered in the investment deci-
sion. Whereas Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli (1994) do not find any significant investment 
effects of loss compensation regulations. Edgerton (2010) observes different investment re-
sponses to tax incentives depending on the tax status of the firms. I add to this strand of litera-
ture by treating restrictions to loss transfers as another possible barrier to entrepreneurship.  
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Third, based on my interpretation of a tradable NOL as a valuable asset I enrich the current 
literature on firm exit behavior by adding a new possible factor that might drive firm dissolu-
tions. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section gives a literature review and describes the 
development of my hypotheses. Section 3 describes my data. In Section 4 the estimation 
methodology and analyses are discussed and my results are presented. Conclusions are drawn 
in Section 5. 
 
5.2 Literature Review and Hypotheses Development  
5.2.1 Taxes and Loss-Acquisitions 
 
Rules and regulations that are targeted at “loss trafficking” are supposed to stop purely tax 
driven mergers and acquisitions (M&A) without any underlying sound economic reasons. The 
mere intention of such tax planning transactions is the reduction of the overall corporate tax 
burden. 
The typical tax planning strategy that is supposed to be prevented by those “anti-loss traffick-
ing” rules can be described as follows: First, a company that carries a loss for tax purposes is 
fully sold to a new owner in the form of a share deal. As a consequence, the new owner does 
not only gain control of the acquired company but also of its losses. Only corporations or oth-
er legal forms that have their own business sphere can carry losses independently from their 
owners. In case of other legal forms that are not treated as separate legal entities losses are 
inextricably linked with the owners of the businesses and cannot be treated independently.52 
In a next step, receivables, other interest bearing assets or patens are transferred to the newly 
acquired entity in order to redirect related interest income or royalty income to the unused tax 
losses.  
This taxable income can now be offset against the available losses. Those losses are still used 
in the hands of the taxpayer who generated the losses in the first place but the acquirer can 
indirectly take advantage of the acquired losses.53  
                                                 
52
 The “same entity” tax policy implies that loss utilization is strictly confined to the entity that incurred the loss. 
Donelly and Young (2002) provide an extensive discussion on the various concepts of tax loss utilization and its 
economic implications.  
53
 Such tax planning strategies imply that an acquirer is not interested in the original business activities of the 
target and usually does not inject new equity capital to have the target carry on its actual business.  
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Most national tax rules that aim at such tax planning structures are usually triggered by a cer-
tain percentage change in ownership of a loss-carrying company. The ownership change can 
be combined with several other legal requirements such as a change of activity, a change in 
the type of income or changes in the employment structure to further specify an underlying 
tax motivation. If an acquisition of a loss-carrying target fulfills these requirements a purely 
tax-driven transaction is assumed and losses of the target that existed prior to the deal cannot 
be utilized for tax purposes after the transaction.   
 
Given the above considerations, any potential acquirer of a company does not only buy assets, 
liabilities or unrecorded synergies but also acquirers the option of future tax savings. Thus, 
the taxable loss also represents a valuable asset to the acquirer that is considered in the price 
negotiation process. In case of a transfer restriction, the unutilized loss of the potential target 
firm can be subject to a complete devaluation, assuming that the loss-carrying company itself 
will not be able to utilize its losses in the future.54 The unused tax losses also lose their value 
to any potential acquirer since it cannot gain any future tax savings. As a consequence, the 
maximum offer price the acquirer is willing to bid is reduced and the acquisition of loss firms 
is systematically discouraged.55  
Early empirical evidence by Moore and Pruitt (1987) confirm such a loss in value. First, they 
show that tax losses represent a portion of a loss firm’s market value. Second, they demon-
strate that a tightening of the anti-loss transfer legislation significantly reduces the present 
value of loss firms. Later empirical studies by Henning, Shaw and Stock (2000) and Chiang, 
Stammerjohan and Englebrecht (2014) also consider possible restrictions to loss transfers in 
estimating the effects of tax losses on acquisition prices.  
Based on the above considerations of a limited usage of tax losses and depressed acquisition 
prices my first hypothesis is:  
 
H1: Introducing a restriction to the transfer of tax losses reduces the acquisition rate of loss-
carrying companies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
54
 Auerbach and Poterba (1987) argue that such a loss in value is caused by restrictions on the preservation of 
loss carry-forwards.  
55
 The restriction can reduce the bidder’s price down to zero if the target contains zero net assets and no future 
positive cash flows are expected. From the seller’s perspective a tax-driven lock-out effect is prevented 
(Schreiber (2014)).  
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5.2.2 Taxes and Firm Entry 
 
Tax policy can have potentially positive as well as negative effects on business start-ups and 
entrepreneurship. Recent studies have identified four different channels through which vari-
ous aspects of a tax system can affect the entrepreneurial decision.56  
 
The first one refers to the effective tax burden. Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011) 
use a panel data set of 17 European countries to examine the effect of effective corporate tax 
rates on firm entry by controlling for possible endogeneity concerns. They report a negative 
effect of corporate income taxation on entry rates. In a related study Djankov, Ganser, 
MacLiesh, Ramalho and Shleifer (2010) use a survey based cross-section of 85 countries. 
They also find a negative association between the effective corporate tax burden of a chosen 
“standard company” and entry rates. Both studies deliver empirical evidence of the predicted 
adverse effect of corporate taxation on entry rates as predicted in the models by Romer (1994) 
and Appelbaum and Katz (1996).  
 
The second channel describes the relationship between the tax burden of self-employed in-
come and taxes on wage income. The relative tax burden can encourage more entrepreneurial 
activities by taxing self-employment income more favorably than alternative wage income as 
an employee. Schuetze (2000) and Bruce (2000) examine the effect of such tax differences on 
employment rates. In both studies it can be shown how differential taxation can affect self-
employment activities suggesting that higher tax rates on wages may increase the self-
employment rate.57  
 
Capital gains taxation is the third channel. At the moment of entry the investor already takes 
into account the tax burden of the exit option. Capital gains taxation plays an especially im-
portant role in the context of venture capital investments. Poterba (1989) describes the possi-
ble shift from labor income to capital gains income when capital gains are subject to a lower 
tax burden.   
 
                                                 
56
 The following literature review covers entrepreneurship with respect to all legal firm types. Within the scope 
of my empirical analysis I later only consider corporate firm entries. Compare Gentry and Hubbard (2005) for an 
alternative literature review. 
57
 Given a series of papers by Carroll, Holtz-Eakin, Rider and Rosen (2000a, 2000b, and 2001) the effect of 
income taxation on ongoing entrepreneurial activity seems far from clear. Their studies examine whether taxes 
affect decisions of entrepreneurs. They find that lower marginal tax rates reduce income, investments and hiring.   
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The tax system and its effect on risk-taking is the last channel. Starting its own company is a 
risky business. A tax system can affect an investor’s willingness to take on risk in various 
ways.58 Domar and Musgrave (1944) examine the effect of a proportional tax on risky assets 
for risk-averse investors. They describe the mechanism of risk-sharing with the government. 
A higher marginal tax rate and therefore more potential risk-sharing eventually makes higher 
entrepreneurial risk-taking more attractive assuming a complete offset of losses.59  
In a next step, extending these early approaches Gentry and Hubbard (2004a, 2004b) focus on 
the effects of tax progressivity on entry into entrepreneurship. They argue that the marginal 
tax rate alone does not necessarily capture the entire effect of a tax system on entrepreneur-
ship. They examine if nonlinearities in the tax system encourage or discourage potential en-
trepreneurs. They find significant evidence that the convexity of a tax schedule negatively 
affects entrepreneurship suggesting that asymmetric taxes on different investment outcomes 
discourage risk-taking.  
 
Cullen and Gordon (2007) formalize how taxation affects the incorporation decision. They 
model three distinct modes through which the tax system can influence the entry decision in 
the form of a corporation. Those three modes have potentially countervailing effects on the 
decision to incorporate which leads to an unclear final outcome. The first effect captures the 
benefits from being able to shift business income but not wage income from the personal to 
the corporate tax schedule, it is therefore referred to as the “income-shifting” effect. It primar-
ily measures the extent to which taxes can be saved through incorporation but does not cap-
ture any risk considerations. In terms of risk, taxes can reduce the costs of bearing risk for two 
reasons: the “risk-subsidy” effect and the “risk-sharing” effect. The former depends on the 
progressivity of the effective tax schedule whereas the latter is determined by the marginal tax 
rate with given predefined loss compensation rules. The overall reduction in risk crucially 
depends on the investor’s ability to offset losses.60    
 
                                                 
58
 Poterba (2001) provides a summary of this strand of literature.  
59
 Sandmo (1969) and Stiglitz (1976) extend their results and directly apply them to entrepreneurial decisions. 
They reach the same conclusion under the assumptions of constant returns to scale in production and fully debt 
financed investments. Mossin (1968) and Mintz (1981) conclude that a full loss offset has either no or a positive 
effect on investments in risky projects. 
60
 In Domar and Musgrave’s (1944) proportional tax rate model the risk-sharing effect is fully described by the 
tax rate t and the respective loss offset. Cullen and Gordon (2007) generalize this effect in their risk-sharing term 
for nonlinear tax schedules. The reduced risk premium due to a risk-sharing effect is essentially based on the 
possibility to offset losses. If losses cannot be offset at all, the investor bears the entire risk and risk-sharing does 
not take place. On the other hand a complete loss compensation will let the government fully participate in the 
losses.     
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Any tax loss that cannot be utilized hampers the risk-sharing effect of a tax system. The risk 
premium inherent in every uncertain investment is not reduced, since the government only 
participates in a positive outcome but does not take its share in a loss. Consequently, under-
taking risky investments is discouraged. This holds for investments in individual assets or for 
the entrepreneurial decision itself. In all cases the investment decision depends on the yield 
and the risk involved.  
 
Based on the idea of a risk-sharing effect as described in the model by Cullen and Gordon 
(2007) I argue that tax rules that effectively restrict the transfer of tax losses reduce the 
amount of overall risk-sharing between investors and the state and thus discourage corporate 
entrepreneurial activities. Intuitively, a rationale investor does not only consider the effects of 
an asymmetric treatment of a NOL but also the final use of a possible loss in case of a future 
market exit. The possibility of a future monetization of remaining losses through a sale reduc-
es an investor’s ex-ante risk premium and consequently encourages entrepreneurial risk-
taking. Whereas, any limitation to the transfer of losses reduces the return relative to the risk 
involved and makes a firm entry less attractive.  
 
Tax authorities usually point to the fact, that limitations to the transfer of losses are intended 
to prevent purely tax driven transactions and to ensure that loss relief is only granted to the 
person that economically incurred the loss. However, the political debate usually ignores the 
above described consequences for entrepreneurial decision making. 
 
For all countries that introduced a restriction to loss transfers I would expect a decrease in 
entry rates after the implementation. However, if a national restriction is considered especially 
effective in discouraging acquisitions of loss-carrying companies based on my first analysis I 
would expect a more pronounced adverse effect on entry rates. Based on the above considera-
tions I set up the following hypothesis: 
 
H2:  Introducing a restriction to the transfer of tax losses reduces the firm entry rate.  
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5.2.3 Value-relevance of Losses and Firm Exit 
 
In order to fully understand the impact of restricted tax loss transfers on firm dynamics it is 
also necessary to look at the exit decision of firms. As the restricted transfer of a NOL ham-
pers the entry decision it also encourages the dissolution of companies. Previous empirical 
literature on determinants of firm exits has primarily focused on legal or institutional condi-
tions, industry-specific determinants or firm-specific factors.  
 
Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003) examine the impact of the legal and institutional frame-
work on the exit decision. They find that fairness, property rights, legal formalism and the 
interference of courts are all associated with a reduction in exit rates.  
 
Many studies predominantly look at the special meaning of industries and industry-specific 
determinants with respect to exit decisions. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988) and 
Samaniego (2009) find a high correlation between entry and exit rates across industries, sug-
gesting that both are determined by the same industry-specific factors. Huyghebaert and van 
de Gucht (2004) find that the exit probability of start-ups in highly competitive industries is 
higher compared to other industries and that a high degree of leverage amplifies this effect.  
 
Firm-specific attributes such as age and size have also been subject to intense scrutiny. Along 
these lines, Mata, Portugal and Guimaraes (1995) find a negative impact of firm size on the 
failure rate and show evidence that the growth rate is negatively associated with the probabil-
ity of survival. Harhoff, Stahl and Woywode (1998) examine the effect of different legal 
forms on insolvency rates of West German firms. They show that firms with limited liability 
face higher insolvency rates than comparable firms with full liability. Furthermore, they study 
how the age of the owner of the firm affects the probability of liquidation or insolvency. 
 
Another strand of literature identifies different forms of firm exits and examines if and how 
they are affected by various economic and firm-specific factors. The study by Schary (1991) 
is the first empirical analysis that differentiates between different modes of exit and tests 
whether these forms have common economic determinants. She finds that firm-specific fac-
tors determine the exit decision and that differences exist between the various forms of exit.61 
                                                 
61
 When talking about firm exits, the empirical literature usually distinguishes between three possible exit chan-
nels: The first one is a voluntary liquidation and the second one an involuntary bankruptcy. In both cases a busi-
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Chang and Singh (1999) identify significantly different drivers for the mode of exit and the 
exit decision itself.  
 
I argue that a limited transfer of losses can also be seen as another legal factor that influences 
a firm’s exit decision. Every owner of a company that is in an overall loss position faces the 
decision to either terminate the business or to carry on the business activities in order to be-
come profitable again and to make up for prior losses. For such a company, a taxable loss is a 
valuable asset since it can be carried forward in time and enables the company to reduce its 
future tax burden.62  
However, a company can only take advantage of those prior losses if it generates sufficient 
future taxable income. If this is not the case and the company is not able to utilize the losses 
in the future the owner can still sell the company as a kind of “shell” containing the loss. As 
future tax savings can be sold the downside risk of running a loss firm with the potential 
threat of even higher future losses is reduced and the owner of a loss-carrying company may 
be more willing to continue the business. Even though the company might not be able to ben-
efit from future tax savings itself, the taxable loss still has an inherent value to the firm as it 
serves as a remaining valuable asset not recorded on the balance sheet.  
 
As a consequence of a limitation to the transfer of tax losses, any unutilized loss of a firm 
may be subject to a complete devaluation, assuming that the loss-carrying company itself will 
not be able to utilize its loss in the future. The costs of failure increase for the owner of a loss 
firm as the company cannot resort to its tax losses as last tradable or lendable asset anymore. 
Thus, running a firm in a loss position becomes more risky and the probability of an earlier 
liquidation or bankruptcy increases. Therefore, I expect any introduction of restrictions to loss 
carry-overs to increase the exit rate of loss-carrying firms through dissolution. Again, in those 
countries with particularly effective rules I would anticipate a more distinct rise in firm exits 
rates. This leads to my third hypothesis:    
 
H3: Introducing a restriction to the transfer of tax losses increases the firm exit rate of loss 
firms. 
                                                                                                                                                        
ness is ultimately dissolved by selling off all its remaining assets and eventually ceases to exist. The third chan-
nel is a complete acquisition or a merger of the company. 
62
 A loss carry-back would be even more valuable since it leads to an immediate tax refund of previously paid 
taxes. 
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5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Database 
 
My main data source is the Orbis database published by Bureau van Dijk. Orbis covers com-
pany accounts from over 200 countries worldwide. It contains a wide range of firm-level mi-
cro data such as general contact information, financial information, legal company infor-
mation, industry classification codes, the date of incorporation, activity status and corporate 
ownership information. Overall, it contains information on over 120 million companies. Bu-
reau van Dijk works with over 100 data providers most of which are chambers of commerce, 
company registries and other private data providers to ensure a comprehensive and constantly 
maintained and updated coverage. Orbis combines the information from the various sources 
and checks them for consistency on a monthly basis.  
A distinct feature of the Orbis database is the preservation of historical company information. 
Once a company has been included into the database, Orbis keeps its key company level in-
formation even after five consecutive years of no reporting. This ensures a complete coverage 
beyond the scope of only active firms.63 This historical data enables me to construct a com-
prehensive dataset of firm entries and firm exits that covers all active as well as inactive 
firms. Due to the preservation of all firms - regardless of their reporting status - the dataset 
allows me to circumvent the potential survivorship bias caused by continuous removal of no 
reporting or inactive firms.64  
 
5.3.2 Dataset  
 
I use the 2013 internet version of Orbis to construct my dataset of 17 countries. I restrict my 
dataset to the period 1995 to 2012. It is important to note that the coverage of the Orbis data-
base varies over time. Therefore I choose the year 1995 as my starting point since data up to 
the end of the eighties is partly very scarce and lacks reliability. But since the beginning of the 
nineties, Bureau van Dijk has made major efforts to expand the coverage of its different data-
bases to ensure a richer and more representative firm coverage.65  
My dataset contains four countries which introduced restrictions to the transferability of tax 
                                                 
63
 In contrast to the Amadeus database: here firms are removed from the database after five years of no reporting 
(Klapper et al. (2006)).  
64
 Klapper et al. (2006) explain the potential problem of deleting inactive firms after five years of no reporting.  
65
 However, those expansions also make earlier data less comparable. 
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losses between 1995 and 2012, namely Brazil, the Czech Republic, Mexico and Japan.66 The 
remaining 13 countries do not limit the transfer of losses by any means for the entire sample 
period.67  
 
By constructing the dataset I follow the steps outlined by Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006). I 
start with roughly 27 million firms for all relevant countries for the years 1995 to 2012. I in-
clude all available size categories in my sample to make sure to cover all possible firm en-
tries.68 In order to ensure a consistent and comparable dataset I drop all observations that do 
not provide any information on the country of seat, the date of incorporation, the legal liabil-
ity status of the entity’s owners, the activity status of the company, any identification infor-
mation of the company, and any information on the last available year of reporting.  
 
Furthermore, I restrict the sample only to those legal forms that do protect all their owners 
from legal liability. Consequently, all types of sole proprietorships, partnerships and limited 
partnerships are excluded from the sample. Since Orbis provides unconsolidated and consoli-
dated financial statements I exclude all consolidated firm observations in order to avoid dou-
ble-counting firms. In a next step I exclude all firm observations that do not provide any in-
formation on the industry classification.69 I further exclude the following industries: agricul-
ture, fishing, mining, utilities in Europe, financial services, public sector, education in Europe, 
health and social sector, activities of households, extraterritorial organizations and any non-
classified industries based on the 2-digit SIC code.70  
 
In a next step I combine the financial statement data with an international M&A Dataset from 
the Bureau van Dijk’s Zephir M&A Database. My M&A Dataset covers 94,125 deals an-
nounced between 1990 and 2012 and completed by the end of 2012. I only consider acquisi-
tions that result in a 100 percent ownership change in the target firm. Mergers, leverage buy-
outs, management buyouts and other forms of restructuring are not considered.  
 
                                                 
66
 Appendix B lists the countries and the respective tax reforms that contain restrictions on the transfer of tax 
losses.  
67
 Countries that did not limit the transfer of losses up to the end of 2012: Argentina, Switzerland, Estonia, 
Greece, Croatia, Iceland, Korea, Norway, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Turkey. 
68
 Small firms are excluded from the analysis of loss M&As and firm exits. I exclude small firms since historical 
financial statement information is poorly covered and would lead to an uneven and non representative sample of 
loss M&As and firm exits. 
69
 Firms are excluded that neither have a SIC classification nor a NAICS classification. 
70
 Those industries are subject to special regulations, country-specific distributions or highly specialized activi-
ties. See Klapper et al. (2006) for a discussion. 
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My final sample size varies from period to period. The sample consists of 101,692 incorpo-
rated companies in 1995. Sample size rises to a maximum of 284,586 companies in Year 
2006. My last sample period 2012 still contains 85,522 companies. Over the entire sample 
period I observe 6,310 completed acquisitions of incorporated firms. 
 
5.4 Loss M&As – Test of Effectiveness 
5.4.1 M&A Rate 
 
I calculate the M&A rates of loss-carrying target companies for all country-industry-year ob-
servations over the entire sample period from 1995 to 2012 across all 17 countries. The M&A 
rate is calculated as follows:   
 
ist
ist
ist
Loss AcquisitionsLoss-Acquisition-Rate  = 
All Acquisitions

   
 
The numerator is defined as all loss-acquisitions in a given country i in industry s and in year 
t.71 Loss-acquisitions is the number of all companies that carry a loss in the period of the 
transaction and are subject to a 100 percent ownership change in the form of an acquisition 
according to Bureau von Dijks Zephir Database. Loss-acquisitions are scaled by the number 
of all M&A transactions that take place in the respective country-industry-year combination 
(Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012)). In calculating the rate I only consider incorporated compa-
nies that provide limited liability status for the owners of the firm.  
 
Table 5-1 summarizes the M&A rates for all countries. For my group of treatment countries 
the Czech Republic and Japan show with 3.4 % and 1.9 % respectively, the highest average 
rates of loss acquisitions whereas Brazil has the lowest M&A rate at 0.7 %. Overall, the aver-
age M&A rate of loss-carrying targets across the entire sample is 1.7 %. For the two control 
countries Argentina and Switzerland I have no loss M&A observations during my sample 
period. These relatively low percentages already indicate that takeovers of loss firms are rare 
events in the market of corporate control.  
 
                                                 
71
 Industry refers to the 2 digit SIC Code level. 
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Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics of M&A Rates 
Variable: M&A Rate Observations Mean  
 
Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Argentina 101 0 0 0 0 
Brazil 889 0.0078 0.081 0 1 
Croatia 785 0.0144 0.115 0 1 
Czech Republic 629 0.0339 0.174 0 1 
Estonia 513 0.0117 0.108 0 1 
Greece 692 0.0152 0.121 0 1 
Iceland 583 0.0034 0.058 0 1 
Japan 858 0.0196 0.132 0 1 
Korea 552 0.0018 0.042 0 1 
Mexico 819 0.0109 0.101 0 1 
Norway 515 0.0620 0.217 0 1 
Poland 651 0.0365 0.177 0 1 
Romania 719 0.0148 0.119 0 1 
Russia 968 0.0543 0.183 0 1 
Slovakia 683 0.0078 0.086 0 1 
Switzerland 167 0 0 0 0 
Turkey 921 0.0018 0.043 0 1 
 
5.4.2 Test of Effectiveness 
 
In my analysis of the effectiveness of “anti-loss trafficking” rules I follow a panel estimation 
approach in order to take advantage of the longitudinal variation in my dataset. I apply a 
model with fixed effects to control for any unobserved time-constant heterogeneity. Standard 
errors are clustered at the country-industry level. The model is  
 
  ist 0 1 it 2 it t is istY Afterreform X Year             
 
The dependent variable istY  is the country-industry-year specific M&A rate of loss compa-
nies. itAfterreform  is my policy indicator that is equal to 1 for country i after it implements a 
limitation to loss transfers and zero otherwise.72 itX  is a vector of measured independent con-
trol variables that vary across country and time. tYear  is a year-specific effect and is  cap-
tures all country-industry-specific time-invariant heterogeneity. Finally, ist  stands for all idi-
                                                 
72
 In additional settings I also exclude the periods of the reforms from the empirical analysis to avoid spurious 
results due to unclear effects in the year of implementation. In order to validate my results I have also run tests 
with up to the last two periods before the reform excluded. The results do not significantly change.   
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osyncratic disturbances that change across country, industry sector and time (Wooldridge 
2010, p. 285). The coefficient 1  of itAfterreform  captures the effect of the change in tax pol-
icy on the rate of loss-acquisitions. This estimator is not contaminated by influences of any 
time-constant, unobserved country/industry characteristics that affect the M&A rate as well as 
the sample groups in which countries are selected.  
Examples of such characteristics could be the underlying political or institutional environment 
for M&A activities, industry-specific incentives or obstacles, or regional differences in the 
cultural attitude towards M&As. The model implicitly controls for all those variables by sub-
tracting a country-industry mean from each observation. This ensures that the effects which I 
attribute to the treatment are not spurious results of the types of country/industry combina-
tions that receive those treatments.73  
      
Vector itX  contains various control variables to account for the possibility that the random 
samples within each group have systematically different characteristics in the period before 
the policy change and afterwards (Wooldridge 2010, p. 148). I control for various country-
specific determinants of M&A activity such as macroeconomic factors, the institutional 
framework (Erel, Liao and Weisbach (2012), Huizinga and Voget (2009); Rossi and Volpin 
(2004), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002)) and national tax rules (Ayers, 
Lefanowicz, and Robinson (2003)). Descriptive statistics of the control variables can be found 
in Table 5-2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 The unobserved individual effects are coefficients on dummies for each country/industry combination. Treat-
ing the individual effects as estimated parameters is mathematically the same as estimating in deviations from 
means. First the country/industry averages are calculated and then subtracted from each country/industry obser-
vation individually thereby deleting all unobserved individual effects. 
 87 
 
Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics of Control Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Standard  
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
GDP per Capita  12975 9.311 0.965 7.003 11.51 
GDP Growth 12628 2.939 3.931 -10.89 9.486 
Inflation 12667 10.03 21.02 -0.900 197.5 
Interest rate 11754 10.48 15.66 0.042 80.74 
Stock/GDP  12975 3.435 1.050 -1.824 5.735 
Credit/GDP  12522 3.868 0.864 1.970 5.767 
Corporate Income Tax Rate 12975 0.289 0.078 0.150 0.514 
Personal Income Tax Rate 12975 0.359 0.103 0.130 0.600 
Loss Carry-Forward 12716 14.79 26.72 2 ∞ 
Overall Score  12967 63.15 8.709 42.90 81.90 
Voice and Accountability 12260 0.635 0.636 -0.965 1.754 
Political Stability 12260 0.324 0.793 -1.462 1.545 
Government Effectiveness 12260 0.665 0.723 -0.766 2.218 
Regulatory Quality 12260 0.632 0.635 -0.964 1.843 
Control of Corruption 12260 0.474 0.870 -1.126 1.988 
Rule of Law 12260 0.420 0.907 -1.088 2.441 
Entry Time 12475 37.23 33.23 4.5 152 
Entry Cost 12475 13.16 9.618 0.9 36.8 
Note: For the definitions and sources of the variables see Appendix A. 
 
In column one of Table 5-3, the combined effect of all reforms is estimated. According to my 
results, the coefficient on the reform dummy is not significantly different from zero, which 
suggests that all four reforms taken together do not reduce the rate of acquired loss-firms. 
This net effect implicitly assumes that all four anti-avoidance rules are identically designed 
and apply to the same type of transactions.  
 
However, national “anti-loss trafficking” rules are individually structured and are not neces-
sarily equally effective. Many national restrictions only apply under certain circumstances and 
national tax codes also provide possible exceptions. These exceptions generally relate to a 
lack of tax avoiding motives or internal reorganizations.74  
In the reform of 2007 the Mexican tax legislator implemented a very rigorous rule that is 
meant to considerably impede the transfer of losses in the case of restructuring. The re-
striction is triggered by any type of restructuring activity without any percentage threshold of 
the change in ownership. A transfer may only be possible if multiple requirements are cumu-
latively fulfilled and the Mexican tax authorities grant their approval. 
                                                 
74
 Further exceptions refer to the preservation of employment, an unchanged income structure of the target or 
other economic or financial reasons. In these cases, an economically justified deal is assumed.  
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Table 5-3: M&A Rate Regression Results 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES M&A Rate M&A Rate M&A Rate M&A Rate 
     
Reform 0.00738 
   
 
(0.991) 
   
Interaction Brazil 
   
0.485*** 
    
(2.873) 
Interaction Mexico 
   
-0.555 
    
(-0.590) 
Interaction Japan 
   
0.00966 
    
(0.0208) 
Interaction Czech  
Republic 
   
0.576 
(0.706) 
     
Brazil 
 
-0.00912 -0.00205 -0.153** 
  
(-1.466) (-0.364) (-2.487) 
Mexico 
 
-0.00343 0.00452 0.164 
  
(-0.321) (0.442) (0.605) 
Japan 
 
0.0124 0.0247** 0.0197 
  
(0.961) (2.085) (0.106) 
Czech Republic 
 
0.0109 0.0181 -0.108 
  
(0.751) (1.260) (-0.643) 
GDP percap 0.0270*** 0.0252*** 0.0327*** 0.0270*** 
 
(3.670) (3.082) (4.432) (3.709) 
GDP Growth 0.000650* 0.000665* 0.000656* 0.000527 
 
(1.845) (1.885) (1.867) (1.482) 
Inflation -0.000110 -7.78e-05 -1.61e-05 -7.72e-06 
 
(-1.588) (-1.182) (-0.265) (-0.128) 
Interest rate 0.000908*** 0.000850*** 0.000655*** 0.000622*** 
 
(6.840) (6.427) (5.750) (5.462) 
Stock/GDP 0.00217 0.00268 0.00712*** 0.00659*** 
 
(0.913) (1.137) (2.971) (2.764) 
Credit/GDP -0.00154 -0.000945 -0.00505 -0.00506 
 
(-0.343) (-0.204) (-1.039) (-1.038) 
Overall Score -0.000769** -0.000691* -0.00107*** -0.00136*** 
 
(-2.108) (-1.820) (-2.970) (-3.662) 
LCF 
  
0.000553*** 0.000604*** 
   
(4.084) (4.426) 
Corporate Tax Rate 
   
-0.115*** 
    
(-4.414) 
     
Observations 11.524 11.524 11.304 11.304 
Number of panel 1.026 1.026 1.026 1.026 
Adjusted R-squared 0.029 0.029 0.033 0.034 
     
The reported estimates are from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the ratio of acquired 
loss companies to the total number of acquisitions over the period 1995 to 2012, by the two-digit SIC industry 
code and by country. Definitions and sources of all my control variables can be found in the Appendix. All con-
trols are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country/industry level. 
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A similarly strict rule can be found in Brazil. Brazil introduced its limitation to loss transfers 
as part of the Budget Law 1999. After the slightest change in ownership that cannot be suffi-
ciently justified by real financial or economic reasons combined with a change in activities a 
carry-over of losses is not possible anymore.75 
 
According to the Japanese anti-avoidance rule, introduced as part of the tax reform of 2006, a 
loss carry-over is not possible if more than 50 % of the shares in a loss making company are 
acquired and a so called “special event” occurs.76 Furthermore, the Japanese corporation tax 
law explicitly mentions and restricts possible other types of transactions that might be used to 
circumvent the previous provisions such as mergers. Given the relatively narrow definition I 
would classify the Japanese rules as less restrictive than the rules in Mexico and Brazil. 
 
In the Czech Republic a loss transfer is generally restricted as soon as a change in ownership 
of more than 25 % takes place and the “Income structure test” is not passed.77 However, the 
income structure test is not uniformly applied to all legal forms and thus leaves enough room 
to circumvent the restriction.78 In addition the Czech anti-avoidance rules also allow for a 
wide range of exceptions that still enable an acquirer to take advantage of an unrestricted loss 
transfer after an ownership change. Most notably, on the merger or demerger of a company, a 
rollover of tax losses of a dissolving company is possible under certain circumstances. There-
fore, I consider the Czech rule as the least effective anti-avoidance measure.  
 
In order to account for these different reforms individually I allow for separate effects in col-
umns two and three of Table 5-3. None of the reforms leads to a constant reduction in M&A 
rates. In Brazil the influence of the reform is consistently negative but not significantly differ-
ent from zero. Despite their strict nature, neither the Mexican nor the Japanese rules negative-
ly affect the rate of loss-acquisitions. The Czech reform does not show a significant impact 
either.  
 
                                                 
75
 According to Brazilian tax taw an acquisition of a bankrupt company is justified by legitimate economic mo-
tives if some of its activities continue to be carried on or some of the employees are retained. 
76
 For instance, a “special event” that triggers a restriction of loss carry-overs is defined as quitting its previous 
business and starting a new business in a scale substantially larger than the previous business within 5 years from 
the date of the share acquisition. 
77
 The income structure test is passed if the company proves that at least 80 % of the income has been generated 
by the same activities as the activities performed in the period during which the losses were incurred. Income 
that is recorded as extraordinary income pursuant to Czech accounting standards is not taken into account for the 
purposes of the test. 
78
 For instance, special testing rules apply to a Czech joint-stock company that has issued bearer shares. 
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In column four I additionally consider the value relevance of a tax loss for the acquirer. As 
higher corporate tax rates increase the value of tax losses I assume a higher level of loss ac-
quisitions before the reform and thus a more pronounced decline afterwards depending on the 
corporate tax rate. However, Brazil shows a significant positive synergy between the imple-
mentation of the anti-avoidance rule and corporate tax rates. The interaction terms for the oth-
er tax reforms do not seem to have an effect on acquisition behavior. 
In sum, I cannot identify any country whose “anti-loss trafficking” rules appear to have suffi-
cient “bite” to permanently reduce the rate of loss acquisitions after the reform. 
 
Most of the macroeconomic control variables show the expected signs. A stronger growth in 
GDP and a higher level of GDP lead to more acquisition activities in general and also to more 
loss-acquisitions. Higher interest rates imply greater risk of financial distress and consequent-
ly cause an increase in potential loss-carrying targets. A more stable political and institutional 
environment measured by the aggregated political stability indicator (Overall Score) is gener-
ally associated with fewer bankruptcies and a lower M&A rate of loss firms. A longer time 
span for tax loss carry-forwards increases the attractiveness of loss-carrying targets and thus 
lets the M&A rate rise.  
 
In all four treatment countries I find rules and regulations concerning the passing on of losses 
that are characterized by a clearly stated set of legal conditions that have to be met and gener-
ally do not provide much room for ambiguous legal interpretations. Nevertheless, while con-
trolling for various economic and institutional explanatory factors, the results indicate that the 
analyzed reforms in Brazil, Mexico, Japan and the Czech Republic do not lead to a consistent 
reduction in the rate of loss-acquisitions.  
 
These results can either be attributed to shortcomings in the identification strategy and the 
used M&A-measure or they indicate that most of the “anti-loss trafficking” regulations fail to 
stop tax driven loss acquisitions.  
 
Although I apply a detailed and thorough data cleaning procedure I cannot rule out the possi-
bility that I might also consider unaffected deals in my analysis. That would be the case if I 
accidentally include firms with positive taxable income in my measure since I only use ac-
counting information to identify loss firms. Consequently, my M&A rate would not decrease. 
Alternatively, acquisitions of loss firms for legitimate business purposes are hard to separate 
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from purely tax-motivated deals. In the former case, an ownership change should be harmless 
to any later use of tax losses and thus no reduction in the rates should be observed either. 
  
Furthermore, it might also be the case that I unintentionally leave out affected deals before the 
reform because the coverage of finished 100 % acquisitions is still incomplete. Thus, the 
number of tax-driven deals before the reforms could be too small in my sample in which case 
I would not expect to find a significant decline in the observed rate. 
     
In addition, even if an acquisition is carried out for tax planning purposes, rational deal partic-
ipants are expected to take advantage of the wide variety of exceptions in the different tax 
codes in order to ensure a later use of tax losses. This also holds true if creative tax planning 
finds ways to circumvent loss transfer limitations through alternative transaction types such as 
mergers or step-by-step acquisitions.  
 
Moreover, the most rigorous tax rule fails to unfold with its full impact if it lacks effective 
enforcement and control. An issue I cannot directly control for but that could be reflected in 
my results.   
 
In all discussed cases, it is not surprising that a test of effectiveness leaves me with no mean-
ingful results. The subsequent analyses of the consequences of these tax rules for real eco-
nomic activities might shed further light on the meaning of loss transfer restrictions.  
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5.5 Firm Entry and Firm Exit 
5.5.1 Base Case 
 
I calculate entry rates for incorporated firms for all country-industry-year observations. The 
entry-rates are determined for the period 1995 to 2012 across all 17 countries. I measure new 
firm entries as in Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006):  
 
ist
ist
ist
New entrantsEntry-Rate  = 
All active incumbents
  
 
The numerator is defined as the number of all newly incorporated firms in a given country-
industry-year combination. The denominator captures all active incumbents. Active incum-
bents in year t are defined as all companies that are already incorporated in year t. This con-
tains two groups of companies: First, companies whose year of incorporation is year t. Se-
cond, all companies with their date of incorporation before year t which are either still record-
ed as active companies or have their last reported information at least one period after year t. 
Thereby, I only include companies that have reported filings for at least two consecutive years 
to avoid counting any frivolous or illegitimate filings. I exclude all entry rates for which I 
have less than 5 firms in a given country-industry-year combination to ensure that the differ-
ent entry rates are more comparable (Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011)).  
The exit rate is defined as the rate of loss-carrying companies being dissolved either through 
liquidation or bankruptcy in a given country-industry-year combination. I calculate the exit 
rate for period t as the number of loss firms that are in my sample in a given year t-1 but are 
not in the sample in the following year t, divided by the total number of existing firms in year 
t-1. The definition follows Desai, Gompers and Lerner (2003):  
 
ist
ist
is,t 1
Loss ExitsExit-Rate
All active incumbents 
   
 
The definition of loss firms is intended to filter out firms that not only carry losses for finan-
cial reporting purposes but also on their tax accounts. Therefore, loss firms are defined as 
companies that report a non-positive accounting profit in combination with either a negative 
(tax refund) or a zero tax burden. Existing firms are all those firms for which I have reporting 
information in a given period.   
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Table 5-4: Descriptive Statistics of Entry Rates and Exit Rates 
 
Entry Rate Exit Rate 
Country Observations Mean  
 
Observations Mean 
Argentina 850 0.0322 619 0.0304 
Brazil 833 0.0421 835 0.0325 
Czech Republic 323 0.094 846 0.0252 
Estonia 272 0.126 484 0.0164 
Greece 697 0.0397 794 0.0268 
Croatia 782 0.0584 894 0.0078 
Iceland 561 0.101 589 0.0216 
Japan 935 0.0291 978 0.0238 
Korea 561 0.1169 851 0.0168 
Mexico 799 0.033 766 0.0361 
Norway 561 0.0879 435 0.0265 
Poland 663 0.0856 754 0.0455 
Romania 17 0.093 726 0.0228 
Russia 816 0.12 1044 0.0344 
Slovakia 17 0.091 770 0.0358 
Switzerland 799 0.0798 776 0.0022 
Turkey 255 0.0067 1157 0.0494 
 
In Table 5-4 I report descriptive statistics for entry rates and exit rates by country. In my sam-
ple, Turkey, Japan, Mexico and Argentina show the lowest entry rates whereas Estonia, Rus-
sia, Korea and Iceland have on average the highest entry rates. Overall, my estimated average 
entry rates are nearly identical to the estimates in Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011) 
and on average about 3 percentage points below the estimates in Klapper, Laeven and Rajan 
(2006). However, my estimated entry rates are comparable to those of Klapper, Laeven and 
Rajan (2006) for the respective years and countries. Differences to earlier studies in average 
entry rates are especially caused by varying estimation periods and a different coverage of 
countries. For example, my sample includes only parts of Europe and also contains other in-
dustrialized countries, whereas former studies exclusively focus on European countries. The 
average rate of loss firms exiting a market is with roughly 2.6 % lower than the entry rate and 
also below the usual firm death rates.79 This is mainly due to my restrictive definition of loss 
firms that is meant to identify firms that carry losses for tax purposes and to the sole consider-
ation of incorporated companies.  
 
 
                                                 
79
 According to the OECD Entrepreneurship at a Glance Report 2011, the average exit rates in the manufacturing 
and service sector range from 18 percent to 3 percent for the year 2011.  
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In addition, I only take into account bankruptcies or liquidations as the relevant modes of exit 
and no other forms such as acquisitions or mergers. Consequently, I only measure the number 
of corporations that terminate their business activities out of a (tax) loss situation which dras-
tically reduces the number of relevant firm deaths.  
In my sample, Turkey, Poland, Mexico and Slovakia have the highest exit rates of loss com-
panies with averages between 3.5 % and 4.5 %. Korea, Estonia and Croatia can be found at 
the other end of the spectrum. Because my measures of firm entry and firm exit heavily de-
pend on data availability and regional coverage I control for country, industry and time spe-
cific effects in my following analyses.       
Figure 5-1 shows the developments of the mean entry rates and mean exit rates over time and 
across all countries and industries. 
 
Figure 5-1: Entry Rates and Exit Rates over Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The mean entry rates are characterized by a clear downward trend. For the period 1995 to 
2012 both groups move around an entry level of 6 % to 10 % which is comparable to the re-
sults in Da Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011). The entry rates at the beginning of my 
estimation period are slightly higher which can partly be explained by the reduced number of 
observations. The mean entry rates of the control countries exceed the corresponding average 
treatment entry rates over the entire sample period which implies generally slower dynamics 
in firm entries in the treatment countries. This points to a possible self-selection bias as treat-
ment countries already experience lower entry rates even before the first reform in 2000.  
 
The following analysis will indirectly control for such pre-reform differences. In general, the 
parallel trend between treatment and control countries becomes obvious and visualizes the 
comparability of these two groups. Figure 5-1 also shows the comparable evolvement of firm 
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exit rates over time. The average exit rates of treatment and control countries move at a level 
between 1 % and 2 %. Beginning in period 2008, exit rates experience a sharp increase. This 
rise of firm exits across all countries is in line with the decline in the number of new firms for 
the same time span. Both developments are due to a non-representative number of firms in 
later periods which amplifies the effect of firm exits and gives the impression of fewer firm 
entries.80 In addition, the developments of entry rates and exit rates reflect the economic 
downturn during the financial crises and the subsequent worldwide struggle for recovery in 
the aftermath.  
 
I want to answer the question how the introduction of a limitation to loss transfers affects firm 
entries and firm exits. As in the specification before I run a fixed effects panel regression with 
country-industry-year specific entry rates or exit rates as dependent variables. The model 
eliminates all the individual-specific effects at the country-industry-level before estimating 
the impact of the reforms. Table 5-5 shows the results for entry rates.   
 
Column one summarizes my combined results. Without differentiating between the different 
treatment countries I aggregate the effect of all four reforms. In contrast to my expectations of 
a negative influence of the tax policy changes, I do not find a significant impact. Breaking 
down the initially aggregated effect into the different treatment countries will help me to at-
tribute the suggested overall effect on entry rates to the individual country-specific reforms. In 
columns two and three I include a dummy variable for every national tax reform.  
The country-specific effects give a mixed picture. On the one hand regression two reveals that 
the Mexican and the Brazilian reforms lead to a constant decrease in entry rates. The results 
are significant at the 1% level and show a decline between roughly 2.0 percentage points and 
2.5 percentage points. On the other hand, the Japanese and the Czech reforms suggest a sig-
nificant increase in entry rates.  
These results remain constant when I include an additional control for tax loss carry-forwards 
in column three. 
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 The Orbis Database completes latest firm information with a certain delay. As a consequence, recent firm 
years are on average underrepresented. New firms entries are not recorded yet and existing firms are not updated 
yet. 
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Table 5-5: Entry Rate Regression 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Entry Rate Entry Rate Entry Rate 
    
Reform 0.000152 
  
 
(0.0536) 
  
Mexico 
 
-0.0254*** -0.0201*** 
  
(-6.475) (-5.314) 
Brazil 
 
-0.0196*** -0.0140*** 
  
(-4.258) (-3.058) 
Japan 
 
0.0246*** 0.0305*** 
  
(7.241) (8.625) 
Czech Republic 
 
0.0203*** 0.0294*** 
  
(2.899) (4.242) 
GDP percap -0.0126*** -0.0110*** -0.0135*** 
 
(-3.851) (-3.219) (-4.096) 
GDP Growth 0.00165*** 0.00178*** 0.00171*** 
 
(6.405) (7.144) (7.123) 
Inflation -0.000176*** -0.000123** -0.000111** 
 
(-3.010) (-2.222) (-1.979) 
Credit/GDP 0.00167 0.00218 0.00136 
 
(0.435) (0.549) (0.355) 
Stock/GDP -0.00342*** -0.000575 -0.00362** 
 
(-2.595) (-0.428) (-2.560) 
Interest rate 0.000435*** 0.000361*** 0.000308*** 
 
(3.598) (3.083) (2.619) 
Personal Tax Rate 0.0562*** 0.0521*** 0.000873 
 
(3.746) (3.657) (0.0690) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.0729*** -0.0254 0.0123 
 
(-4.914) (-1.643) (0.770) 
Time -0.000104 -0.000391*** -0.000316*** 
 
(-1.318) (-3.914) (-3.350) 
Cost -0.00153*** -0.00235*** -0.00286*** 
 
(-3.579) (-6.101) (-8.167) 
Overall Score 0.00153*** 0.00186*** 0.00148*** 
 
(8.085) (9.448) (7.633) 
LCF 
  
0.00166*** 
   
(9.730) 
    
Observations 8.714 8.714 8.484 
Number of panel 548 548 548 
Adjusted R-squared 0.237 0.255 0.320 
    
The reported estimates are from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent varia-
ble is the ratio of new firm to total firms over the period 1995 to 2012, by the two-
digit SIC industry Code and by country. Definitions and sources of all control varia-
bles can be found in the Appendix. All controls are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. T-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at 
the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at coun-
try/industry level. 
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I include four different sets of control variables: First, I control for country-time varying mac-
roeconomic effects. The second set contains the overall score of economic freedoms that co-
vers a variety of international policy indicators constructed by the Heritage Foundation 
(Klapper, Laeven and Rajan (2006), Claessens and Leaven (2003)). Third, I include entry 
barriers in the form of start-up time and start-up costs as described by Djankov et al. (2002). 
The last set of variables consists of different tax aspects of a country such as the corporation 
tax rate, the personal income tax rate and tax loss compensation rules. The impact of the con-
trol variables can be summarized as follows:  
 
A higher level of economic development as measured by GDP per capita generally shows 
lower rates of entrepreneurial activities. This finding is consistent with the results in Egger, 
Keuschnigg and Winner (2009). In their model a higher level of per-capita GDP is associated 
with higher wage expectations that c.p. reduce the likelihood to incorporate. In contrast, the 
GDP growth rate has significant positive effects as a more dynamically growing economy is 
associated with more entrepreneurial activities.  
 
In my first setting the adverse investment effect of higher corporate tax rates becomes obvi-
ous. The maximum time span of a loss carry-forward for tax purposes directly refers to the 
risk and return relation for any potential investor. The longer a tax loss can be used, the better 
for the investor. Thus, I can identify a significant positive effect on firm entries.   
Increased time and costs of establishing a new company show a significant negative effect on 
firm entries. Higher entry costs and more time consuming legislative procedures as measures 
of the regulatory environment are associated with lower entry rates as shown by Klapper, 
Laeven and Rajan (2006).  
 
The aggregate score of the political and institutional environment has a significant positive 
influence an entry rates which is in line with previous results in the empirical literature (Da 
Rin, Di Giacomo and Sembenelli (2011).   
 
In sum, the results do not provide consistent supporting evidence for my second hypothesis on 
firm entries. Two out of four countries show a significant reduction in entry rates whereas the 
other two reforms suggest a significant increase.  
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With respect to firm exits, I expect the implementation of a limitation to loss transfers to in-
crease the rate of firm exits. The rationale behind my last hypothesis is based on the idea that 
financially distressed firms cannot resort to their tax losses as last available collateral any-
more. Taxable losses are rendered useless for potential acquirers and also as available finan-
cial funds. Therefore, a firm exit through liquidation or bankruptcy becomes more likely than 
an acquisition or an economic recovery. The regression results are summarized in Table 5-6.  
 
In my aggregate regression in column one, I find a significant increase in exit rates. This ini-
tial result of the combined effect supports my third hypothesis. However, the disproportionate 
increase in exit rates at the end of my sample period could introduce a severe bias into my 
results. To confirm my previous estimates I exclude the periods 2009 to 2012 from the regres-
sion in column two. I still find a significant increase in exit rates of about 0.6 percentage 
points. 
 
As I split up the overall estimate into the effects of the four different reforms in the treatment 
countries I find that the reforms in Brazil and the Czech Republic lead to a rise in firm exits of 
loss-carrying companies.81 The results for Mexico and Japan are not statistically different 
from zero. In Column four I include two additional tax variables to control for the corporate 
tax rates and the possibility to carry tax losses forward. In general, all my previous results 
remain constant implying an adverse effect of the Brazilian and the Czech reforms on the life 
expectancy of loss firms. 
 
With regard to the control variables, tax systems that apply generous loss compensation rules 
ease the situation for financially distressed firms. Consequently the exit rate is significantly 
reduced as tax losses can be carried forward for a longer period of time.  
GDP per capita has a consistently positive effect on the frequency of firm exits. As a country 
has already reached a relatively high level of economic development more firm exits could be 
caused by intensified competition and by the fact that growth in mature economies is rather 
driven by within-firm efficiency improvements and by market exits of less established or ob-
solete firms (Rincon and Vecchi (2003)).  
The interest rate represents the costs of debt financing and has a significantly positive impact 
on firm exits. Higher financing cost increase the risk of financial distress and thus the proba-
bility of firm death. 
                                                 
81
 Regressions two to four are all based on the reduced sample period from 1995 to 2008. 
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Table 5-6: Exit Rate Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Exit Rate Exit Rate Exit Rate Exit Rate 
     
Reform Countries 0.0440*** 0.00595***   
 (9.481) (4.239)   
Mexico   0.000149 -0.000606 
   (0.0233) (-0.0947) 
Brazil   0.0118*** 0.0137*** 
   (5.994) (6.294) 
Japan   0.00347 0.00313 
   (1.390) (1.266) 
Czech Republic   0.00469*** 0.00309* 
   (2.718) (1.791) 
GDP percap 0.0267*** 0.00804*** 0.00820*** 0.00851*** 
 (5.767) (4.420) (4.292) (4.302) 
GDP Growth 0.00101*** 0.000550*** 0.000528*** 0.000702*** 
 (4.267) (3.722) (3.705) (4.301) 
Interest rate 5.17e-05 0.000367*** 0.000363*** 0.000390*** 
 (0.646) (5.253) (5.239) (5.206) 
Inflation 7.70e-05*** -6.48e-05*** -6.95e-05*** -7.68e-05*** 
 (2.808) (-3.124) (-3.347) (-3.386) 
Credit/GDP 0.0109*** 0.00597*** 0.00551*** 0.00484*** 
 (3.082) (4.866) (4.556) (3.696) 
Voice and Accountability -0.0406*** -0.0166*** -0.0175*** -0.0198*** 
 (-9.080) (-5.875) (-6.175) (-5.313) 
Political Stability -0.00962* 0.00261 0.00185 0.00260 
 (-1.787) (1.618) (1.136) (1.473) 
Government Effectiveness -0.0308*** -0.00302 -0.00254 -0.00418 
 (-4.793) (-1.034) (-0.888) (-1.495) 
Regulatory Quality -0.0102*** 0.0104*** 0.0116*** 0.0132*** 
 (-2.929) (4.747) (5.023) (5.619) 
Rule of Law 0.0415*** -0.00758** -0.00770** -0.00977** 
 (4.274) (-2.086) (-2.112) (-2.402) 
Control of Corruption 0.0242*** 0.00358** 0.00392*** 0.00381** 
 (3.962) (2.448) (2.675) (2.471) 
Corporate Tax Rate    -0.0107 
    (-1.515) 
LCF    -5.12e-05*** 
    (-6.505) 
     
Observations 10.366 8.160 8.160 7.679 
Number of panel 813 813 813 813 
Adjusted R-squared 0.243 0.133 0.134 0.144 
     
The reported estimates are from fixed effects panel regressions. The dependent variable is the ratio of liquidated 
or bankrupt firms to total firms over the period 1995 to 2012 in column one and 1995 to 2008 in columns two to 
four, by two-digit SIC industry Code and by country. Definitions and sources of all control variables can be 
found in the Appendix. All controls are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics are in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are clus-
tered at country/industry level. 
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The baseline results as well as further specifications confirm my third hypothesis. I find a 
significant positive association between the introduction of restrictions to tax loss transfers 
and firm exits. The Brazilian “anti-loss trafficking” rule is the only one that meets my expec-
tations with respect to firm entries and firm exits. It leads to a reduction in entry rates and to a 
corresponding increase in exit rates. The remaining results taken together show rather mixed 
empirical evidence. 
 
In order to more clearly identify a causal relationship I need to more accurately single out 
particularly affected firm groups. I next test my results to alternative specification strategies.  
 
First, the probability of facing a loss situation could heavily depend on the industry and thus 
could lead to very different industry-specific effects. In particular, I seek to address the issue 
that may be only investments or loss firms in certain industries react to the new tax rules.  
Second, a broad cross-country specification might not be precise enough to identify the im-
pact of a single change in national tax rules. The quality of my estimations crucially depends 
on how well the outcome variables of my control countries resemble the outcome variables of 
my treatment countries. Instead of relying on a natural sample of control countries, creating a 
tailor made comparison group might generate more reliable results. Hence, I construct for 
every reform country an aggregated comparison group and compare the differences in the 
variables of interest.  
5.5.2 Loss-Probability 
 
The first robustness check is based on a measure of industry-specific risk. The relative risk 
positions of different industries provide a possibility to further distinguish between industry-
specific influences. In order to capture this effect I include the industry-specific loss-
probability in my regression model and estimate the effects on entry rates and exit rates at the 
country-industry level. Industries with higher loss-probability should reflect a more pro-
nounced impact on both entry rates as well as exit rates. Loss-probability is defined as the 
ratio of loss making companies to all companies by country, industry and year (Dreßler and 
Overesch (2013)). For new firm entries the coefficients on the aggregated interaction term and 
on the individual country interactions are expected to be negative. Investors planning to invest 
in a sector that bears a relatively high risk of facing a loss situation are expected to be more 
considerate or more careful when it comes to potential business risks. In contrast, the corre-
 101 
 
sponding coefficients for firm exits are expected to be positive. While the reduction in entry 
rates is based on investors’ anticipation of future risks, the increase in firm exits is the conse-
quence of firms’ missing opportunities to recover from losses. The higher the probability of 
incurring a loss the more likely a firm termination becomes.  
 
Table 5-7 presents my industry-specific outcomes for firm entries. The aggregated term and 
the country-specific reform dummies are interacted with the industry-specific loss-
probabilities to capture the combined effect of the introduction of a loss transfer restriction 
and the risk of incurring losses in a particular sector.  
 
The coefficient on the aggregated term in column one and most of the combined country coef-
ficients in column two do not show a significant impact depending on the industry-specific 
loss-probability. In comparison to the analysis from Table 5-5, my results do not suggest a 
significant effect of the Mexican reform. The interaction term for Brazil suggests a significant 
positive impact which contradicts previous estimates for the Brazilian reform.  
 
My robustness checks in Table 5-8 confirm the previous effects on firm exits. The effect over 
all reforms suggests a significant increase in firm exits for industries with a relatively high 
risk of having losses. When I break down the overall effect, I can attribute the rise in firm 
terminations to the Brazilian and the Japanese reforms. Since I only include the periods 1995 
to 2008 I can be fairly certain that I do not capture any data-driven upward trends.    
 
Based on industry-specific loss-probabilities I do not find any supporting evidence for a relia-
bly negative influence on firm entries. But my estimates verify the positive impact on exit 
rates.  
So far, I can conclude that the introductions of various “anti-loss trafficking” rules do not 
have a clear negative effect on national firm entries. But regarding their influence on firm 
exits I find a consistent and significant positive overall effect of 0.6 percentage points. 
  
To rule out the possibility that my universal panel approach unintentionally ignores systemat-
ic differences between my treatment and control units I focus on each treatment country indi-
vidually in comparison to an aggregated control group.  
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Table 5-7: Entry Rates and Loss-Probability 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Entry Rate Entry Rate 
   
Reform 0.00908***  
 (2.735)  
Interaction 0.0648  
 (1.020)  
Interaction Mexico  0.0311 
  (0.775) 
Interaction Brazil  0.426*** 
  (3.161) 
Interaction Japan  0.0666 
  (0.832) 
Interaction Czech Republic  0.198 
  (1.624) 
Loss Probability -0.0136 -0.0395** 
 (-0.846) (-2.260) 
GDP percap -0.00765* -0.0285*** 
 (-1.955) (-10.55) 
GDP Growth 0.00150*** 0.00181*** 
 (5.702) (9.612) 
Inflation -7.75e-05 -0.000215*** 
 (-1.317) (-3.350) 
Credit/GDP -0.00279 0.00146 
 (-0.603) (0.345) 
Stock/GDP -0.00732*** -0.00638*** 
 (-4.688) (-4.258) 
Interest rate 0.000162 0.000279*** 
 (1.323) (2.614) 
Personal Tax Rate 0.00346 -0.00617 
 (0.201) (-0.319) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.0388** 0.0661*** 
 (-2.492) (4.400) 
Time -7.26e-06 0.000101 
 (-0.0885) (1.204) 
Cost -0.00203*** 0.000605* 
 (-5.602) (1.703) 
Overall Score 0.00124*** 0.00198*** 
 (5.772) (8.701) 
LCF 0.00161*** 0.00149*** 
 (10.31) (9.509) 
   
Observations 7.475 7.475 
Number of panel 539 539 
Adjusted R-squared 0.329 0.254 
The reported estimates are from fixed effects panel re-
gressions. The dependent variable is the ratio of new 
firms to total firms over the period 1995 to 2012, by two-
digit SIC industry Code and by country. Definitions and 
sources of all control variables can be found in the Ap-
pendix. Individual reform dummies are neglected for 
brevity. All controls are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level. T-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered at coun-
try/industry level. 
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Table 5-8: Exit Rates and Loss-Probability 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Exit Rate Exit Rate 
   
Reform -0.0161  
 (-1.108)  
Interaction Reform 0.449***  
 (2.734)  
Interaction Mexico  -0.229 
  (-0.762) 
Interaction Brazil  1.649*** 
  (2.859) 
Interaction Japan  0.798* 
  (1.706) 
Interaction Czech Republic  -0.308 
  (-0.582) 
Loss Probability -0.279*** -0.279*** 
 (-3.396) (-3.388) 
GDP percap -0.0147* -0.0135* 
 (-1.796) (-1.849) 
GDP Growth 0.00213*** 0.00220*** 
 (3.616) (3.801) 
Interest rate 0.00132*** 0.00135*** 
 (5.269) (5.562) 
Inflation -0.000295*** -0.000290*** 
 (-4.308) (-4.056) 
Credit/GDP 0.0307*** 0.0296*** 
 (3.261) (3.321) 
Voice and Accountability -0.0273*** -0.0262*** 
 (-3.438) (-3.606) 
Political Stability 0.0244** 0.0292*** 
 (2.458) (2.962) 
Government Effectiveness -0.0146 -0.0155 
 (-1.246) (-1.272) 
Regulatory Quality 0.000793 -0.00228 
 (0.0826) (-0.268) 
Rule of Law -0.0308 -0.0315* 
 (-1.631) (-1.670) 
Control of Corruption 0.0793*** 0.0778*** 
 (4.914) (4.835) 
Corporate Tax Rate -0.116** -0.126** 
 (-1.977) (-2.010) 
LCF -0.000175** -0.000167* 
 (-2.010) (-1.914) 
   
Observations 7.355 7.355 
Number of panel 813 813 
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.133 
The reported estimates are from fixed effects panel regressions. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of liquidated or bankrupt 
firms to total firms over the period 1995 to 2008 by the two-digit 
SIC industry Code and by country. Definitions and sources of all 
control variables can be found in the Appendix. Individual re-
form dummies are neglected for brevity.  All controls are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. T-statistics are in parenthe-
ses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 
% and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at 
country/industry level. 
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5.5.3 Synthetic Control Groups 
 
In the last step, I apply a recently implemented approach for comparative case studies to im-
prove the quality of my comparison groups. Using aggregate entities as units of studies (as in 
my case countries) usually bears the problem of finding suitable single comparisons (George 
and Bennet (2005), Gerring (2007)). The selection of comparison units is very crucial for 
comparative studies since using inappropriate comparisons might lead to erroneous conclu-
sions. If treatment and comparison units are not sufficiently similar, then any differences in 
outcomes between these two groups may only reflect initial disparities in their characteristics 
(George and Bennet (2005)).  
The synthetic control method is based on the idea that a combination of comparison units 
most likely does a better job than any single comparison unit (Abadie, Diamond and 
Hainmueller (2014)). The synthetic control method chooses a comparison unit as a weighted 
average of all potential comparison units that best resembles the characteristics of the treat-
ment unit during the pre-treatment period (Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie, Diamond 
and Hainmueller (2010)). In other words, country specific weights W are chosen to minimize 
the discrepancy  
    1 0 1 0 1 0X X W v X X W 'V X X W     
 
between the pre-treatment characteristics of treatment country 1X  and the pre-treatment char-
acteristics of the untreated countries 0X . Variable v assigns larger weights to pre-treatment 
variables that have larger predictive power on the outcome variable.82 That way, the post-
intervention outcomes for the constructed comparison unit is meant to approximate the coun-
terfactual of the treatment case without the intervention.83  
 
The group of thirteen countries that have not implemented a limitation to loss transfers is the 
so called “donor pool”. From this reservoir of potential comparison units I construct a syn-
thetic control unit for each treatment country. The synthetic Japan, Mexico, Czech Republic 
or Brazil replicate either the counterfactual entry rate trends or the counterfactual exit rate 
                                                 
82
 An optimal choice of V assigns weights that minimize the mean squared prediction error (MSPE) of the out-
come variable in the pretreament period (Abadie and Gardeazabl (2003)). For a more formal derivation and 
discussion of the method compare Abadie, Diamond and Hainmueller (2014). 
83
 In contrast to the fixed effects model used in my base line regressions, this approach also allows the effects of 
unobservable confounding factors to vary with time (Billmeier and Nannicini (2013)).    
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trends that the reform countries would have had in the absence of any “loss-trafficking” legis-
lation. 
 
Table 5-9 shows the synthetic control weights of each country in the synthetic versions of the 
reform countries for entry rates. Depending on the various characteristics that describe the 
development of entry rates four slightly different sets of control countries are chosen. The 
entry rate trend for the synthetic Japan is best resembled by a combination of Switzerland and 
Greece. Whereas trends of the synthetic versions of the Czech Republic and Brazil are each 
weighted averages of five different control countries. Countries such as Iceland or Russia are 
not considered in the estimation of the synthetic control groups.  
 
Table 5-9: Weights for Synthetic Entry Control Groups 
 
Table 5-10 compares the pre-reform characteristics of the treatment units to those of their 
synthetic control groups. Similar to a matching estimator, the similarities of or the discrepan-
cies between the different outcome predictors demonstrate the affinity between the countries 
exposed to the treatment of interest and their synthetic counterparts. Across the majority of 
my predictors I can conclude that the treatment countries are closely resembled by their syn-
thetic counterparts which serve as suitable comparison groups.  
 
 
Country Synthetic Japan Synthetic Mexico Synthetic Czech 
Republic 
Synthetic Brazil 
Argentina 0 0.529 0.098 0.634 
Switzerland 0.114 0 0.335 0 
Estonia 0 0 0 0.13 
Greece 0.886 0.289 0.123 0.111 
Croatia 0 0 0 0.097 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 
Korea 0 0 0.196 0 
Norway 0 0 0 0.028 
Poland 0 0.098 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0 0 0 0 
Slovakia 0 0 0.248 0 
Turkey 0 0.084 0 0 
 106 
 
Table 5-10: Predictor Means for Entry before the Tax Reforms 
 
In general, the underlying optimization procedure primarily matches variables with the high-
est predictive power. The remaining country characteristics that are considered less important 
in approximating the trajectory of the outcome variable might show weaker pretreatment fits. 
Therefore, it would be misleading to expect the same matching quality for all variables and 
interpret infrequent discrepancies as an overall misfit.84  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
84
 For instance, Entry Cost for Japan is only assigned a relative weight of 0.000567 whereas GDP per capita has 
a weight of 0.344. Similarly, in the case of Mexico, Interest rate is only weighted with 0.00547 in contrast to 
GDP per capita with a relative weight of 0.083. Underlying weights are not shown for brevity.  
Variable Japan Synthetic Japan Mexico Synthetic Mexico 
GDP per Capita 10.5158 9.8521 8.7527 9.0918 
GDP Growth  0.8632 1.5052 2.6166 2.5925 
Inflation 0.2575 3.1198 5.1170 7.9079 
Interest rate 2.2055 5.7921 2.5583 10.703 
Credit/GDP 5.2607 4.2069 9.3052 8.2703 
Corporate Tax Rate 0.4341 0.3263 0.3216 0.3223 
Entry Time 31 37.9896 58 48.5366 
Entry Cost 10.6909 29.1022 29.1416 20.9189 
Loss Carry Forward 5.7272 6.9483 10 4.9396 
Overall Score 69.5181 74.5924 61.825 62.3452 
 
Czech Republic Synthetic Czech 
Republic 
Brazil Synthetic Brazil 
GDP per Capita 9.2507 9.9037 8.6005 9.1414 
GDP Growth  2.8026 2.9420 3.0309 2.6480 
Inflation 2.6759 3.2649 6.7202 6.7686 
Interest rate 9.3098 9.3207 6.7389 12.2039 
Credit/GDP 3.8577 4.3747 3.6814 3.3162 
Corporate Tax Rate 0.2838 0.2832 0.3322 0.3302 
Entry Time 40 47.087 152 59.907 
Entry Cost 10 10.1937 13.1 12.2831 
Loss Carry Forward 6.8 6.8262 ∞ 5.135 
Overall Score 68.26 68.2792 53.14 68.7801 
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Figure 5-2 plots the trends in entry rates of the reform countries and the fictitious trends of the 
synthetic comparison groups.    
 
Figure 5-2: Comparison of Entry Rates – Treatment Unit vs. Synthetic Control Unit 
 
Part one displays the trajectory of Japan and its synthetic counterpart for the period 1995 to 
2012. The synthetic comparison group reproduces the entry rate for Japan to a considerable 
extent. Both entry rates basically follow the same trend over the entire pre-2006 period. From 
2006 onwards both lines only diverge unsubstantially. After 2006, the synthetic entry rate 
continues roughly at the same level as before the reform while the treatment entry rate slightly 
decelerates under the assumed effect of the tax reform. 
 
The consistent decrease in both entry rates for Mexico illustrates a time lag between the actual 
number of new firm entries and the availability of firm data on Orbis. Nevertheless, the syn-
thetic trend sufficiently replicates actual firm entries before the reform in 2007. During the 
after-reform period the Mexican entry rate follows a more pronounced decline than its syn-
thetic counterpart.  
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But this decrease already starts before the reform which either indicates an anticipative effect 
on new incorporations or suggests that firm entries are unrelated to the reform. 85 
 
The graphical illustration for the Czech Republic does not suggest a pronounced negative ef-
fect of the introduction of an “anti-loss trafficking” rule on firm entries. Both trends remain 
largely unaffected by the 2005 tax reform and thus do not imply any reaction of the develop-
ment in entry rates.    
Since the pre-reform period for Brazil is limited to only five years the overall fit of the two 
trends is bound to be weaker. A comparison of the two after-reform trajectories does not sug-
gest a causal relationship between the reform in 2000 and a reduction in the relative frequency 
of new companies. 
 
Table 5-11 shows the corresponding regression results from a simple difference-in-difference 
estimator based on the treatment entry rates and their synthetic counterparts. I find no signifi-
cant decrease in entry rates in any reform country in comparison to their synthetic control 
units. The significant decrease after the different reforms is most likely caused by the overall 
downward slopping entry rate trends. These results are just the numerical affirmation of what 
the graphical findings already indicate. In sum, the combined null results of my two robust-
ness checks cast further doubt on a suspected detrimental effect on entry rates.   
 
Table 5-11: Synthetic Difference-in-Difference Entry Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Japan Mexico Czech Republic Brazil 
     
Interaction 0.0105 -0.0108 -0.0149 -0.00783 
 
(1.307) (-1.402) (-0.763) (-0.628) 
Treatment -0.0250*** 0.000148 0.00158 -0.00373 
 
(-7.256) (0.0247) (0.0898) (-0.405) 
After Reform -0.0198** -0.0327*** -0.0318*** -0.0300*** 
 
(-2.609) (-6.358) (-3.419) (-6.133) 
Constant 0.0518*** 0.0497*** 0.115*** 0.0774*** 
 
(15.70) (13.72) (16.95) (33.93) 
     
Observations 36 36 36 36 
Adjusted R-squared 0.591 0.662 0.249 0.368 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimates are based on the period 
1995 to 2008. 
 
                                                 
85
 This falling trend could also be reflected in the significant decline in entry rates after the Mexican reform re-
ported in Table 5-5.  
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Table 5-12 displays the weights of each control country in the synthetic versions for exit rates. 
The country combinations are slightly different from those in Table 5-9. This is mainly due to 
another set of pre-treatment characteristics that determine the development in exit rate trends. 
Furthermore, it also indicates that common country factors have varying impacts on the two 
rates. Therefore, different control units are picked to simulate the best possible counterfactual 
development in exit rates.   
 
Table 5-12: Weights for Synthetic Exit Control Groups 
 
Table 5-13 contains the comparison of the pre-reform characteristics of the four treatment 
countries and their respective synthetic counterparts.  As before, the relative importance of the 
individual variables is also reflected by the matching quality. The pre-intervention mean 
squared prediction error (MSPE) serves as a measure of the goodness-of-fit. It reflects the 
average of the squared discrepancies between the outcome variable in a treatment country and 
in its synthetic counterpart.  
The aggregated MSPE over all four treatment countries is only 0.0268 for exit rates in con-
trast to 0.0818 for entry rates. This suggests that the overall fit across all four treatment coun-
tries is better for exit rates than for entry rates. However, for both outcome variables the 
squared differences are sufficiently low to ensure valid conclusions.  
 
 
 
 
Country Synthetic Japan Synthetic Mexico 
Synthetic Czech Re-
public 
Synthetic Brazil 
Argentina 0 0 0 0 
Switzerland 0.363 0.504 0.074 0.158 
Estonia 0 0 0.405 0 
Greece 0.235 0 0 0 
Croatia 0 0.168 0 0 
Iceland 0 0 0 0 
Korea 0.307 0 0 0.357 
Norway 0 0 0 0 
Poland 0 0 0 0 
Romania 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0 0 0 0.485 
Slovakia 0.095 0.265 0.087 0 
Turkey 0 0.063 0.434 0 
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Table 5-13: Predictor Means for Exit before the Tax Reforms 
 
Figure 5-3 depicts the development in exit rates of loss firms for the treatment units and their 
synthetic control units. For all four treatment countries the small number of non-zero observa-
tions leads to an almost identical development of exit rates until the years 2003.   
When the Japanese anti-avoidance rule was introduced in 2006 both rates were roughly at the 
same level. In later periods the treatment exit rate does not show a more drastic increase than 
its synthetic counterpart.   
In Mexico, the exit rate trend sharply rises directly after the reform whereas the comparison 
trend can be described by a rather constant increase beginning in 2004. Yet, in the post-
reform periods the rate of firm exits of the treatment unit is not consistently higher than the 
rate in the control group. 
 
 
 
Variable Japan Synthetic Japan Mexico Synthetic Mexico 
GDP per Capita 10.4654 9.8175 8.5742 9.3709 
GDP Growth  1.1087 3.3489 2.9591 3.1824 
Inflation 0.2575 2.5481 5.1170 5.2346 
Interest rate 2.2055 8.3624 1.8059 20.391 
Credit/GDP 5.3061 4.4588 2.9648 3.9788 
Corporate Tax Rate 0.4539 0.3035 0.3375 0.3403 
Accountability 0.9779 1.0487 0.1430 0.6419 
Political Stability 1.0949 0.8224 0.4168 0.1232 
Government Effect 1.1440 1.1856 0.2033 0.8433 
Regulatary Quality 0.7748 1.0607 0.3618 0.5765 
Rule of Law 1.2583 1.1691 0.4932 0.5997 
Control of Corruption 1.0677 1.0501 0.2912 0.5123 
 
Czech Republic Synthetic Czech 
Republic 
Brazil Synthetic Brazil 
GDP per Capita 8.8284 9.3424 8.4424 8.7086 
GDP Growth  2.9292 3.0187 2.0465 1.3902 
Inflation 2.6759 4.1271 6.7202 7.7292 
Interest rate 9.3098 15.134 6.7389 12.047 
Credit/GDP 3.8456 4.0326 3.6085 3.4499 
Corporate Tax Rate 0.341 0.3406 0.306 0.3437 
Accountability 0.9047 0.9036 0.1359 0.2319 
Political Stability 0.7597 0.6203 0.2114 0.2173 
Government Effect 0.7450 1.0205 0.0935 0.1781 
Regulatary Quality 0.9965 0.7928 0.3997 0.2173 
Rule of Law 0.7790 0.7217 0.3170 0.1091 
Control of Corruption 0.4084 0.7024 0.0235 0.0232 
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For the Czech Republic I find a similar picture. For post-reform periods a more pronounced 
increase in treated firm exits in comparison to the tailored control group cannot be observed.   
In the case of Brazil a direct reaction of both exit rates immediately after the reform is not 
observable. The later development rather indicates a higher rate of firm exits for the synthetic 
control unit and thus does not meet my expectations.  
 
Figure 5-3: Comparison of Exit Rates – Treatment Unit vs. Synthetic Control Unit 
  
 
The general increase in the periods after 2008 is predominantly caused by an incomplete cov-
erage of financial statement data for younger firm years and does not reflect the actual rate of 
firm terminations in either group. 
 
In Table 5-14 my numerical estimation results are depicted. For none of my treatment coun-
tries a significant increase in exit rates can be shown. On the contrary, the exit rates in Brazil 
suggest a significant decrease for the post-reform periods. 
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Table 5-14: Synthetic Difference-in-Difference Exit Estimates 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Japan Mexico Czech Republic Brazil 
     
Interaction -0.00322 -0.00708 -0.00235 -0.00901* 
 
(-0.566) (-1.482) (-0.334) (-1.868) 
Treatment 0.000107 -0.00119 -7.78e-05 0.00335 
 
(0.197) (-1.672) (-1.568) (1.127) 
After Reform 0.0111** 0.0129*** 0.0114** 0.00807** 
 
(2.123) (6.837) (2.332) (2.556) 
Constant 0.000495* 0.00130* 9.55e-05* 4.42e-06 
 
(1.774) (1.828) (1.988) (1.035) 
     
Observations 28 28 28 28 
Adjusted R-squared 0.563 0.697 0.407 0.073 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses with *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The estimates are based on the period 
1995 to 2008 
 
The insignificant results are in line with the graphical presentations in Figure 5-3. Given the 
above results and the lack of pre-intervention observations I cannot confirm a significant in-
crease in exit rates based on a country-by-country comparison. 
 
To further validate my results I apply placebo experiments. Following Abadie, Diamond and 
Hainmüller (2010) I implement cross-sectional placebo tests. The basic principle is to sequen-
tially apply the synthetic control algorithm to every country in the donor pool and compare 
the placebo effects to my base line effects. The results can be found in Appendix C. I display 
the estimated differences between every country in the donor pool and its respective synthetic 
control group for entry rates and exit rates. The red line stands for the estimated (entry rate or 
exit rate) gap between the actual treatment country compared to its synthetic control group. 
Across all my placebo tests I find no clear differences between the entry rate gaps (or exit rate 
gaps) of my actual treatment countries and the iteratively chosen control countries. The treat-
ment trends do not show more or less pronounced increases or decreases in comparison to the 
non-reform units. Hence, my overall impression of not finding consistent results for entry 
rates nor exit rates does not seem to be coincidental. 
 
Overall, the results from the graphical and numerical analyses of treatment and synthetic con-
trol groups do not suggest any effect of loss transfer limitations on entry rates. Empirical re-
sults of accelerated firm terminations are also rather scarce and do not confirm earlier find-
ings.    
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5.6 Discussion of Results 
 
The ambiguous results for the effects of a restriction to loss transfers on entry rates or exit 
rates do not enable me to draw obvious conclusions. The partly conflicting findings do not 
support the theoretical adverse effect on entry rates nor do they provide clear empirical evi-
dence of the hypothesized increase in firm exits. The observed inconsistencies across my 
baseline estimates and robustness checks could be the consequence of various factors that are 
implicitly or explicitly not taken into account in the above analyses:  
 
First, as my descriptive analysis already suggests, acquisitions of loss-carrying targets are 
very rare events compared to ownership changes with respect to profitable firms. Further-
more, companies in a loss situation can hardly ever be sold in the first place as transaction 
costs probably outweigh possible tax savings. Consequently, the possibility of eventually sell-
ing a taxable loss might not play a role in the initial investment decision at all and does not 
affect the decision to terminate an ongoing business either.    
 
Second, the “Achilles Heel” of every difference-in-difference estimation is the assumed paral-
lel trend of the outcome variable between the treatment and the control group. As shown in 
Figure 5-1, I can be fairly confident that the common trend assumption is sufficiently met in 
the aggregate. However, since most limitations were implemented as part of larger amend-
ments to national tax systems I cannot rule out the possibility that other changes at the same 
time had an influence on entrepreneurial activities or firm dissolutions. For instance, tax re-
liefs or non-tax related subsidies which I do not control for could cause a substantial increase 
in entry rates that overcompensates a negative effect of loss transfer restrictions.  
  
Third, it is far from clear if the implementation of “anti-loss trafficking” restrictions can be 
understood as a constant barrier to entrepreneurship or as a constant thread to loss-carrying 
firms. In my empirical model a remaining and consistent effect on entry rates and exit rates is 
assumed. Any temporary shocks to firm entries or firm exits would not or only partly be cap-
tured by the applied estimator that reflects the development of both rates over the entire post-
reform period. Initial decreases in entry rates or primary increases in exit rates due to a limita-
tion to loss transfers could be overcompensated by later reforms or policy changes. In addi-
tion, any unobserved or unmeasured macroeconomic factors affecting entrepreneurship or 
firm deaths in treatment and control countries differently could also introduce another estima-
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tion bias. For instance, the Czech Republic joined the European Union in May 2004 which 
meant a major overhaul to its political, institutional and economic systems. These amend-
ments could possibly interfere with the expected effects of a tax reform in 2005 and bias my 
results. 
 
The results concerning the market exit of loss firms show quite consistent and significant 
findings in contrast to my estimates for firm entries. These different findings can be attributed 
to economic reasons and to irrational investment behavior:  
 
First of all, investors rather react to new tax loss legislations when firms are already in a trou-
blesome loss situation rather than anticipating a potential increase in risk. In other words, tak-
ing into account a theoretical future loss situation is barely found in any business plan. 
Whereas existing losses are viewed as a direct burden for the company and have to be directly 
dealt with. 
 
Furthermore, an identification approach based on the industry level might not be precise 
enough to capture the effect on firm entries. Especially investors with a high degree of strate-
gic and rational investment behavior are required to consider such sophisticated tax rules in 
their business plans. For example, venture capital investments can be expected to take into 
account loss compensation rules in case of a negative outcome and to react more sensitively 
to tax law amendments. An econometric model that simply distinguishes between different 
industries might not be able to pinpoint such strategic investments. 
  
In addition, the estimation of how entry rates are affected by the introduction of “anti-loss 
trafficking” rules might be subject to additional shortcomings. Despite an effective “loss traf-
ficking” restriction, every potential investor has the possibility to indirectly benefit from a 
loss in its incorporated firm if the national tax code allows for an impairment write-off from 
the book value of the recorded shares. Thereby, the loss in firm value at the company level is 
also reflected in a reduction of the value of shares at the level of the investor. Thus, losses 
generated at the company level reduce the investor’s personal tax burden and let the state par-
ticipate in the investor’s risk. If such an indirect loss recognition is possible a restriction to 
loss transfers does not necessarily cause the investors to suffer from an ex-ante higher risk of 
investing. Risky projects are not discouraged and entrepreneurial activities should suffer to a 
lesser extent.      
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Besides economic drivers, further explanations of (excess) firm entries can also be found in 
behavioral economics. Past research has shown that entrepreneurs are susceptible to certain 
judgmental biases. The most prominent for which this has been shown is the overconfidence 
bias. Overconfidence is understood as the overestimation of one’s own ability relative to oth-
ers. In the empirical literature overconfidence has been identified as a recurring characteristic 
among entrepreneurs and as an important driver to start a business.86 For example, using a 
sample of 2,994 entrepreneurs, Cooper, Woo and Dunkelberg (1988) find that 81 % of them 
rate their chances to succeed at least 70 % and about one third of them is entirely certain to 
succeed. Different empirical studies suggest that excess entrepreneurial entry into markets is 
causally linked to overconfidence (Busenitz and Barney (1997), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), 
Forbes (2005), Koellinger, Minniti and Schade (2007)). Furthermore, empirical evidence sug-
gests that overconfidence also has predictive power in explaining over-investment and com-
mitment to risky projects (Hayward and Hambrick (1997), Simon and Houghton (2003)).  
 
Another psychologically based explanation describes the phenomenon of self-focus in entry 
decisions. Investors concentrate on their own capabilities, strengths and weaknesses but do 
not put equal weight to external factors such as competitive assessment when starting their 
business. They show a very limited and imperfect perception of competition or market capaci-
ty (Cypert and March (1963), Moore, Oesch and Zietsma (2007)).  
Overconfidence as well as self-focus could be other possible reasons for not observing the 
hypothesized adverse effects on entry rates.  
5.7 Conclusion 
 
In this study I use a comprehensive panel data set of 17 European and non-European countries 
to analyze the effects of restrictions to tax loss transfers on firm entries and firm exits. Most 
countries do not allow companies to pass on tax losses as part of an acquisition when a 
change in ownership takes place and the loss would be indirectly transferred to another tax 
payer. Even though, these restrictions are mainly targeted at tax-driven “loss trafficking”, they 
should also affect the entrepreneurial risk-return considerations of potential firm entries and 
alter firms’ exit behavior. 
 
                                                 
86
 Based on their findings of probabilistically poor but socially useful gambles made by entrepreneurs, Dosi and 
Lovallo (1997) describe entrepreneurs as “optimistic martyrs”.  
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In the first step of my analysis, I test whether the introduction of limited loss transfers in my 
different treatment countries significantly reduces the number of loss-acquisitions. According 
to my results none of the four examined rules proves to be especially effective in reducing the 
relative frequency of loss-acquisitions. These results can either be understood as a conse-
quence of my identification strategy or they can be attributed to weak implementations or 
insufficient enforcements of anti-avoidance rules.  
 
In a next step I extend the scope of my analysis and directly study the effects on firm entries 
and firm exits. I argue with respect to entry rates that any limitation to loss transfers causes 
the entry rates to decline since the relative risk of an investment is increased. However, nei-
ther my baseline analysis nor several robustness checks reveal a consistent detrimental impact 
on entry rates.   
For a distressed firm a restriction on loss transfers leads to a devaluation of unutilized losses 
and thereby increases the cost of failure for the owner of the loss-firm. Thus, I expect such a 
limitation to lead to an increase in the rate of firm exits. My base case results suggest an aver-
age increase in the mean rate of firm dissolutions by about 0.6 percentage points. On a single 
country basis, the Brazilian and the Czech “anti-loss trafficking” rules are shown to be the 
drivers of the overall effect. However, in subsequent tests my initial findings can only be con-
firmed to a limited extent. 
I discuss various reasons for my partly conflicting outcomes and identify the unclear econom-
ic relevance of loss acquisitions, other national tax rules, specialized investments and irration-
al investment behavior along with the anticipative character of future tax losses as possible 
identification issues.   
 
Nevertheless, taking my results at face value implies very interesting policy conclusions. On 
the one hand, according to my results burdening private investors with additional restrictions 
to loss compensation does not come at the cost of reduced investment activities. That means 
that the state can protect its tax revenue without imposing new barriers to firm entries. On the 
other hand, the devaluation of tax losses seems to speed up the natural selection process at the 
end of the life span of unsuccessful business ventures. Failed business concepts are sorted out 
more quickly and resources can be sooner reallocated to more promising investments. But it 
remains an open question whether the loss of a tradable tax asset just stops putting off the 
inevitable for doomed business ventures or if potentially profitable businesses are deprived of 
their chance to recover. 
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5.8 Appendix 
 
Table 5-15: Appendix A - Variable Definition 
 
Variable Definition Source 
   
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product of country i divided by midyear population of country i  
(logarithm). 
World Development Indicators  
Worldbank 2014 
 
   
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of gross domestic product of country i. 
 
World Development Indicators  
Worldbank 2014 
 
   
Inflation Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflecting the annual percentage 
change in the cost of the average consumer. 
 
World Development Indicators  
Worldbank 2014 
 
   
Interest rate Rate paid by commercial or similar banks for demand, time or saving deposits in per-
cent. 
 
World Development Indicators  
Worldbank 2014 
 
   
Stock/GDP Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP of country i (logarithm). 
 
World Development Indicators  
Worldbank 2014 
 
   
Credit/GDP Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP of country i (logarithm). World Development Indicators  
Worldbank 2014 
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Table 5-15 – continued 
 
Variable Definition Source 
   
Corporate Tax 
Rate 
The top corporate income tax rate in country i. Author’s computation on data from 
Ernst & Young's “Worldwide Corpo-
rate Tax Guide 
   
Personal Tax Rate The top personal income tax rate in country i. 
 
Author’s computation on data from 
Ernst & Young's “Worldwide Corpo-
rate Tax Guide 
   
Voice and  
Accountability 
 
Measuring perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to partici-
pate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of asso-
ciation and a free media. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators  
   
Political Stability Measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including political violence and 
terrorism. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators  
   
Government  
Effectiveness 
Measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the de-
gree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such pol-
icies. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators  
   
Regulatory Quality Measuring perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement 
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators  
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Table 5-15 - continued 
 
Variable Definition Source 
   
Control of  
Corruption 
Measuring perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the 
state by elites and private interests. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators  
   
Rule of Law Measuring perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
World Bank’s Worldwide Govern-
ance Indicators  
   
Overall Score A country’s overall economic freedom score is a simple average of its scores on the 
10 individual freedoms. 
Index of Economic Freedoms by the 
Heritage Foundation 
   
Loss Carry-
Forward 
The number of years a company is allowed to carry losses forward in time for corpo-
rate tax purposes. 
Author’s computation on data from 
Ernst & Young's “Worldwide Corpo-
rate Tax Guide, and from the IBFD 
Country Analysis 
   
Time  Average number of days required to start a business in country i. World Bank Doing Business  
Datasbase 2014 
   
Cost Average cost of starting a business as % of income per capital in country i. World Bank Doing Business  
Datasbase 2014 
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Appendix B 
Table 5-16: Appendix B - Reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country   Year of Reform Reform 
Brazil   2000 Budget Law 1999/2000 
     
Czech Republic   2005 Changes to Corporate and Personal Taxation 2005 
     
Mexico   2007 Tax Reform of 2007 
     
Japan   2006 Tax Reform of 2006 
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  Figure 5-4: Appendix C - Placebo Studies – Entry Rate Gap 87 
 
 
  Figure 5-5: Appendix C - Placebo Studies – Exit Rate Gap 88 
   
                                                 
87
 Entry Rate Gap is defined as the entry rate of the treatment country minus the entry rate of the synthetic control unit.   
88
 Exit Rate Gap is defined as the exit rate of the treatment country minus the exit rate of the synthetic control unit.   
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Working Paper III 
 
6 Capital Gains Taxes and Long-term Return Reversal: Evidence from Pole to Pole89 
 
 
Abstract: This paper examines whether capital gains taxes can explain long-term return rever-
sal in a global context. I first show that capital gains taxes have a significant effect on stock 
returns in the U.S. stock market. Next, the scope of my analysis is extended and the signifi-
cant effect of capital gains taxes is confirmed in a large panel of countries controlling for oth-
er possible drivers. I distinguish between winner and loser stocks and find supportive evi-
dence of asymmetric return reactions due to capital gains taxes. I also consider the ongoing 
integration of financial markets by taking into account the diversification of domestic equity 
portfolios as well as the allocation of international equity holdings. My results suggest that the 
effect of domestic capital gains taxes becomes stronger as the share of domestic equity hold-
ings increases. Furthermore, I present empirical evidence that foreign capital gains taxes also 
affect stock prices.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: capital gains tax, stock return reversal, equity portfolio, market integration 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
Over the course of the last 30 years a large body of empirical literature has found negative 
serial correlation of stock price changes over longer investment horizons (De Bondt and 
Thaler (1985, 1987), Poterba and Summers (1988), Chan (1988), Ball and Kothari (1989), 
Jones (1993), Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), George and 
Hwang (2007)). The most important implication of the observed reversal of stock returns is 
the predictability of stock prices that questions stock market efficiency. While it is widely 
accepted that investors who follow a contrarian portfolio strategy: i.e. selling recent “winners” 
and buying recent “losers” can beat the market, the reason what causes the observed negative 
autocorrelation of price changes still remains a controversial issue.  
 
Traditional explanations can be broadly divided into three schools of thought that are not mu-
tually exclusive: psychological-based theories of irrational investor behavior, measurement 
errors in an efficient market environment and compensation for risk among rational market 
participants.90 
 
First, behavioral explanations generally relax the assumption of investors as completely ra-
tional information processors. De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) attribute their findings to 
stock prices that tend to initially overshoot their innate fundamental values after a series of 
good news which must be corrected in the long-run and thus leads to reversing return patterns. 
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and 
Hong and Stein (1999) model this market overreaction hypothesis based on different psycho-
logical evidence.  
 
Second, assuming market efficiency many studies argue that the observed correlation arises 
from different types of market frictions. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) attribute contrarian profits 
to cross-autocorrelation between stocks and reject possible market overreactions. Conrad and 
Kaul (1993) identify measurement issues in stock market prices as another potential source of 
negative autocorrelation. Furthermore, nonsynchronous trading strategies (Boudoukh, Rich-
ardson and Whitelaw (1994)) or data snooping biases (Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003)) are 
suggested as alternative explanations.     
 
                                                 
90
 Compare Boudoukh, Richardson and Whitelaw (1994) for a comparison of the different strands of literature.  
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Third, in a series of papers Fama and French (1988, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998) argue that inves-
tors following contrarian investment strategies based on firm-specific characteristics bear a 
higher fundamental risk. Consistent with this, Fama and French (1995) document that stocks 
with high book-to-market ratios face higher distress costs and relatively lower expected earn-
ings. Reverting stock returns that lead to excess portfolio returns of contrarian investment 
strategies simply reflect compensation for this risk. Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) 
also argue in favor of a risk-based explanation. 
  
An alternative factor that could also explain reverting stock returns and that is in line with 
rational investment behavior but has received relatively little attention in the literature is in-
vestors’ reaction to tax incentives. As Klein (1999, 2001) and George and Hwang (2007) 
show, return reversals can also be understood as the result of a rational model of tax avoid-
ance. As capital gains are only taxed when realized, investors have a natural incentive to delay 
selling stocks with embedded capital gains. Prices of shares with locked-in capital gains are 
elevated relative to shares that have no embedded capital gains. As a result, inflated share 
prices imply lower expected returns as prices mean-revert to their fundamental values.  
 
This paper seeks to provide independent support for the idea of capital gains taxes contrib-
uting to the phenomenon of long-term stock return reversal. Since empirical studies on the 
relationship between taxes and asset prices predominantly focus on the U.S. market, I start 
with a purely national analysis of U.S. stocks as my base case. I construct investment portfo-
lios based on a measure of fictitious capital gains tax burdens to test the lock-in hypothesis of 
return reversal. I consider embedded capital gains and different long-term and short-term 
capital gains tax rates over a period from 1960 to 2012. I find that winner portfolios as de-
fined by my tax-based measure exhibit significant reversals over a five year period and that 
those reversals are robust to risk-adjusted returns. In line with the expected effect of capital 
gains taxes I do not find any corresponding reversals of loser stocks. This reflects the asym-
metric nature of the lock-in hypothesis.     
 
In a next step I use an international dataset to provide “out of sample” evidence of stock re-
turn reversal and its relation to capital gains taxes. In different panel regressions I exploit 
time-series variations in long-term and short-term capital gains tax rates across 151 interna-
tional tax reforms in 31 countries between 1985 and 2012. During this period the statutory 
capital gains tax rates range from a maximum of 80 % to a minimum of 0 %. In addition to 
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taxes I consider multiple other variables that are related to return reversal and that vary across 
countries and over time. These variables are intended to capture the effects of stock market 
development and information flows which are suggested by behavioral decision theory. Fur-
thermore, I consider variables that are associated with risk-based explanations such as the 
value-growth theory or stock market volatility. I separately test for the influence of taxes on 
winner reversal and loser reversal to disentangle these different effects.  
I find that especially long-term capital gains taxes have a significant positive effect on winner 
reversal. This relation is confirmed controlling for different sets of country characteristics. In 
addition, I demonstrate that an influence of capital gains taxes on loser reversal cannot be 
shown over the course of the entire fiscal year but is especially pronounced during the first 
month of a country’s tax year. An increased difference between short-term and long-term cap-
ital gains taxes leads to more reversal in loser stocks at the beginning of the tax year. This 
confirms the relation between stock returns around the turn of the fiscal year and tax-loss sell-
ing strategies documented by Poterba and Weisbenner (2001) or Grinblatt and Keloharju 
(2004). 
 
To further examine the link between stock return reversals and shareholder taxation I take into 
account the growing cross-border diversification of equity portfolios. Many studies have 
shown that investors allocate a relatively large fraction of their wealth to domestic equities 
and only hold modest amounts of foreign equities in their portfolios, a phenomenon known as 
“home bias” (French and Poterba (1991), Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Tesar and Werner 
(1995)). Such a preference for domestic stocks is a vital prerequisite for an analysis of capital 
gains taxes and national stock returns in a purely domestic context.  
 
However, there is ample empirical evidence that suggests that a home bias of equity portfolios 
has substantially decreased at a global level and shows a recent surge in international financial 
market integration (Amadi (2004), Baele Pungulescu and Horst (2007), Sörensen, Wu, Yosha 
and Zhu (2007)). To capture the effect of international portfolio diversification I test how var-
iations in the proportion of domestic equity holdings change the effect of domestic capital 
gains taxes on return reversal.  
My results show that an increase in domestic equity holdings strengthens the effect of domes-
tic capital gains taxes on winner reversal. In addition, I decompose a country’s equity liabili-
ties into its individual investment flows to estimate the average capital gains tax burden of 
domestic equities held by foreign investors. As I control for foreign capital gains taxes I still 
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find a positive synergy between the share of domestically held stocks and domestic capital 
gains taxes. In addition, foreign capital gains taxes also seem to affect returns in domestic 
stocks.  
 
In sum, my results provide empirical evidence for the meaning of capital gains taxes for long-
term stock return reversal from a purely national as well as an international perspective. I con-
firm findings by George and Hwang (2007) and contribute to the literature by underlining the 
importance of capital gains taxes for security pricing. I also extend earlier international stud-
ies of long-term return reversal by explicitly considering cross-country portfolio diversifica-
tion as well as international financial market integration.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two discusses the lock-in hy-
pothesis. Section three focuses on the U.S. case and presents results. In Section four I analyze 
stock return reversals from a global perspective. The data is described and numerous results 
are provided. Finally, section five concludes. 
 
6.2 Lock-in Hypothesis 
 
The lock-in hypothesis is based on the fact that taxes on capital gains are only levied upon 
realization. This leads to initially inflated stock prices that decrease again at a later point in 
time.  
Klein (1999, 2001) formalizes in his model the relationship between taxes on capital gains 
and reversal of stock returns. The intuition can be summarized as follows:  
 
Stocks that have positive returns also provide their shareholders with embedded capital gains. 
Investors with accrued capital gains will sell fewer shares to benefit from delaying tax pay-
ments. In that sense, the lock-in effect refers to the incentive to hold appreciated shares in 
order to defer capital gains taxes until realization. But there is no comparable reduction in 
demand for those shares, since buying “successful” shares does not trigger capital gains taxes. 
Thus, stocks with embedded capital gains are traded at a higher equilibrium price that induces 
shareholders to more selling of locked-in shares and eventually restores market equilibrium 
(see e.g. Landsman and Shackelford (1995)).  
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The premium at which locked-in shares are traded must be sufficiently high to compensate the 
shareholders to forgo the value of postponing the tax payments. As stock prices increase ex-
pected future returns decrease which leads to a slowly dissipating return reversal. According 
to Klein (1999, 2001) the magnitude of the increase in prices and the extent of the subsequent 
return reversal depend on the size of the average accrued capital gain per share, the length of 
the investment horizon and the nominal tax rate on capital gains.91 He shows that larger em-
bedded capital gains, a longer investment horizon and  higher tax rates lead to a more elevated 
share price and consequently to a more pronounced return reversal.  
This result also implies that shareholders are willing to continue to hold the initial sharehold-
ing even if expected returns on a stock are lower than returns on alternative investments.92  
 
It is important to note, that the lock-in hypothesis predicts long-term return reversal for stocks 
with embedded capital gains but not for stocks with embedded capital losses. A stock with an 
embedded capital loss is not traded at a lower price than an identical stock with no embedded 
capital loss since a potential buyer should be willing to pay the same market price for both 
stocks. A shareholder does not need to require a discount for a stock with an embedded capi-
tal loss in order to sell the stock. Thus, empirical tests of return reversal should indicate that 
the lock-in effect of a capital loss is not opposite of that of a capital gain. However, return 
reversal of loser stocks at the beginning of the fiscal year can be attributed to tax-loss selling 
at the end of the previous fiscal year (Poterba and Weisbenner (2001), Grinblatt and 
Keloharju (2004)).  
 
Overall, the lock-in hypothesis is characterized by two central predictions: First, the magni-
tude and length of a stock’s return reversal depend, among other things, on the size of the em-
bedded capital gains and the level of the nominal tax rate. Second, there is an asymmetry be-
tween the effects of capital gains and capital losses on long-term return reversal. Long-term 
return reversal is expected to occur for stocks with accrued capital gains whereas stocks with 
embedded capital losses should not exhibit reverting patterns throughout the year. But I would 
expect loser stocks to show a positive price reaction around the turn of the fiscal year.  
 
                                                 
91
 Klein (1999) illustrates the adverse effect of capital gains taxes on expected returns in a CAPM-type pricing 
model.   
92
 This effect is documented by Auerbach (1991). 
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6.3 The U.S. Case 
 
In the first step of my analysis I apply a commonly used procedure for stock classification to 
verify the profitability of contrarian investment strategies in general and to separately exam-
ine stock return patterns of winner portfolios and loser portfolios. I use the U.S. stock market 
as the largest and most versatile financial market in the world to gain initial estimates of an 
expected stock return reversal. The results serve as base case estimates that are compared with 
the effects documented in other studies and that are later considered in the subsequent interna-
tional analysis. Moreover, I more explicitly test for the validity of the lock-in hypothesis by 
applying a tax-based measure that takes into account an estimation of accrued capital gains 
and the effect of different capital gains tax rates.     
 
6.3.1 Data and Methodology 
 
I obtain monthly prices, returns and information on market capitalization for all equity securi-
ties traded on the NYSE, the NYSE Arca, the NYSE MKT (formerly AMEX) or the 
NASDAQ from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) over the period 1960 to 
2012. All prices are adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends and monthly prices stand for 
the last trading day of each month. I consider active and inactive companies that have at least 
61 consecutive months of price data. The final dataset consists of 12,198 firms.  
 
Information on capital gains tax rates, special tax regimes, grandfathering rules, tax reforms 
and tax holidays for the period 1960 to 2012 are all hand-collected from The Ernst Young 
Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide, The European Tax Handbook, The IBFD Tax News Ser-
vices, The IBFD Country Analysis, The IBFD Annual Reports and various other sources. 
  
I use two different measures to identify return reversal that are both based on a 5-year hori-
zon. For each month t I use the previous 60 months (ranking period) to form winner and loser 
portfolios that are held for the subsequent 60 months (holding period). The measures are used 
to identify winner and loser portfolios for each month t. The development of the returns of 
these winner and loser portfolios over the next 60 months holding period is seen as an indica-
tor of return reversal.  
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In general, return reversal is understood as winner portfolios showing a significant negative 
development in returns in the future and loser portfolios that exhibit a significant positive de-
velopment in future returns.  
 
The first measure can be seen as a traditional return measure and is simply a stock’s return 
over the entire portfolio ranking period t to t-60. It is used to identify the general tendency of 
stock returns to reverse within a 5-year horizon. 
 
 
t t 60
t
t 60
P PRM
P



  
  
This traditional return measure (RM) treats winner and loser portfolios symmetrically and 
does not distinguish between different theoretical explanations for return reversals. The RM 
measure is meant to capture any negative autocorrelation in stock returns irrespective of its 
source. 
 
The following measure is designed to approximate the potential capital gains tax burden of a 
stock over a period of 5 years to test the lock-in hypothesis. It reflects the combined impact of 
embedded capital gains and the applicable capital gains tax rates on stock prices and the ex-
pected reversal of returns as described in Klein (1999). 
 
K 60
short longt t-k t t-n
t t k t t n t
k=1 n=K+1t-k t-n
P -P P -PCGTB = ω  TR + ω  TR
P P 
            
 
where t kω  = 1 if t t-kP >P  and t kω  = 0 otherwise and correspondingly where t nω  = 1 if 
t t-nP >P  and t nω   = 0 otherwise. The capital gains tax burden measure (CGTB) calculates a 
fictitious tax burden of a stock that would be sold in period t. I subdivide ranking period capi-
tal gains into short-term gains (1 to K) and long-term gains (K+1 to 60). The first sum cap-
tures all positive gains that fall within the short-term horizon multiplied by the valid short-
term capital gains tax rate in period t. The second term sums up all older capital gains that 
qualify for long-term treatment multiplied by the current long-term capital gains tax rate in 
period t. I use personal capital gains tax rates that are applicable to individuals for selling 
shares in exchange for cash. Thus, my estimates are based on two underlying assumptions: 
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First, investors do not receive equity in exchange for their shares since taxes on those capital 
gains would be deferred. Secondly, I assume that the marginal investor is a taxable natural 
person and not an institutional investor.93  
Moreover, the CGTB measure assumes that shares are acquired evenly over the period t to t-
60 and attributes a zero tax burden to embedded capital losses. Thus, I do not explicitly con-
sider the possibility of loss compensation over time. Besides other possible drivers of return 
reversal the CGTB measure is expected to more accurately predict the tax-driven portion of 
winner return reversal than the RM measure. Most importantly, in contrast to the RM measure 
the CGTB measure should not capture any loser reversal outside January since capital gains 
taxes do not lead to a reverting discount in share prices.94  
 
The following analysis is based on three steps: First, every stock is categorized as winner or 
loser stock for each calendar month t from January 1965 to December 2012. An individual 
stock is considered a winner (loser) in month t if its value of the respective measure ranks in 
the top (bottom) 10 % of all stocks in month t. For each measure, winner (loser) stocks get a 
winner (loser) dummy set to one for month t. Otherwise the winner (loser) dummy variable 
takes the value zero.95  
 
Second, I use Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions to estimate the contribution 
of a particular portfolio formed in month t-j to a stock’s return in month t. This enables me to 
isolate the returns to a particular investment strategy while controlling for other factors affect-
ing returns. I control for the effects of firm size, bid-ask bounce and momentum trading.  
 
 
 
                                                 
93
 Throughout the entire study I assume that individuals keeping shares in their private portfolios are the relevant 
group of price setting investors whose tax burden matters for equity pricing. Academic studies (i.e. Bennet, Sias 
and Starks (2003)) document that the proportion of equities held by institutional investors has hovered around 50 
percent during the last decade which indirectly suggests the alternative use of corporate capital gains taxes to test 
the effect on stock returns. However, the share of institutional holdings consists to a considerable extent of tax-
free institutions (i.e. pension funds) and mutual fund equity holdings for which the corporate capital gains tax 
rate is usually not applicable. Mutual funds are required to pass through essentially all of their capital gains to be 
taxed at the level of the receiving clients. As they manage assets on behalf of their clients, who primarily are 
individual investors, in most cases the individual capital gains tax is applicable. Thus, corporate capital gains 
taxes would not necessarily capture the effect of the marginal investor. 
94
 According to IRC Section 441 Subtitle A Chapter 1: A tax payer must choose a fiscal year for personal income 
tax purposes. He can freely choose any annual accounting period which is usually the calendar year. Under cer-
tain circumstances a taxpayer is even forced to use the calendar year. Hence, I use the calendar year as the rele-
vant period for my tests. 
95
 The 10 % ranking rule follows Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and George and Hwang (2007). 
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Furthermore, the Fama-MacBeth approach allows me to examine abnormal returns not only 
over a 60-months holding period but also across different subintervals. I run the following 
cross-sectional regression 60-times {j = 1 to T = 60} over all stocks for each calendar month t 
between February 1965 and December 2012.96 
 
it 0 jt 1jt i,t 1 2 jt i,t 1 3jt i,t j 4 jt i,t j 5 jt i,t j 6 jt i,t j ijtR b b R b size b 52wkW b 52wkL b M1W b M1L            
 
itR  is the raw return to stock i in month t. i,t jM1W   ( i,t jM1L  ) are dummy variables that equal 
1 if stock i is a winner (loser) in month t-j according to one of my two measures applied and 
zero otherwise. My first control variable is a stock’s previous month’s market capitalization 
i,t 1size  , as small stocks tend to outperform large stocks. Furthermore I include the previous 
month’s return i,t 1R   that captures the effect of a possible bid-ask bounce (Conrad and Kaul 
(1993)). And I consider the 52-week high momentum measures i,t j52wkW   and i,t j52wkL  to 
control for any short-term momentum effects. 97        
       
Third, for every calendar month t the average return over the entire holding period of 60 
months can be expressed as the equal-weighted average return of the individual coefficients 
for winner stocks 605t 5 jtj 1
1S b
60    and loser stocks 606t 6 jtj 11S b60   estimated from 60 sep-
arate cross-sectional regressions for each month j = 1,….,60. The coefficient estimates of each 
independent variable can be averaged either over the entire 60 months holding period or over 
different subintervals j = 1,…,12; j = 13,…,24 ; j = 25,…,36; j = 37,…,48; j = 49,…,60 to 
capture the effect of a slowly diminishing reversal.  
The time series means of the averaged estimates 5tS  and 6tS  and the accompanying t-statistics 
calculated from the time series are reported in the tables.98 The coefficients and estimates of 
the other variables can be interpreted correspondingly.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96
 The earliest month in my dataset is January 1960. As I need a ranking period of 5 years to categorize a stock 
as winner or loser for every month, January 1965 is the first month for which I can identify winner and loser 
stocks.  
97
 The 52-week high momentum measure is defined in George and Hwang (2004).  
98
 Time series means are based on the period between February 1965 and December 2012. 
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6.3.2 Results 
 
I begin with the results for the traditional measure in Table 6-1. All results are reported in 
percent per month over five subintervals and the entire 5-year holding period. Following 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and George and Hwang (2007) I report results including and 
excluding January. My estimations confirm previous findings in showing strong empirical 
evidence of long-term stock return reversal. The 5-years winners in column 11 show a signifi-
cant reversal of 0.14 %. The aggregated performance of a contrarian investment strategy 
measured as the return to loser portfolios minus winner portfolios is roughly 0.529 % per 
month over the 60 months period. This figure almost exactly matches the 31.9 % for a five 
year period reported by DeBondt and Thaler (1987). The effect is slightly less than the esti-
mated 0.56 % by George and Hwang (2007) but more than a return of 0.29 % per month 
measured by Jegadeesh and Titman (2001). Across the different subintervals winner reversal 
can be observed beginning in the first period. The magnitude of winner reversal is constantly 
decreasing starting in the second period with 0.204 % down to an insignificant 0.096 % in the 
fifth period.  
 
I also report a significant reversal in loser stocks for the individual subperiods as well as for 
the entire holding period. I estimate an average monthly loser reversal of the 5-year horizon of 
0.387 % (column 11). These findings correspond to estimates by DeBondt and Thaler (1985, 
1987) and confirm my interpretation of RM as a measure that captures an overall reversal 
effect for both winner portfolios and loser portfolios. Comparable to the results in George and 
Hwang (2007) loser returns outside January are less pronounced than those including all cal-
endar months even though positive loser returns are statistically significant in both settings.  
The decline in magnitude of loser reversals outside January can point to individual investors 
selling shares with accrued capital losses at year-end. Realized losses can be used to offset 
realized capital gains or other non-gain income.99 As taxes are calculated on a calendar year 
basis, realizing capital losses before year-end accelerates tax benefits by one year. As a con-
sequence, prices decline at the turn of the year under the selling pressure followed by an ab-
normal rise in share prices after the turn of the year (Dyl (1977); Poterba and Weisbenner 
(2001); Grinblatt and Keloharju (2004); Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004)). 
                                                 
99
 The loss offset of capital losses with other non-gain income is usually limited in amount. 
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Table 6-1: Stock Return Reversal based on the Traditional Reversal Measure 
 (1) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;12) 
(2) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;12) 
Excluding 
January 
(3) 
Monthly 
Return 
(13;24) 
(4) 
Monthly 
Return 
(13;24) 
Excluding 
January 
(5) 
Monthly 
Return 
(25;36) 
(6) 
Monthly 
Return 
(25;36) 
Excluding 
January 
(7) 
Monthly 
Return 
(37;48) 
(8) 
Monthly 
Return 
(37;48) 
Excluding 
January 
(9) 
Monthly 
Return 
(49;60) 
(10) 
Monthly 
Return 
(49;60) 
Excluding 
January 
(11) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;60) 
(12) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;60) 
Excluding 
January 
             
Intercept 1.034 0.7799 1.001 0.7446 1.037 0.7427 1.059 0.7356 1.084 0.7367 1.032 0.7450 
 (6.184) (3.7244) (5.958) (3.5563) (6.207) (3.5602) (6.340) (3.5412) (6.536) (3.5442) (6.160) (3.5767) 
             
R -5.987 -4.7374 -5.962 -4.6523 -5.934 -4.4982 -5.861 -4.4418 -5.731 -4.4085 -5.883 -4.5304 
 (-17.88) (-13.15) (-17.38) (-12.58) (-17.08) (-11.81) (-16.82) (-11.55) (-16.28) (-11.10) (-17.05) (-12.06) 
             
Size -0.008 0.0606 0.000 0.0724 -0.008 0.0668 -0.015 0.0593 -0.020 0.0531 -0.011 0.0626 
 (-0.427) (2.7100) (0.015) (3.1411) (-0.410) (2.8315) (-0.743) (2.5162) (-1.004) (2.2586) (-0.564) (2.7165) 
             
Moment-W 0.004 0.0253 -0.060 -0.0255 -0.013 0.0083 -0.037 -0.0423 -0.040 -0.0478 -0.030 -0.0202 
 (0.148) (0.7849) (-3.442) (-1.3985) (-0.880) (0.4397) (-2.661) (-2.3855) (-2.947) (-3.0487) (-3.178) (-1.8419) 
             
Moment-L -0.037 -0.4792 0.295 0.0071 0.229 0.0164 0.201 0.0592 0.245 0.1349 0.224 -0.0135 
 (-0.351) (-3.6991) (3.354) (0.0647) (2.853) 0.1603 (2.460) (0.5803) (3.353) (1.4586) (3.159) (-0.1560) 
             
Return-W -0.147 -0.2049 -0.204 -0.2585 -0.149 -0.2159 -0.099 -0.1146 -0.096 -0.1126 -0.142 -0.1792 
 (-1.917) (-2.0137) (-2.996) (-2.9191) (-2.345) (-2.5696) (-1.585) (-1.4185) (-1.574) (-1.4712) (-2.448) (-2.3571) 
             
Return-L 0.666 0.4195 0.540 0.3830 0.344 0.2275 0.277 0.1932 0.222 0.1567 0.387 0.2629 
 (6.593) (3.4964) (6.401) (3.5826) (4.810) (2.4871) (4.086) (2.2479) (3.486) (1.9388) (6.206) (3.4196) 
 
For each month 60 (j=1,2,…,60) cross-sectional regressions of the form                                                                                                       are esti-
mated.     is the raw return to stock i in month t.        and           are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalization of stock i in month t-1 net of the month t-1 cross sectional mean.             (          ) is the 52-week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 10 % in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise.  The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in months t-j-12 to t-j. The coefficient estimates of a given independent 
variable are averaged over j = 1,2,…,12 in columns labelled (1,12), j = 13,14,…,24 for columns labelled (13;24) and so forth. The numbers reported in the tables are the time-series averages of these 
averages in percent per month. The accompanying t-statistics are in parentheses and calculated from the time series.   
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My findings that loser reversals have higher returns including January are consistent with results 
by Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and DeBondt and Thaler (1987) who attribute excess Janu-
ary returns to tax-loss selling behavior. However, the fact that my estimates show significant 
loser reversals across all periods (with and without January) indicates that return reversal is not 
exclusively driven by rational tax incentives.  
 
Overall, my results confirm the existence of return reversals for winner stocks as well as loser 
stocks. To test if taxes can really be viewed as contributory factor to long-term return reversal I 
apply my CGTB measure to rank stocks into winner and loser portfolios. According to the lock-
in hypothesis I would expect winner return reversal as predicted by Klein (1999) but no loser 
reversal except for a positive turn-off the year effect.  
 
Table 6-2 reports results for winner and loser reversal based on the CGTB measure. The return to 
a zero investment portfolio over the 5-year period including January is 0.301 % (column 11) 
which is less than the overall return measured by RM. This confirms that the CGTB measure 
only capture a fraction of the total amount of return reversal. It reflects the portion of negative 
autocorrelation that is associated with capital gains taxes and implies that the CGTB measure is 
less effective at measuring other sources of stock return reversal.  
 
Decomposing winner reversal into the different subperiods of the investment horizon reveals that 
the reversal effect slowly wears off as time goes on. I find significant negative returns to winners 
over the first three periods and insignificant returns for the intervals four and five (columns 7 and 
9). This downward trend is in line with Klein’s (1999) description of a slowly dissipating rever-
sal over time.  
 
With respect to loser stocks, in column 11, I find a clearly significant positive return for the 
overall period on loser stocks. Most notably, as I exclude January from my analysis (column 12) 
I do not detect a significant loser reversal anymore which corresponds to a tax related explana-
tion of long-term return reversals. The lock-in hypothesis does not predict prices of loser stocks 
to rebound to their equilibrium price due to capital gains tax. The observed loser reversal in col-
umn 11 is attributed to tax-loss selling pressure that reverses in January. For the other investment 
periods I do not find any significant loser reversals when January is excluded with the exception 
of period 5 (column 10).  
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Table 6-2: Stock Return Reversal based on the Capital Gains Tax Burden Measure 
 (1) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;12) 
(2) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;12) 
Excluding 
January 
(3) 
Monthly 
Return 
(13;24) 
(4) 
Monthly 
Return 
(13;24) 
Excluding 
January 
(5) 
Monthly 
Return 
(25;36) 
(6) 
Monthly 
Return 
(25;36) 
Excluding 
January 
(7) 
Monthly 
Return 
(37;48) 
(8) 
Monthly 
Return 
(37;48) 
Excluding 
January 
(9) 
Monthly 
Return 
(49;60) 
(10) 
Monthly 
Return 
(49;60) 
Excluding 
January 
(11) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;60) 
(12) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;60) 
Excluding 
January 
             
Intercept 1.1635 0.8227 1.1327 0.7803 1.1275 0.7641 1.1075 0.7481 1.0966 0.7367 1.1206 0.7656 
 (5.1717) (4.7790) (5.0379) (4.5291) (5.0230) (4.4544) (4.9710) (4.3978) (4.9306) (4.3234) (5.0135) (4.4771) 
             
R -5.6297 -4.6628 -5.6573 -4.6225 -5.5628 -4.4869 -5.4947 -4.4325 -5.4345 -4.4064 -5.5460 -4.5094 
 (-14.07) (-16.10) (-13.72) (-15.42) (-13.04) (-14.50) (-12.83) (-14.13) (-12.45) (-13.62) (-13.23) (-14.79) 
             
Size -0.0431 0.0479 -0.0326 0.0640 -0.0373 0.0616 -0.0396 0.0569 -0.0431 0.0518 -0.0386 0.0572 
 (-1.534) (2.4914) (-1.155) (3.2948) (-1.306) (3.1471) (-1.396) (2.9109) (-1.540) (2.6667) (-1.376) (2.9693) 
             
Moment-W -0.0156 0.0208 -0.0559 -0.0250 -0.0084 0.0170 -0.0455 -0.0346 -0.0538 -0.0465 -0.0385 -0.0168 
 (-0.487) (0.8249) (-2.675) (-1.7176) (-0.425) (1.1112) (-2.470) (-2.3659) (-3.247) (-3.6161) (-3.217) (-1.8612) 
             
Moment-L 0.2497 -0.3151 0.4386 0.0909 0.2727 0.0413 0.2664 0.0774 0.3023 0.1437 0.3134 0.0370 
 (1.5235) (-2.6575) (3.2163) (0.9021) (2.2673) (0.4545) (2.1815) (0.8575) (2.8321) (1.7802) (2.8452) (0.4562) 
             
Return-W -0.2777 -0.1922 -0.3360 -0.3346 -0.2320 -0.2880 -0.0702 -0.1541 0.0063 -0.0793 -0.1693 -0.2112 
 (-2.388) (-2.0798) (-3.385) (-4.2233) (-2.549) (-3.9548) (-0.795) (-2.2352) (0.0696) (-1.1476) (-2.046) (-3.2177) 
             
Return-L 0.0202 -0.1770 0.2206 0.0465 0.1420 0.0475 0.1018 0.0674 0.1087 0.1261 0.1317 0.0402 
 (0.2585) (0.9328) (3.1606) (0.9747) (2.2888) (0.9747) (1.6701) (1.3794) (1.8254) (2.7043) (2.8336) (1.1347) 
 
For each month 60 (j=1,2,…,60) cross-sectional regressions of the form                                                                                                       are esti-
mated.     is the raw return to stock i in month t.        and           are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalization of stock i in month t-1 net of the month t-1 cross sectional mean.             (          ) is the 52-week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i is ranked in the top (bottom) 10 % in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise.  The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price achieved in months t-j-12 to t-j. The coefficient estimates of a given independent 
variable are averaged over j = 1,2,…,12 in columns labelled (1,12), j = 13,14,…,24 for columns labelled (13;24) and so forth. The numbers reported in the tables are the time-series averages of these 
averages in percent per month.  The accompanying t-statistics are in parentheses and calculated from the time series.   
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As another finding, including January over the entire 5-year period leads to reduced negative 
return reversals for winner stocks. This implies that tax-loss selling also puts positive price pres-
sure on winner stocks in January. Ritter (1988) describes with his “parking-the-proceeds hypoth-
esis” how funds from year-end tax loss selling are reinvested. Individuals do not immediately 
reinvest their proceeds from the sales but rather “park” those until January. According to Ritter 
(1988) funds are most intensively reinvested in small stocks that are characterized by a greater 
degree of volatility and are therefore more likely to become winner or loser stocks.100 Conse-
quently, upward price pressure should be especially pronounced for the top or bottom 10 % of 
my stocks which is line with my results.    
 
Next, I test if significant reversals in returns are not only bound to raw returns but can also be 
found for risk-adjusted returns. Fama and French (1993, 1996) and Zhang (2005) argue that con-
trarian excess returns are the consequence of rational value investment strategies that bear higher 
fundamental risk than conventional glamour strategies.  
In order to obtain risk-adjusted returns I run time-series regressions of the averages (e.g. 5tS  or 
6tS ) from the cross-sectional regressions on the contemporaneous Fama-French (1993) factors 
(one regression for each average). Risk-adjusted returns are the intercepts from these time-series 
regressions.  
 
The estimates in Table 6-3 confirm my previous results. I find a slowly dissipating winner rever-
sal across the different subintervals with significant negative returns. Over the entire 5-year hold-
ing period winner reversal is significant at the one percent level with the exclusion of January 
leading to a slightly more negative coefficient.  
Whereas, significant loser reversals are almost completely absent when applying risk-adjusted 
returns. An overall effect in column 11 can be found which again seems to be mainly driven by 
turn of the year tax loss selling, since the corresponding results without January (column 12) do 
not show significant loser return reversal. I can conclude that as far as greater systematic risk 
affects excess returns of contrarian investment strategies it does not completely subsume the ef-
fect of capital gains taxation. 
                                                 
100
 In contrast to individual investors, Gompers and Metrick (2001) document that institutional investors prefer 
„larger, more liquid stocks“ considering the period 1980 to 1996 in their study. Bennett, Sias and Starks (2003) also 
find that portfolios of institutional investors tend to be overweight in large-capitalization stocks.   
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Table 6-3: Risk-adjusted Stock Return Reversal 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;12) 
(2) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;12) 
Excluding 
January 
(3) 
Monthly 
Return 
(13;24) 
(4) 
Monthly 
Return 
(13;24) 
Excluding 
January 
(5) 
Monthly 
Return 
(25;36) 
(6) 
Monthly 
Return 
(25;36) 
Excluding 
January 
(7) 
Monthly 
Return 
(37;48) 
(8) 
Monthly 
Return 
(37;48) 
Excluding 
January 
(9) 
Monthly 
Return 
(49;60) 
(10) 
Monthly 
Return 
(49;60) 
Excluding 
January 
(11) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;60) 
(12) 
Monthly 
Return 
(1;60) 
Excluding 
January 
             
Return-W -0.1445 -0.1370 -0.3049 -0.3226 -0.2552 -0.3036 -0.1104 -0.1747 -0.0379 -0.0873 -0.1729 -0.2112 
 (-1.958) (-1.8506) (-4.6218) (-4.7336) (-3.9371) (-4.5394) (-1.7604) (-2.8352) (-0.5837) (-1.3606) (-3.6722) (-4.5234) 
             
Return-L -0.0537 -0.2140 0.1364 0.0029 0.0758 0.0051 0.0647 0.0250 0.0932 0.0999 0.0739 0.0017 
 (-0.706) (-3.0602) (2.0420) (0.0476) (1.2941) (0.0852) (1.0906) (0.4139) (1.4939) (1.6598) (1.7168) (0.0418) 
 
For each month 60 (j=1,2,…,60) cross sectional regressions of the form                                                                                                       are estimated.     is the raw return to stock i in month t.        and           are the return and natural logarithm of market capitalization of stock i in month t-1 
net of the month t-1 cross sectional mean.             (          ) is the 52-week high winner (loser) dummy that takes the value of one if the 52-week high measure for stock i 
is ranked in the top (bottom) 10 % in month t-j, and zero otherwise.  The 52-week high measure in month t-j is the ratio of the price level in month t-j to the maximum price 
achieved in months t-j-12 to t-j. The coefficient estimates of a given independent variable are averaged over j = 1,2,…,12 in columns labelled (1,12), j = 13,14,…,24 for columns 
labelled (13;24) and so on. To obtain risk-adjusted returns, I further run time-series regressions of these averages on the Fama-French three factor model                                . SMB and HML are size and value factors respectively according to Fama and French (1993). The numbers reported for risk-adjusted returns are the 
intercepts    from these time-series regressions. They are in percent per month and their t-statistics are in parentheses. Coefficients on control variables are omitted for brevity.    
 
 145 
 
In sum, all my results suggest that long-term return reversal is a present phenomenon in the 
U.S. stock market for both winner and loser stocks. Furthermore, capital gains taxes appear to 
contribute to this anomaly as they burden accrued capital gains with additional costs and set 
incentives to sell stocks with accrued capital losses at the end of the tax year. 
 
So far, differences between my reversal measures and different estimates for winner and loser 
stocks can be viewed as indirect evidence for the effect of capital gains taxes on the reversal 
of stock returns. The tests in the following section intend to more directly identify the role of 
capital gains taxes. I examine how stock return reversal can be attributed to capital gains taxes 
in a global context while exploring the variation in tax rates across multiple international tax 
reforms and controlling for other potential explanatory factors.  
6.4 Capital Gains Taxes and Long-term Return Reversal around the World 
6.4.1 Return Reversal from Pole to Pole 
 
In this section I seek to show that a reliable link between capital gains taxes and stock return 
reversal exits and that this association persists not only for a limited U.S. sample but also in a 
global setting. An international testing strategy enables me to take advantage of the diverse 
composition of international equity markets, different regional trading behaviors, multiple tax 
regimes and other time-varying characteristics. I show that mean-reverting stock returns are a 
global phenomenon and not only the consequence of possibly biased estimates of heavily ex-
plored U.S. data. In this respect, Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003) explicitly attribute signifi-
cant returns to contrarian investment strategies with U.S. stocks to extensive data snooping of 
U.S. stock market data. To overcome such claims, especially Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) 
point out the importance of “out of sample” testing of contrarian profits in order to verify the 
robustness of previous studies since the U.S. stock market may not be universal.  
 
Empirical evidence of long-term return reversal has been found in equity markets throughout 
the world in many developed and developing countries. As shown in studies by Dissanaike 
(1999), Schiereck, DeBondt and Weber (1999), Nam, Pyun and Kim (2003), Wongchotti and 
Pyun (2005), MacInish, Ding, Pyun and Wongchoti (2008) and Wu and Li (2011) long-term 
return reversal is persistent and economically relevant in many European and Asian markets. 
Giving the available international evidence of profitable contrarian investment strategies, data 
mining seems to be an unlikely explanation. However, despite the broad range of comprehen-
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sive studies examining the various competing explanations there has been no cross-country 
analysis testing the relevance of the capital gains tax lock-in hypothesis. 
 
I use my previous U.S. dataset from the CRSP database and merge this data with stock market 
data for 34 international equity markets from Datastream. The combined dataset covers 
monthly security prices, returns and market values of all listed common stocks in the 34 
OECD countries and Hong Kong for the years 1973 to 2012.101 Cross-listed stocks are elimi-
nated from the dataset and only the major stock type is kept in case an equity security has 
more than one type of stocks issued. The datasets contains active as well as inactive compa-
nies.  
I combine the stock market data with a comprehensive dataset of international capital gains 
tax rates. I focus on capital gains tax rates of individual shareholders. In accordance with the 
assumptions from the previous chapter I use the tax rates that apply to individuals for taxable 
cash deals. In addition, I only use taxes that apply to listed shares and to non-substantial 
shareholdings.102 I distinguish between long-term and short-term tax rates. All in all my data 
covers 151 major and minor tax reforms over a time span of up to 50 years. 
 
To mitigate potential issues regarding the quality of the stock market data from Datastream I 
screen out numerous observations. The entire clean-up procedure follows Ince and Porter 
(2006), Griffin, Kelly and Nardari (2010) and Schmidt, von Arx, Schrimpf, Wagner and Zieg-
ler (2011). The major clearing steps include eliminating price dummy records for delisted 
stocks, screening company names for suspicious words that might indicate non-equity securi-
ties and comparing Thomson Reuters’ market values with self-computed market capitaliza-
tions. My final dataset contains only 30 OECD countries and Hong Kong. I exclude Estonia, 
Iceland, Luxembourg and Slovenia from my sample since their remaining stock market data is 
not sufficient to calculate meaningful reversal measures.  
 
Table 6-4 lists the countries included along with the individual time periods covered after the 
clearing procedure. Table 6-4 also reports total market values of all stocks and the number of 
firms at the beginning and end of my sampling periods. My final dataset for the year 2012 
contains 22,853 companies that represent a market value of 32,672,686 million U.S. Dollar.   
                                                 
101
 U.S. data ranges from 1960 to 2012. 
102
 In some countries the applicable tax rate depends on the size of the shareholding and if a stock is traded at an 
official stock exchange. My assumptions seem to be reasonable since I only have data on listed stocks and focus 
on individuals whose shareholdings tend to be relatively small.   
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Table 6-4: Country Overview 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country Period Beginning  End 
  Number 
of firms 
Market  
capitalization 
 Number 
of firms 
Market  
capitalization 
       
Australia 1973 - 2012 3 214  1,959 1,038,712 
Austria 1980 - 2012 2 304  63 84,933 
Belgium 1973 - 2012 2 367  98 216,108 
Canada 1973 - 2012 56 56,522  5,062 1,580,692 
Chile 1989 - 2012 48 5,748  65 228,254 
Czech Republic 1993 - 2012 28 5,139  67 377,461 
Denmark 1974 - 2012 1 155  113 176,327 
Finland 1987 - 2012 2 4,594  72 138,522 
France 1973 - 2012 2 1,597  1,399 1,455,404 
Germany 1973 - 2012 1 269  993 1,177,044 
Greece 1988 - 2012 36 2,016  170 29,432 
Hong Kong 1973 - 2012 22 35,584  701 1,368,820 
Hungary 1996 - 2012 5 1,475  75 30,577 
Ireland 1973 - 2012 1 78  33 65,272 
Israel 1986 - 2012 49 175  348 61,352 
Italy 1973 - 2012 4 1,415  186 459,691 
Japan 1973 - 2012 16 5,160  2,204 3,289,382 
Korea 1980 - 2012 3 445  600 763,184 
Mexico 1987 - 2012 1 24  86 372,380 
Netherlands 1973 - 2012 3 106  66 376,362 
New Zealand 1986 - 2012 4 4,628  97 35,429 
Norway 1973 - 2012 2 620  255 237,540 
Poland 1991 - 2012 4 168  306 111,723 
Portugal 1988 - 2012 27 11,519  52 59,286 
Slovak Republic 1996 - 2012 2 1,228  105 27,062 
Spain 1986 - 2012 6 5,436  99 545,694 
Sweden 1982 - 2012 23 35,045  545 439,561 
Switzerland 1973 - 2012 2 143  132 1,061,976 
Turkey 1988 - 2012 23 9,811  168 163,613 
United Kingdom 1973 - 2012 40 66,841  3,173 2,792,843 
United States 1960 - 2012 1,565 4,779,525  3,561 13,908,050 
SUM  1,983 5,036,351  22,853 32,672,686 
       
The data consists of individual stocks of 31 developed countries around the world. U.S. data is obtained from the 
CRSP database. Data on the remaining countries is collected from Datastream. I only include common equity 
stocks and major stock types. Cross-listed stocks are excluded from my dataset. Market capitalization is dis-
played in millions of U.S. Dollar.  
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I use the traditional reversal measure (RM) from the previous chapter to calculate estimates of 
long-term return reversal for winner and loser stocks. The estimates of the RM variables from 
the cross-sectional regressions are averaged over the entire 5-year holding period to capture 
an overall reversal effect. Since I need a reasonable number of stocks per year and country to 
form winner and loser portfolios I only keep those country-year observations with a minimum 
of 20 stocks.  
 
Table 6-5 displays reversal estimates based on raw returns and on risk-adjusted returns after 
hedging out the Fama-French (1993) factor exposures. In general, throughout my entire sam-
ple I find ample empirical evidence of both winner reversal and loser reversal. The magnitude 
of the aggregate effect ranges from 1.3 % per month in Greece to an insignificant 0.28 % per 
month in Finland for raw return winner reversal. Loser reversal is especially pronounced in 
the Slovak Republic with 2.76 %. Countries such as Ireland or Italy show no significant loser 
reversal. Results for my risk-adjusted estimates confirm the economic and statistical signifi-
cance for most of the countries. In comparison to previous international studies my results 
seem to reconcile most of the earlier findings.  
 
Antoniou, Galariotis and Spyrou (2005) show that negative serial correlation is present in 
Athens stock exchange securities for both raw returns and risk-adjusted returns. I also find 
consistently significant return reversal for my Greece subsample.  
 
Schiereck, DeBondt and Weber (1999) find excess returns of contrarian investment strategies 
for portfolios of the major German companies listed on the Frankfurt stock exchange between 
1961 and 1991. Their results document an especially pronounced return to loser portfolios 
compared to winners over the entire sample period. They show that risk or firm-specific fac-
tors do not easily account for their findings and suggest psychological reasons based on inves-
tors’ overreaction. My findings generally confirm the existence of winner and loser return 
reversal in the German stock market even though I do not detect a disproportionally high 
positive return on loser stocks.  
 
In their study of overreaction and return reversal for the G-7 countries Baytas and Cakici 
(1999) find significant negative winner reversal for all members except the U.K. 
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Table 6-5: International Long-term Return Reversal 
 
 
 
 
 
Country  Winner  Reversal 
Risk-adjusted 
Winner  
Reversal 
 
Loser  
Reversal 
Risk-adjusted 
Loser  
Reversal 
       
Australia  -0.82 -0.89  6.22 1.98 
  (-3.66259) (-3.3049)  (1.3325) (10.613) 
Austria  -0.54 -0.74  0.64 0.68 
  (-3.5135) (-3.2816)  (5.5211) (4.2224) 
Belgium  -0.57 -0.85  0.48 0.57 
  (-5.2198) (-4.754)  (4.4118) (5.9773) 
Canada  -1.08 -0.78  1.58 1.76 
  (-7.3118) (-4.0619)  (15.539) (13.057) 
Chile  -0.85 -0.84  1.4 1.31 
  (-5.9853) (-4.429)  (6.3229) (4.4266) 
Czech Republic  -0.94 -0.102  0.61 0.59 
  (-4.0591) (-2.9848)  (3.7273) (2.3167) 
Denmark  -0.42 -0.71  0.41 0.76 
  (-2.8073) (-3.3412)  (2.1762) (3.02) 
Finland  -0.28 -0.23  0.91 0.84 
  (-0.8812) (-0.5299)  (6.2013) (4.72) 
France  -0.69 -0.78  1.28 1.37 
  (-5.3158) (-6.172)  (9.1329) (8.39) 
Germany  -0.95 -1.4  0.8 1.03 
  (-6.676) (-7.5046)  (6.206) (11.216) 
Greece  -1.3 -1.13  1.41 1.37 
  (-6.41379) (-5.476)  (6.973) (5.0241) 
Hong Kong  -1.1 -1.12  1.22 1.33 
  (-6.9256) (-5.3493)  (6.6316) (8.4037) 
Hungary  -0.49 -0.5  -0.94 -0.91 
  (-5.7111) (-3.5132)  (-1.147) (-0.713) 
Ireland  -0.38 -0.59  0.45 0.0128 
  (-1.8686) (-2.0414)  (0.6818) (4.3277) 
Israel  -0.81 -0.89  1.13 1.07 
  (-3.7266) (-4.2021)  (7.6482) (6.496) 
Italy  -0.48 -0.77  -0.01 0.86 
  (-3.4598) (-3.6808)  (-0.5291) (5.3249) 
Japan  -0.45 -0.55  1.03 0.68 
  (-6.4214) (-7.2235)  (3.7173) (8.4229) 
Korea  -0.48 -0.66  1.04 1.36 
  (-6.3533) (-5.5935)  (10.332) (10.104) 
Mexico  -1.05 -1.16  0.97 0.74 
  (-4.9234) (-4.0472)  (6.4163) (4.3099) 
Netherlands  -0.49 -0.73  0.66 0.71 
  (-3.1607) (-3.1825)  (2.7203) (4.2833) 
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Table 6-5 - continued 
 
Significant loser reversal is only identified for Japan, Germany and the U.K. In contrast to 
their results, I report significant winner and loser return reversal of comparable magnitudes in 
all seven countries.      
 
There is a wide range of studies that examine profits to contrarian investment strategies in 
Asian-Pacific stock markets. Most if these studies confirm the existence of serially correlated 
returns over shorter horizons. Nam, Pyun and Kim (2003) find for nine Asian stock markets 
(including Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and Korea) significant reverting stock return patterns 
and show that it takes longer for positive returns to revert than for negative returns. They in-
terpret their results as the consequence of irrational mispricing behavior of investors.  
MacInish, Ding, Pyun and Wongchoti (2008) find evidence of short-term winner reversal in 
Hong Kong, Japan and Korea among others. However, following a contrarian investment 
Country  Winner  Reversal 
Risk-adjusted 
Winner  
Reversal 
 
Loser  
Reversal 
Risk-adjusted 
Loser  
Reversal 
       
New Zealand  -0.37 -0.65  1.03 1.12 
  (-1.2007) (-1.5711)  (5.9132) (5.0732) 
Norway  -0.56 -0.63  1.18 1.23 
  (-3.6156) (-3.9943)  (8.8281) (7.4905) 
Poland  -1.05 -1.15  1.05 0.85 
  (-6.4202) (-4.921)  (3.0258) (1.9347) 
Portugal  -0.29 -0.22  0.97 1 
  (-1.1319) (-0.7126)  (3.9441) (2.7587) 
Slovak Republic  -0.42 -0.71  2.76 2.49 
  (-1.1715) (-0.8325)  (3.9363) (2.1961) 
Spain  -0.58 -0.6  0.67 0.64 
  (-3.8381) (-3.1853)  (8.0701) (6.04779 
Sweden  -0.91 -0.88  0.86 0.99 
  (-4.85) (-3.7165)  (8.0493) (7.8923) 
Switzerland  -0.56 -0.98  0.73 0.91 
  (-3.8102) (-4.0235)  (2.2501) (6.6012) 
Turkey  -0.88 -0.87  2.17 1.44 
  (-2.6921) (-2.034)  (6.2766) (4.2484) 
United Kingdom  -1.07 -0.92  1.42 1.03 
  (-5.2576) (-6.4453)  (9.0426) (12.1591) 
United States  -0.142 -0.1803  0.387 0.2833 
  (-2.448) (-4.6548)  (6.206) (4.7374) 
 
The coefficient estimates of the RM-winner and RM-loser measures are averaged over j = 1,2,…,60 periods.  
The numbers reported in the tables are the time-series averages of these averages in percent per month. The 
accompanying t-statistics are in parentheses and calculated from the time series. Risk-adjusted returns are ob-
tained from time-series regressions of these averages on the Fama-French (1993) three factor model. The num-
bers reported for risk-adjusted returns are the intercepts from these time-series regressions. They are in percent 
per month and their t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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strategy proves to be profitable only in Japan. Chou, Wei and Chung (2007) show that over 
varying ranking and holding horizons significant long-term contrarian profits persist in the 
Japanese stock market. Their results are robust to partitioning the sample period into bull- and 
bear market subperiods and to controlling for risk. In particular, reversal of loser portfolios 
creates monthly returns of about 1 % for almost all cases which exactly matches my esti-
mates. Although I focus on longer holding periods my results are generally in line with the 
previous literature. The estimates suggest significant long-term winner reversal for Australia, 
Hong Kong, Korea and Japan. Significant positive returns on loser portfolios can be found for 
equity markets in Hong Kong, Japan, Korea and New Zealand.103   
 
Outside the U.S. equity market long-term stock return reversal has been most intensively ana-
lyzed for the U.K. stock market. Clare and Thomas (1995) find long-term return reversal for a 
sample of U.K. stocks from 1955 to 1990 which they attribute to the overreaction hypothesis. 
Dissanaike (1999) identifies reversal while controlling for different measures of time-varying 
betas. Galariotis, Holmes and Ma (2007) also provide evidence of profitable contrarian in-
vestment strategies but show that excess returns can be fully explained by the Fama-French 
(1993) three factor model. Most recently, Wu and Li (2011) test competing explanations for 
return reversal and conclude that firm-factors as used by Fama-French (1993, 1996) are supe-
rior to the overreaction hypothesis or the lock-in hypothesis in predicting return reversal in 
U.K. stocks. All studies identify clear evidence of stock return reversal which is further con-
firmed by my estimates. Winner reversals as well as loser reversals are highly significant at 
the one percent level for raw returns and risk-adjusted returns. 
 
In sum, my numbers underline the existence of long-term return reversal as a financial market 
phenomenon that can be found in the U.S. stock market and in many other international equi-
ty markets. My estimates serve as an initial glance at the magnitude and frequency of interna-
tional return reversals without drawing further inferences. Since I also detect significant re-
turn reversal in countries that do not levy taxes on capital gains (e.g. Hong Kong, Switzer-
land, the Netherlands) I conduct a series of subsequent tests controlling for other explanatory 
variables to shed further light on a possible link between capital gains taxes and long-term 
return reversal. 
 
                                                 
103
 Further empirical evidence can be found in Gaunt (2000) for the Australian stock market and in Bowman and 
Iverson (1998) for the New Zealand stock market.  
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6.4.2 Capital Gains Taxes as a Driver of Long-term Return Reversal 
 
If long-term winner portfolios around the world earn negative expected returns due to region-
al investment behavior, time-varying risk factors or capital gains taxation then country-
specific capital gains tax rates and country-specific control variables should do well in captur-
ing variation in return reversal. To investigate the relation between capital gains taxes and 
winner reversal I estimate the following panel regression with fixed effects:  
 
short long
ct 0 1 ct 2 ct cy 1 ct 2 y 3 c ctWR ATR ATR A M Y            
 
where the subscript c and t stand for country and month respectively. ctWR  is the equal-
weighted 5-year average return of the individual coefficients for winner stocks in country c in 
month t.104 shortctATR stands for the 5-year average short-term capital gains tax rate based on 
month t-1 to t-60. While longctATR  represents the 5-year average long-term capital gains tax 
rate over the same time period.105 Both moving averages intend to capture a causal relation-
ship between an initially tax-driven inflation of stock prices and subsequently measured return 
reversals over the entire holding period.106 cy 1A   and ct 2M   are vectors of control variables 
that vary annually and monthly, respectively.107 yY  is a full set of time-fixed dummies to fil-
ter out year-specific effects. c  is the unknown intercept for each entity and ct  is the error 
term. My control variables follow rational risk-based pricing models and psychological-based 
behavioral theories on security pricing. I expect time-series differences in the average values 
of these variables to explain differences in winner returns across countries. 
 
In terms of rational explanations of return reversal Fama and French (1993, 1995, 1996) argue 
that reverting stock returns are consistent with time-varying economic risk premiums. Inves-
tors in value stocks that are characterized by low prices relative to a measure of intrinsic value 
tend to bear higher risks. Higher future returns are simply compensation for this increased risk 
                                                 
104
     is equivalent to                   for country c in month t when the RM-measure is applied. 
105
 The time period on which the average capital gains tax rates are based on corresponds to the holding period 
for the average return.  
106
 Grandfathering rules that maintain a former tax status of shares being acquired under an old tax regime could 
lead to spurious results because the applicable tax rates do not correspond to the average return reversal during 
the estimation period. I exclude all observations after tax reforms preserving the former tax status.  
107
 Chui, Titman and Wei (2010) apply a similar approach in a cross-sectional setting. 
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position. In contrast, investors in high-growth glamour stocks tend to receive lower expected 
returns. I include the ratio of book value to market value (BM) as a control variable for risk-
induced excess returns to value versus growth investment strategies. Return volatility (RV) as 
another measure of risk that is also associated with reversal profits (Fama and French (1988), 
Haugen, Talmor and Tourous (1991) and Ball, Kothari and Shanken (1995) among others) is 
considered as well.  
 
A different strand of literature models long-term return reversal as the consequence of cogni-
tive biases and the interaction between investors that lead to underreaction and overreaction in 
stock prices (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1998) and Hong and Stein (1999)).108 From a behavioral viewpoint all theories center around 
the question how the markets absorbs new information. The development and the integrity of 
a stock market essentially determine the flow of information and how easily information can 
be processed by investors. I follow Stulz and Williamson (2003) by using total private credit 
to GDP (Credit) as a measure of financial market development. To measure market integrity I 
include the Freedom from Corruption Index (Corr) and the Property Rights Index (PR) both 
published by the Heritage Foundation. 
I also consider firm size (SZ) as it seems reasonable that the diffusion of firm-specific infor-
mation increases in firm size (Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)). In addition I include GDP per 
Capital (GDP) and GDP Growth (GDPG) as further controls that generally characterize the 
condition of an economy and its stock market.109   
 
The fixed effects approach at the country-level enables me to consider time-varying country-
characteristics and to simultaneously control for all time-invariant differences between the 
various countries. Those differences would include institutional settings and trading practices 
that are associated with potential measurement problems or data issues leading to falsely in-
terpreted return reversals (Lo and MacKinley (1990), Conrad and Kaul (1993), Ball, Kothari 
and Shanken (1995)). Cultural differences are another dimension that could directly affect 
serial correlation of returns. The social psychology literature distinguishes between individu-
alistic and collectivistic cultures and suggests a direct link between the degree of individual-
ism and overoptimistic or overconfident behavior (Markus and Kitayama (1991), Heine, 
                                                 
108
 Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyan (1998) base their model on investors’ overconfidence and variations of 
confidence arising from biased self- attribution. Whereas, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) and Hong and 
Stein (1999) build their theoretical models on the psychological phenomena of conservatism and representative-
ness heuristic.  
109
 The Appendix contains all variable definitions.  
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Lehman, Markus and Kitayama (1999) and Hofstede (2001)).110 Both are identified in behav-
ioral finance models as main drivers of investors’ overreaction (Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyan (1998)). Thus, my regression estimates are not contaminated by country-
specific investment behavior. 
 
Panel A in Table 6-6 reports the results for capital gains tax rates and a set of variables that 
are related to rational risk adjustments. The results from the panel regression reveal that the 
coefficient on the average long-term capital gains tax rate longATR  is negative and significant 
at the 10 % level. Since winner reversal is defined negatively, a negative coefficient on 
longATR  indicates an increase in average monthly return reversal in long-term capital gains 
taxes. The taxation of short-term gains does not have a significant effect.  
In Panel B I consider a group of control variables that are associated with behavioral reversal 
models. My regression results indicate that taxes on long-term capital gains still have a signif-
icant influence on long-term return reversal. An increase in the longATR  by one percentage 
point leads to an average increase in monthly winner reversal of 0.033 percentage points. 
Panel C reports the results when all my control variables are considered jointly. Similar to the 
effect size in Panel B, the coefficient on longATR  indicates an average increase in monthly 
winner reversal of 0.031 percentage points. For an overall cross-country average of winner 
reversal of 0.67 % per month this increase translates into a rise in average winner reversal of 
4.42 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
110
 In individualistic cultures, individuals tend to view themselves as “autonomous, independent person” (Markus 
and Kitayama (1991), while in collectivistic cultures, individuals view themselves “not as separate from the 
social context but as more connected and less differentiated from others” (Markus and Kitayama (1991), Chui, 
Titman and Wei (2010)). 
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Table 6-6: Winner Stock Return Reversal 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VARIABLES WR WR WR 
    
longATR  -0.0194* -0.0334** -0.0313* 
 
(-1.881) (-2.031) (-1.892) 
shortATR  0.00160 0.00452 0.00334 
 
(0.247) (0.341) (0.250) 
GDP -2.13e-07 -2.51e-08 -5.69e-09 
 
(-1.509) (-0.125) (-0.0282) 
GDPG 0.000353 0.000513 0.000444 
 
(1.524) (1.497) (1.268) 
SZ 
 
-0.000374 -0.000357 
  
(-1.198) (-1.141) 
Corr 
 
-6.96e-05 -6.65e-05 
  
(-0.818) (-0.782) 
PR 
 
8.56e-05 6.36e-05 
  
(0.641) (0.468) 
Credit 
 
-4.17e-06 -7.97e-06 
  
(-0.108) (-0.205) 
RV -2.98e-09 
 
2.68e-08 
 
(-0.436) 
 
(0.752) 
BM 0.00139 
 
-0.00586 
 
(0.397) 
 
(-0.870) 
    
Observations 8,014 4,370 4,370 
Number of Countries 31 29 29 
    
The average 5-year monthly return of winner portfolios is regressed on the average 5-year long-term and short-
term capital gains tax rates and on different sets of explanatory variables. Winner reversal is characterized by a 
negative sign. Panel A shows results related to risk-based variables. Panel B reports results with respect to be-
havioral variables and Panel C shows results with respect to all explanatory variables. T-statistics are in paren-
theses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard er-
rors are clustered at country level.   
 
The next section tests the flip side of the reversal coin. In general, capital gains taxes are not 
supposed to have any explanatory power with respect to loser reversals as embedded capital 
losses do not lead to a discount in share prices in case of a stock sale. However, tax incentives 
can cause investors to disproportionally sell loser stocks at the end of a tax year which induc-
es upward price pressure at the beginning of the following fiscal year and thus leads to revert-
ing return patterns.  
 
Constantinides (1984) demonstrates when transaction costs are greater than zero and the 
short-term rate exceeds the long-term rate on capital gains, it can be optimal for an investor to 
realize accrued capital losses before they qualify for long-term treatment or before the end of 
the year. The earlier moment of the two is decisive. It can be concluded that the incentive to 
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realize a capital loss is increasing in the difference between short-term and long-term capital 
gains tax rates (Poterba and Weisbenner (2001)). Based on this timing option model I test if 
the tax rate difference TR short longcy cy cyDiff TR TR   has a positive effect on loser reversal after the 
turn of the year. In contrast to the previous analysis of winner reversal I only consider the 
difference between the current tax rates. Backward looking 5-year averages are not relevant 
since the tax-loss selling decision is based on the present tax rates.  
 
Descriptive evidence already suggests a particularly pronounced positive return of loser 
stocks in January. The cross-country average loser reversal based on the entire fiscal year is 
0.94 % per month. In comparison, the cross-country average loser reversal only with respect 
to the first month of a country’s fiscal year is roughly 1.59 % which is statistically larger than 
the overall year estimate at a 5 % level.111    
 
The commonly used term “January effect” that describes an unusually large increase in re-
turns at the beginning of a year can be misleading for a tax-based analysis because fiscal years 
for personal income tax purposes are not necessarily identical to the calendar year. More pre-
cisely, my hypothesis suggests positive returns to loser portfolios at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. To capture the turn-of-the-fiscal-year effect the following regressions only include the 
first month of a country’s tax year.112 The dependent variable ctWR  is replaced by ctLR  the 
equal-weighted 5-year average return of the individual coefficients for loser stocks in month t 
for country c. 
 
Table 6-7 starts in Panel A with a comparison of the effect on capital gains taxes on loser and 
winner reversal. For that purpose Panel A in Table 6-7 replicates Panel D from Table 6-6 in-
cluding all months but using loser reversal as dependent variable. As predicted by the lock-in 
hypothesis I do neither find a significant impact of the long-term rates nor of the short-term 
rates. This result implies that the significant effect of longATR  on winner reversal is not 
caused by omitted variables. Furthermore, based on the significant increase in winner reversal 
from Table 6-6 and on the finding that loser reversal seems to be unaffected over the course of 
                                                 
111
 One-tailed p-value for the t-test (Average Loser Reversal First Month – Average Loser Reversal Entire Fiscal 
Year) > 0 is equal to 0.0157 with a respective t-value of 2.1581.  
112
 Most countries have tax years that correspond to the calendar year. However, there are some noteworthy 
exceptions: Fiscal years in Hong Kong, New Zealand and the U.K. run from April to March. In Australia the tax 
year goes from July to June. In Canada and the U.S. the fiscal year typically runs from January to December, but 
tax payers can choose alternative tax reporting periods. The fiscal year in Ireland used to run from April to 
March until 2001. Ireland effectively changed to a tax year matching the calendar year in 2003.   
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the entire fiscal year, a one percentage point higher average long-term capital gains tax rate 
would imply a rise in the average return to a contrarian investment strategy of roughly 2 %.113 
Intuitively, selling winner stocks with a greater risk of negative expected returns and at the 
same time investing in largely unaffected loser stocks would create on average a higher net 
yield.    
 
In Panels B to D I focus on the reduced sample only containing the first month of the tax year. 
Panel B shows no significant effect of the tax rate difference considering rational risk factors. 
Controlling for variables suggested in behavioral research Panel C shows that the coefficient 
on TRDiff  is positive and significant at the 1 % level. The results imply a more pronounced 
return reversal of loser stocks at the beginning of a tax year as short-term capital losses be-
come more valuable relative to long-term losses. This finding is confirmed in Panel D after 
considering all relevant control factors. An one percentage point increase in the tax rate dif-
ference implies an increase in January return reversals of loser portfolios of 0.125 percentage 
points.  
 
Overall, my results of the impact of capital gains tax rates and tax rate differences on stock 
return reversals suggest that among other behavioral-based explanations or risk-related asso-
ciations rational investors’ tax-avoidance behavior should also be viewed as a relevant driver 
of reverting stock returns.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
113
 The average return to a contrarian investment strategy over all countries would be about 1.61 % (0.0094 – (-
0.0067)). An increase in the average capital gains tax rate by one percentage point would lead to an increased 
winner reversal of (– 0.00701) and thus to an overall return of 1.643 %. The calculation ignores the effect of 
larger loser reversals at the beginning of a fiscal year.   
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Table 6-7: Loser Stock Return Reversal 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
VARIABLES LR LR LR LR 
     
longATR  -0.0158    
 
(-0.780) 
   
shortATR  -0.00221    
 
(-0.136) 
   
TRDiff   0.0470 0.126*** 0.125*** 
  
(1.483) (2.708) (2.651) 
GDP -3.15e-07 2.77e-07 -4.41e-07 -3.75e-07 
 
(-1.277) (0.348) (-0.417) (-0.354) 
GDPG 0.000295 0.00142 0.000122 -0.000306 
 
(0.689) (1.009) (0.0644) (-0.153) 
SZ -0.000162 
 
-7.47e-05 -8.04e-05 
 
(-0.424) 
 
(-0.0494) (-0.0532) 
Corr -2.79e-05 
 
-0.000443 -0.000465 
 
(-0.268) 
 
(-0.798) (-0.835) 
PR 0.000225 
 
0.000583 0.000498 
 
(1.357) 
 
(0.762) (0.642) 
Credit 3.53e-05 
 
6.99e-05 7.42e-05 
 
(0.744) 
 
(0.335) (0.352) 
RV 1.78e-08 5.75e-08 
 
3.78e-09 
 
(0.407) (0.331) 
 
(0.0200) 
BM -0.00118 -0.0232 
 
-0.0239 
 
(-0.144) (-1.207) 
 
(-0.719) 
     
Observations 4,370 700 445 445 
Number of Countries 31 31 29 29 
     
In Panel A the average 5-year monthly return of loser portfolios is regressed on the average 5-year long-term and 
short-term capital gains tax rates and on a full set of explanatory variables. Loser reversal is characterized by a 
positive sign. In Panel B the average 5-year monthly return of loser portfolios is regressed on the difference 
between the current short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates and a set of risk-based variables. Panel C 
reports results with respect to behavioral variables and Panel D shows results with respect to all explanatory 
variables. T-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % 
level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level.    
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6.4.3 Return Reversal and International Market Integration 
 
So far I have treated national equity markets as independent objects that exist and act next to 
each other but do not interact in any form. It easy to argue that a purely domestic examination 
of taxes and equity stock markets is not a sufficient setting to draw valid empirical conclu-
sions in times of global investment flows and international market integration.  
To test the relevance of capital gains taxes for stock return reversal in the light of cross-border 
investment activities I also take into account the degree of domestic equity holdings as well as 
the possible effect of foreign capital gains taxes on domestic equity prices.    
 
It has been long known that most investors hold a disproportionally large amount of domestic 
stocks in their portfolios while shying away from investing in foreign stocks. This lack of 
international portfolio diversification is commonly known as “home bias” and has been well 
documented for equity markets around the world (see e.g. French and Poterba (1991), Tesar 
and Werner (1998), Ahearne, Griever and Warnock (2004)). The fact that investors predomi-
nantly invest in domestic stocks not only underlines the importance of national capital gains 
taxes for the development of stock returns but also conveniently justifies the analysis of taxes 
and equity prices in a purely domestic context.  
However, as there are plenty of confirmative findings of overinvestment in domestic stocks 
there is also unambiguous empirical evidence that an equity home bias has significantly de-
creased over the course of the last two decades. Amadi (2004) shows for a group of industrial-
ized countries including the U.K. and the U.S. that investors’ share of foreign equity holdings 
more than quintupled from 1986 to 2001. Sörensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007) confirm the 
upward trend in foreign diversification for 24 OECD countries between 1993 and 2003. One 
of their results indicates that the ratio of foreign equity investments to GDP for the U.S. stock 
market more than doubled during this period.114  
The finance literature has come up with a host of possible explanations for the sharp decline 
in home bias ranging from easier access to information, free trade developments, an increase 
in emerging markets to more international mutual fund investments. This surge in equity mar-
ket integration requires an examination of the combined effect of investment behavior and 
international capital gains taxes on stock return reversal.    
 
 
                                                 
114
 For further empirical evidence see Baele, Pungulescu and Horst (2007). 
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I consider this recent development in cross-border investments in my analysis in two ways:  
First, I include in my regression model the share of domestic equity investments. That is the 
market value of domestic equity investments relative to the overall stock market capitalization 
of a particular country. I expect an increase in the effect of domestic capital gains taxes on 
stock returns as the share of domestic equity holdings grows.  
Second, I also add a weighted average foreign capital gains tax rate with weights being the 
individual foreign investment inflows in a particular country. Similar to domestic capital 
gains taxes, a higher average foreign capital gains tax rate should lead to locked-in embedded 
capital gains and thus increase the magnitude of return reversal.  
6.4.3.1 Home Bias and National Tax Rates 
 
In this subsection I test if the internationalization of investment portfolios changes the impact 
of national capital gains taxes on national stock returns. In a purely national setting, capital 
gains of domestically issued stocks held by domestic shareholders are only subject to national 
capital gains taxes. In case of the alienation of domestic shares held by foreign investors mul-
tiple jurisdictions may exert the right to levy taxes. The allocation of those taxing rights with 
respect to the proportion of national stocks held by international investors depends on unilat-
eral as well as bilateral taxing rules. In Article 13, paragraph 5, the OECD Model Treaty (cor-
respondingly, Article 13, paragraph 6 of the UN Model Treaty) deals with the allocation of 
taxing rights with regard to gains from the alienation of shares.115  
In principle, both conventions allocate an exclusive taxing right to the country of residence of 
the person who realizes the gain. Consequently, share prices of the internationally held por-
tion of domestic stocks are not affected by domestic tax rates. Based on the assumption that 
countries generally follow the principles laid out in the OECD Model Treaty or the UN Model 
Treaty, I hypothesize that an increase in the relative share of domestically owned stocks will 
let the domestic capital gains tax rates exert a greater impact on stock price reversal.116  
 
 
                                                 
115
 Article 13, paragraph 5 of the OECD Model Treaty regards the taxation of gains from the alienation of any 
property other than that referred to in paragraph 1, 2, 3 and 4 which also includes shares. I ignore special provi-
sions in Article 13, paragraph 4 of the OECD Model Treaty regarding gains from the alienation of shares in 
“land-rich” companies. In this respect I do not consider Article 13, paragraph 4 of the UN Model Treaty either. 
Furthermore, I neglect in Article 13, paragraph 5 of the UN Model Treaty the special treatment of the alienation 
of shares if the investor exceeds a certain percentage threshold of shares, at any time during the 12-month period 
preceding the alienation of those shares.  
116
 I relax this assumption in section 6.4.3.2. 
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I measure the domestically owned part of stocks in country c in year y as  
 
c,yHome
c,y
c,y
Foreign Equity Liability
Equity 1
Market Capitalization
   
 
Foreign equity liabilities are domestically issued stocks held by foreign investors. The foreign 
equity holdings data comes from the International Financial Services database, which is com-
piled by the International Monetary Fund. The International Investment Positions as reported 
in the International Financial Statistics and the Balance of Payments Statistics contain infor-
mation on foreign equity assets and foreign equity liabilities for over eighty countries and 
cover the years 1980 to 2012. The total market capitalization is the aggregated market value 
of all traded stocks in country c. Market capitalization is based on market values of the 
Datastream Global Index for each country.117          
 
Table 6-8 contains the standard measure of equity home bias and the share of domestic equity 
holdings ( HomeEquity ) of all countries for varying time periods covered by my data. The de-
scriptive statistics show the clear decline in equity home bias that is described in the litera-
ture.118 The average equity home bias declines from roughly 85 % to 57.9 % at the end of the 
sample period. The development of the equity home bias measure documents the ongoing 
equity market integration.119 Furthermore, the changes in domestic equity holdings across 
almost all countries also indicate an increased international diversification in national equity 
portfolios. At the beginning of the different sample periods the average share of domestically 
held stocks is about 74.2 % and decreases to 56.6 % by the End of 2012.     
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117
 The Datastream Global Index does not contain any market values for the following countries: Czech Repub-
lic, Ireland, Israel and Slovak Republic. I use data on a country’s overall market capitalization from the World 
Bank instead.  
118
 The equity home bias measure applied in this study is used in numerous articles, such as Warnock (2002), 
Sörensen, Wu, Yosha and Zhu (2007) and Baele, Pungulescu and Horst (2007).  
119
 A meaningful equity home bias measure for Ireland could not be calculated because foreign equity liabilities 
exceed the sum of market capitalization and foreign equity assets. This corresponds to (negative) zero domestic 
equity holdings. In other word, Irish investors do not invest in Ireland but only hold foreign stocks and Irish 
stocks are completely held by foreign investors. This corresponds to Ireland being a major center for offshore 
mutual funds and to empirical findings by Chan, Covrig and Ng (2005).    
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Table 6-8: Home Bias and Domestic Equity Holdings 
 
 
 
Country Period Equity Home Bias  Domestic Equity  
Holdings 
  Start End  Start End 
       
Australia 1986 - 2012 0.726 0.644  0.560 0.615 
Austria 1988 - 2012 0.815 0.356  0.942 0.455 
Belgium 1981 - 2012 0.569 0.340  0.948 0.563 
Canada 1980 - 2012 0.814 0.612  0.748 0.730 
Chile 1996 - 2012 0.975 0.681  0.835 0.877 
Czech Republic 1994 - 2012 0.932 0.731  0.776 0.759 
Denmark 1991 - 2012 0.751 0.295  0.872 0.391 
Finland 1988 - 2012 0.988 0.302  0.793 0.442 
France 1989 - 2012 0.870 0.596  0.862 0.571 
Germany 1980 - 2012 0.905 0.550  0.840 0.598 
Greece 1998 - 2012 0.928 0.717  0.850 0.647 
Hong Kong 2000 - 2012 0.821 0.588  0.750 0.671 
Hungary 1997 - 2012 0.997 0.594  0.833 0.447 
Ireland 1980 - 2012 - -  0.000 0.000 
Israel 1994 - 2012 0.988 0.684  0.912 0.612 
Italy 1980 - 2012 0.804 0.498  1.000 0.735 
Japan 1995 - 2012 0.935 0.750  0.910 0.707 
Korea 2001 - 2012 0.979 0.797  0.593 0.524 
Mexico 2009 - 2012 0.811 0.863  0.605 0.673 
Netherlands 1982 - 2012 0.584 0.061  0.443 0.095 
New Zealand 1990 - 2012 0.974 0.458  0.856 0.749 
Norway 1998 - 2012 0.626 0.788  0.225 0.628 
Poland 1997 - 2012 0.999 0.890  0.545 0.666 
Portugal 1994 - 2012 0.738 0.441  0.671 0.379 
Slovak Republic 1996 - 2012 0.925 0.668  0.972 0.907 
Spain 1988 - 2012 0.973 0.720  0.822 0.567 
Sweden 1984 - 2012 0.808 0.371  0.775 0.492 
Switzerland 1988 - 2012 0.666 0.388  0.534 0.306 
Turkey 1996 - 2012 1.000 0.997  0.791 0.568 
United Kingdom 1980 - 2012 0.682 0.491  0.871 0.497 
United States 1980 - 2012 0.925 0.498  0.882 0.673 
       
The data is based on the International Investment Positions reported in the International Financial Statistics and 
the Balance of Payments Statistics compiled by the International Monetary Fund. The Equity Home Bias of 
country c is calculated as 1 – (Foreign Portfolio Holdings/World Portfolio Share). Foreign Portfolio Holdings = 
foreign equity assets held by country c/(stock market capitalization of country c + foreign equity assets held by 
country c – foreign equity liabilities of country c). World Portfolio Share = 1 – (stock market capitalization of 
country c/stock market capitalization of the world). The measure is normalized between 1 and 0. It takes the 
value 1 when the domestic investors hold only domestic shares. It takes the value of 0 when the actual foreign 
portfolio holdings are equal to the world portfolio share. Domestic Equity Holdings of country c are calculated 
as 1 – (foreign equity liabilities of country c/stock market capitalization of country c).  
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Table 6-9 reports the coefficients and t-statistics for three panel regressions with winner re-
turn reversal ctWR  as dependent variable. The variable 
HomeEquity
 is the proportion of do-
mestic equity holdings relative to the overall domestic market capitalization. The interaction 
term longInter  ( shortInter ) is the combined effect of the share of domestically held stocks with 
the average 5-year long-term (short-term) capital gains tax rate. I would expect a negative 
sign on its coefficient as higher taxes imply a more drastic lock-in effect and a higher share of 
domestically owned stocks magnifies the impact of national tax rates. In Panel A of Table 6-9 
the interaction term of long-term rate and domestic equity holdings has a negative coefficient 
that is significant at the 10 % level while controlling for risk-related factors. In Panel B I in-
clude behavioral characteristics. The coefficient on the short-term interaction term is negative 
and significantly different from zero which is in line with my hypothesized combined effect. 
This relation is confirmed in Panel C when I control for all relevant factors that may impact 
on return reversal.  
 
Corresponding to my previous tests I also examine the impact of taxes on positive loser rever-
sal. The table is shown in the Appendix. The results are based on the first month of a coun-
try’s tax year and generally support my findings. The estimates in Panel B suggest that the 
difference between both tax rates becomes more relevant for the turn of the tax year effect on 
loser reversal as the national share of equity holdings increases.         
 
In sum, the negative coefficient on the interaction term shows the expected positive synergy 
between domestic capital gains taxes and domestic equity holdings on stock return reversal. 
As predicted, national share holdings enhance the effect of capital gains taxes on stock prices.    
This effect is particularly pronounced for short-term capital gains tax rates since capital gains 
on shareholdings not qualifying for preferential long-term treatment are subject to a tax bur-
den that is on average 10 percentage points higher.      
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Table 6-9: Domestic Equity Holdings Regression 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VARIABLES WR WR WR 
    
longATR  0.0529** 0.0194 0.0198 
 
(2.164) (0.655) (0.670) 
longInter  -0.0569* -0.0293 -0.0288 
 
(-1.862) (-0.749) (-0.736) 
shortATR  0.00295 0.0803*** 0.0787*** 
 
(0.188) (3.456) (3.382) 
shortInter  -0.0124 -0.0832*** -0.0833*** 
 
(-0.685) (-3.071) (-3.075) 
HomeEquity
 
0.00965* 0.0100 0.0105 
 
(1.794) (1.494) (1.560) 
GDP -3.43e-08 5.27e-08 4.21e-08 
 
(-0.250) (0.327) (0.260) 
GDPG 0.00084*** 0.000213 0.000299 
 
(2.967) (0.645) (0.874) 
SZ 
 
-0.000468** -0.000460** 
  
(-2.019) (-1.985) 
Corr 
 
-8.38e-05 -8.19e-05 
  
(-0.943) (-0.921) 
PR 
 
0.000191 0.000212 
  
(1.484) (1.623) 
Credit 
 
-1.39e-05 -1.52e-05 
  
(-0.430) (-0.469) 
RV -2.23e-09 
 
1.83e-08 
 
(-0.349) 
 
(0.532) 
BM 0.00233 
 
0.00514 
 
(0.532) 
 
(0.981) 
    
Observations 6,839 4,980 4,980 
Number of Countries 30 29 29 
    
The average 5-year monthly return of winner portfolios is regressed on the average 5-year long-term and short-
term capital gains tax rates and on different sets of explanatory variables. The interaction terms are defined as:                               and                                 . Winner reversal is characterized 
by a negative sign. Panel A shows results related to risk-based variables. Panel B reports results with respect to 
behavioral variables and Panel C shows results with respect to all explanatory variables. T-statistics are in paren-
theses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard er-
rors are clustered at country level.   
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6.4.3.2 International Capital Gains Tax Rates 
 
In this section I extend the previous analysis by explicitly controlling for foreign capital gains 
taxes. Foreign capital gains taxes can influence stock prices of domestic securities if the tax-
ing right of a realized gain is allocated to the seller’s foreign country of residence. To measure 
the effect of foreign capital gains tax rates I consider the foreign statutory tax rate on capital 
gains as well as the amount of domestic investments by foreign investors in each country. I 
calculate two weighted average foreign capital gains tax rates (short-term and long-term) with 
weights being the amounts of the individual equity liabilities towards each foreign country. 
 
For the purpose of illustration I use a simple three country example: Companies located in 
Country A issue stocks with a market value of 100. Stocks with a value of 20 are held by in-
vestors resident in country B and stocks with a value of 10 are held by investors resident in 
country C. The remaining stocks are held by domestic investors in country A.  The double tax 
treaties between the three countries are based on the OECD Model Convention. The capital 
gains tax rate in country B is 10 % and the tax rate in country C amounts to 25 %. Conse-
quently, in case of a sale, country A’s domestic stocks held by foreign investors would be 
subject to a weighted average foreign capital gains tax rate of (20*0.1 + 10*0.25)/30 = 0.15.   
 
I use data from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) provided by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund to gain an accurate picture of a country’s composition of foreign equity 
liabilities. CPIS records bilateral portfolio equity allocations covering over 60 investor coun-
tries for the period 1997 to 2012.120   
 
In order to disentangle the influences of domestic and foreign capital gains taxes I need to 
make sure that the taxing rights are exclusively allocated to the country of resident of the al-
ienator of the shares as it is stipulated in the OECD Model Treaty (or the UN Model Treaty). 
It is common practice for countries to use the OECD Model Treaty as a blue print for individ-
ual bilateral tax treaties and basically apply the same allocation rules. The overwhelming ma-
jority of double taxation conventions follow the tax principles described in the OECD Model 
                                                 
120
 Since information is only available for 1997 and 2001 to 2012, I interpolate the data for the years 1998 to 
2000. To avoid issues regarding the representativeness of the data I require each source country to have a mini-
mum of at least 10 billion U.S. Dollar in foreign equity holdings. I also exclude Ireland as popular financial 
center since the allocation of equity investments channeled through financial centers is not possible. In addition, 
I exclude Australia and New Zealand as source countries because of many missing values due to confidentiality 
(Vermeulen (2013)). A careful treatment of the data is pointed out by Lane and Milesi-Feretti (2007). 
 166 
 
Convention. However, some bilateral treaties deviate from that path and contain alternative 
allocation rules. In addition, by far not all countries have concluded double tax treaties with 
their trading partners. In those cases the national tax rules apply.  
 
I relax the assumption from the previous section that the principles from the OECD Model 
treaty generally apply to all countries in my sample but instead individually check all bilateral 
equity investment relations. Country-pairs are only included in the calculation of the weighted 
average foreign capital gains tax rates if an effective double tax treaty exits and if such a trea-
ty attributes the taxing right of an alienation of shares to the alienator’s country of residence. 
Based on these criteria I exclude 73 bilateral investment relations from my sample due to 
missing treaty agreements or alternative allocation rules.121 The allocation of taxing rights 
regarding the remaining equity holdings is purely based on the place of residence of the 
shareholders and thus does not inhibit my estimations. 
 
The settings in Table 6-10 Panels A to C are comparable with the regressions in Panels A to C 
from Table 6-9 but contain additional controls for foreign short-term and long-term capital 
gains tax rates. The results in all three settings suggest that higher domestic short-term tax 
rates lead to more winner stock return reversal and that this effect increases in domestic 
shareholdings. I can also confirm the validity of the lock-in hypothesis from an international 
perspective. Estimates reveal a significant positive impact of foreign long-term capital gains 
taxes on domestic winner return reversal. The results remain robust across all three estimation 
settings. 
 
So far all estimates are based on the assumption that the marginal investor is an individual 
investor and that only the personal capital gains tax matters for equity pricing. However, insti-
tutional investor tend to be the predominant cross-border equity holders as they tend to have 
better excess to information and more sophisticated investment strategies.122  
 
 
                                                 
121
 For example, I exclude the bilateral investment relation between Germany and Chile since both countries 
have not concluded a double taxation convention. Similarly, I exclude the bilateral investment relation between 
Australia and Italy from the calculation of the average weighted foreign capital gains tax rate as it says in the 
double tax treaty: “Gains from the alienation of shares or corporate rights in a company which is a resident of 
Italy for the purposes of Italian tax, derived by an individual who is a resident of Australia, may be taxed in 
Italy.” 
122
 Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show that the degree of sophistication matters when studying investor behav-
ior.  
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Table 6-10: Weighted Average Foreign Capital Gains Tax Regression 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VARIABLES WR WR WR 
    
longATR  -0.0177 -0.0256 -0.0244 
 
(-0.650) (-0.925) (-0.879) 
longInter  0.0433 0.0352 0.0359 
 
(1.241) (0.957) (0.977) 
shortATR  0.0716*** 0.0784*** 0.0787*** 
 
(2.955) (3.159) (3.170) 
shortInter  -0.101*** -0.110*** -0.110*** 
 
(-3.575) (-3.807) (-3.811) 
longWFATR  -0.0559* -0.0559* -0.0578* 
 
(-1.709) (-1.675) (-1.730) 
shortWFATR  0.0382 0.0104 0.0224 
 
(0.685) (0.183) (0.390) 
HomeEquity
 
3.21e-05 0.000322 0.00130 
 
(0.00425) (0.0419) (0.168) 
GDP 1.21e-08 -1.33e-07 -1.26e-07 
 
(0.0825) (-0.822) (-0.780) 
GDPG 9.09e-05 5.35e-05 0.000198 
 
(0.240) (0.136) (0.491) 
SZ 
 
-0.000652*** -0.000627*** 
  
(-3.130) (-3.002) 
Corr 
 
-0.000238 -0.000215 
  
(-1.415) (-1.273) 
PR 
 
0.000163 0.000187 
  
(1.212) (1.383) 
Credit 
 
3.95e-05 3.59e-05 
  
(0.982) (0.891) 
RV -2.23e-09 
 
-1.93e-09 
 
(-0.0785) 
 
(-0.0674) 
BM 0.00952* 
 
0.00836 
 
(1.758) 
 
(1.502) 
    
Observations 2,947 2,865 2,865 
Number of Countries 21 21 21 
    
The average 5-year monthly return of winner portfolios is regressed on the average 5-year long-term and short-
term capital gains tax rates, the weighted average 5-year foreign long-term and short-term capital gains tax rate 
and on different sets of explanatory variables. The interaction terms are defined as:                               and                                .           (           ) stands for the average 
weighted foreign long-term (short-term) capital gains tax rate. Winner reversal is characterized by a negative 
sign. Panel A shows results related to risk-based variables. Panel B reports results with respect to behavioral 
variables and Panel C shows results with respect to all explanatory variables. T-statistics are in parentheses. The 
symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are clus-
tered at country level.   
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Ferreira and Matos (2008) report that nearly 40 % of the entire world stock market capitaliza-
tion are held at equal shares by U.S.-based institutions and non-U.S.-institutions.   
 
Thus, in an international context the marginal investor does not necessarily have to be a natu-
ral person but can also be an institutional investor that is subject to corporate capital gains 
taxes. To test this alternative explanation I also run the regressions in Table 6-10 with 
weighted average foreign corporate capital gains tax rates. Results are shown in the Appen-
dix. The impact of domestic short-term capital gains taxes remains consistent and highly sig-
nificant while the results do not suggest any effect of foreign corporate capital gains taxes. 
This supports my base case assumption that corporate capital gains taxes are not relevant for 
stock prices. Studies by He, Ng and Wang (2004) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) sug-
gest that different types of institutional investors such as corporations, insurance companies or 
mutual investment funds engage in similar trading strategies. Thus, my findings indicate that 
international investments through mutual funds let natural persons also become price setting 
investors for cross-border security holdings whose tax burdens are eventually reflected in 
stock price reactions.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
 
This study presents a comprehensive and thorough international analysis of the effect of capi-
tal gains taxation on long-term stock return reversal. It is first to seek evidence of a link be-
tween taxes and reverting stock return patterns for the U.S. stock market. Classifying portfoli-
os based on a tax-specific measure reveals different results for winner and loser stocks. While 
I find significant return reversal for winner stocks as predicted by theoretical models (Klein 
(1999, 2001)) I do not find a corresponding effect with respect to loser portfolios. This 
asymmetric return reaction supports the lock-in hypothesis of capital gains taxes. Most inter-
estingly, in line with previous findings of end-of-year tax-loss selling strategies I can show 
that loser reversal is only prevalent in January which underlines the meaning of capital gains 
taxes for equity pricing.  
 
In contrast to earlier studies in the literature I test the influence of capital gains taxes on stock 
returns in a global setting. This enables me to take advantage of 31 different tax systems and 
multiple changes in tax rates over a time span of up to 50 years. My analysis provides robust 
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empirical evidence of capital gains taxes being a contributory factor to reverting stock returns 
when controlling for various sets of other explanatory factors. Again, I distinguish between 
winner and loser stocks. Capital gains taxes are significantly associated with a decline in re-
turns of appreciated stocks in the long-run. I do not detect a similar relation between capital 
gains taxes and stocks with embedded capital losses as predicted by the lock-in hypothesis. 
However, an increased difference between long-term and short-term capital gains tax rates 
raises the selling pressure at the end of the tax year and eventually leads to a more pro-
nounced return reversal of loser stocks.   
 
The evidence motivates me to broaden the scope of my analysis and also take into account 
international portfolio diversification. I investigate whether the degree of domestic sharehold-
ings changes the effect of domestic taxes on stock returns. The results show that national 
shareholdings enhance the effect of domestic capital gains taxes on stock price changes. This 
conclusion can also be drawn with respect to loser reversals and differences between domestic 
long-term and short-term tax rates. 
 
Finally, I consider the composition of international equity holdings and test if foreign capital 
gains taxes also have an impact on stock return reversal similar to domestic taxes. According 
to my results I can also confirm the lock-in hypothesis for foreign capital gains taxes. Taking 
into account the relative share of national as well as international equity investments shows 
that domestic and foreign capital gains taxes systematically affect changes in stock prices. 
 
Overall, my results imply that besides investor overreaction, risk compensation and measure-
ment issues rational investors’ response to tax incentives can be seen as another factor driving 
the reversion of stock returns in the long-run.  
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6.6 Appendix 
 
 
Table 6-11: Appendix - Domestic Equity Holding and Loser Reversal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VARIABLES LR LR LR 
    
TRDiff  -0.0217 -0.0349 -0.0421 
 
(-0.738) (-0.915) (-1.078) 
shortInter  0.0334 0.285* 0.282 
 
(0.286) (1.657) (1.638) 
HomeEquity
 
0.00965* 0.0100 0.0105 
 
(1.794) (1.494) (1.560) 
GDP 2.67e-07 -4.55e-07 -3.80e-07 
 
(0.292) (-0.409) (-0.340) 
GDPG 0.00179 -0.000392 -0.000974 
 
(1.003) (-0.175) (-0.418) 
Size 
 
2.21e-05 5.59e-07 
  
(0.0143) (0.000360) 
Corr 
 
-0.000499 -0.000523 
  
(-0.836) (-0.873) 
PR 
 
0.000460 0.000339 
  
(0.539) (0.392) 
Credit 
 
4.60e-05 5.65e-05 
  
(0.205) (0.250) 
RV 3.59e-08 
 
-1.61e-08 
 
(0.193) 
 
(-0.0816) 
BM -0.0359 
 
-0.0342 
 
(-1.432) 
 
(-0.932) 
    
Observations 607 422 422 
Number of Countries 30 29 29 
    
The average 5-year monthly return of loser portfolios is regressed on the difference between the current short-
term and long-term capital gains tax rates and on different sets of explanatory variables. The interaction term is 
defined as:                            . Loser reversal is characterized by a positive sign. Panel A shows 
results related to risk-based variables. Panel B reports results with respect to behavioral variables and Panel C 
shows results with respect to all explanatory variables. T-statistics are in parentheses. The symbols *, **, *** 
indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at country level.    
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Table 6-12: Appendix - Weighted Average Foreign Corporate Capital Gains Tax  
 
Panel A Panel B Panel C 
VARIABLES WR WR WR 
    
longATR  0.00226 -0.0143 -0.0120 
 
(0.0745) (-0.466) (-0.390) 
longInter  0.0108 0.0112 0.0112 
 
(0.264) (0.264) (0.263) 
shortATR  0.0652** 0.0740** 0.0754*** 
 
(2.321) (2.566) (2.613) 
shortInter  -0.0953*** -0.107*** -0.109*** 
 
(-2.633) (-2.902) (-2.959) 
longWFCATR  -0.207 0.159 0.177 
 
(-0.254) (0.192) (0.214) 
shortWFCATR  0.253 -0.139 -0.168 
 
(0.310) (-0.167) (-0.201) 
HomeEquity
 
0.00291 0.00247 0.00413 
 
(0.383) (0.322) (0.534) 
GDP 1.31e-08 -1.51e-07 -1.63e-07 
 
(0.0910) (-0.937) (-1.013) 
GDPG -0.000111 -0.000170 -7.77e-05 
 
(-0.273) (-0.397) (-0.180) 
Size 
 
-0.000606*** -0.000607*** 
  
(-2.907) (-2.911) 
Corr 
 
-0.000195 -0.000202 
  
(-1.242) (-1.287) 
PR 
 
0.000184 0.000212 
  
(1.427) (1.626) 
Credit 
 
4.55e-05 4.02e-05 
  
(1.183) (1.040) 
RV 3.95e-09 
 
3.67e-09 
 
(0.144) 
 
(0.134) 
BM 0.00793 
 
0.00874 
 
(1.411) 
 
(1.514) 
    
Observations 3,048 2,964 2,964 
Number of Countries 21 21 21 
    
The average 5-year monthly return of winner portfolios is regressed on the average 5-year long-term and short-
term capital gains tax rates, the weighted average 5-year foreign long-term and short-term capital gains tax rate 
and on different sets of explanatory variables. The interaction terms are defined as:                               and                                .            (           ) stands for the average 
weighted foreign corporate long-term (short-term) capital gains tax rate. Winner reversal is characterized by a 
negative sign. Panel A shows results related to risk-based variables. Panel B reports results with respect to be-
havioral variables and Panel C shows results with respect to all explanatory variables. T-statistics are in paren-
theses. The symbols *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 %, 5 % and 1 % level, respectively. Standard er-
rors are clustered at country level.   
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Table 6-13: Appendix - Variable Definition 
Variable  Definition Source 
   
i,t 1size   The natural logarithm of market capitalization of stock 
i in month t-1 net of month t-1 cross sectional mean. 
CRSP 
   
i,t j52wkW   52-week high measure equals one if i,t j
i,t j
P
high

  is ranked 
among the top 10 % of all stocks in month t-j, and zero 
otherwise, where i,t jP   is the price of stock i at the end 
of month t-j and i,t jhigh   is the highest month-end 
price of stock i during the 12-month period that ends 
on the last day of the month t-j.  
CRSP 
   
i,t j52wkL   52-week low measure equals one if i,t j
i,t j
P
high

  is ranked 
among the bottom 10 % of all stocks in month t-j, and 
zero otherwise, where i,t jP   is the price of stock i at the 
end of month t-j and i,t jhigh   is the highest month-end 
price of stock i during the 12-month period that ends 
on the last day of the month t-j. 
CRSP 
 
  
short
ctATR  The average of the statutory short-term capital gains 
tax rates for the period month t-1 to month t-60 in 
country c  
Own  
calculation 
   
long
ctATR  The average of the statutory long-term capital gains tax 
rates for the period month t-1 to month t-60 in country 
c. 
Own  
calculation 
   
ctWR  The equal-weighted average return of the individual 
coefficients for winner stocks 605t 5 jtj 1
1S b
60    in 
month t in country c. 
Own  
calculation 
   
ctLR  The equal-weighted average return of the individual 
coefficients for loser stocks 606t 6 jtj 1
1S b
60    in month 
t in country c. 
Own  
calculation 
   
short
cyTR  The statutory short term capital gains tax rate in coun-
try c for year y. 
IBFD 
   
long
cyTR  The statutory short term capital gains tax rate in coun-
try c for year y. 
IBFD 
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Table 6-13 - continued 
Variable  Definition Source 
   
TR
cyDiff  Difference between the statutory short-term capital 
gains tax rate and the statutory long-term capital gains 
tax rate in country c for year y. 
Own  
calculation 
   
long
cyWFATR  
n
long
i iy
long i 1
cy n
i
i 1
w TR
WFATR
w


   with weights iw  being the 
market value of stocks in country c held by investors 
from country i in year y. longiyTR   is the statutory long-
term capital gains tax rate in country i in year y. 
International 
Monetary 
Fund 
   
short
cyWFATR  
n
short
i iy
short i 1
cy n
i
i 1
w TR
WFATR
w


   with weights iw  being the 
market value of stocks in country c held by investors 
from country i in year y. shortiyTR   is the statutory short-
term capital gains tax rate in country i in year y. 
International 
Monetary 
Fund 
   
Home
c,yEquity  Domestic Equity Holdings of country c are calculated 
as 1 – (foreign equity liabilities of country c/stock 
market capitalization of country c). 
International 
Monetary 
Fund 
   
c,yEquity Home Bias  The Equity Home Bias of country c is calculated as 1 – (Foreign Portfolio Holdings/World Portfolio Share). 
Foreign Portfolio Holdings = foreign equity assets held 
by country c/(stock market capitalization of country c + 
foreign equity assets held by country c – foreign equity 
liabilities of country c). World Portfolio Share = 1 – 
(stock market capitalization of country c/stock market 
capitalization of the world). The measure is normalized 
between 1 and 0. 
International 
Monetary 
Fund 
   
cyGDP  Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in country c 
in year y. 
Worldbank 
   
cyGDPG  Gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate in country c 
in year y. 
Worldbank 
   
cySZ  SZ of country c in year y is the median of the average 
size of firms in that country. The average size of a firm 
in year y is the average of the monthly market capitali-
zation of this firm in year y. 
Datastream 
and CRSP 
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Table 6-13 - continued 
Variable  Definition Source 
   
cyCorr  Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing 
insecurity and uncertainty into economic relationships. 
The score for this component is derived primarily from 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index (CPI) for 2011, which measures the level of cor-
ruption in 183 countries. It ranges from 0 to 10. 
The  
Heritage 
Foundation 
   
cyPR  The property rights Index is an assessment of the abil-
ity of individuals to accumulate private property, se-
cured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. 
It measures the degree to which a country’s laws pro-
tect private property rights and the degree to which its 
government enforces those laws. It also assesses the 
likelihood that private property will be expropriated 
and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the 
existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the 
ability of individuals and businesses to enforce con-
tracts. It ranges from 0 to 100. 
The  
Heritage 
Foundation 
   
cyCredit  Total private credit of country c in year y divided by this country’s GDP in year y. 
Worldbank 
   
ctRV  Market volatility for country c in month t is 
n
2
ct it
i 1
1V R
n    , where 2itR  is the squared return on 
stock i in month t. 
Datastream 
and CRSP 
   
ctBM  BM is the book-to-market ratio of the Datastream 
Global index of country c in month t. 
Datastream 
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7 Overall Conclusion 
 
The focus of this doctoral thesis is on the effects of taxes on investment decisions and asset 
prices. Based on three scientific studies I examine the effect of tax planning possibilities on 
M&As, how restrictions to loss transfers influence the decisions to start or to terminate a 
business and if capital gains taxes lead to reverting stock returns in the long-run. The results 
of all three papers taken together underline the economic meaning of taxes for investors’ 
choices in the private marketplace.  
 
The first paper tests for the use of tax avoidance strategies at the level of acquisition targets. I 
distinguish between three different tax planning channels and find empirical evidence for tax 
planning through permanent book-tax differences and tax-driven profit shifting via transfer 
pricing at the target post-deal. The results imply that acquirers that are able to implement tax 
planning strategies at the target level gain an ownership advantage over the initial owner. 
Thus, the deal takes place due to tax planning opportunities. 
The results also imply that international acquirers might gain a competitive advantage over 
national bidders since purely domestic companies do not have access to cross-border tax 
planning opportunities. The same line of reasoning applies to international acquirers located 
in high-tax countries that cannot benefit from profit shifting into low taxed subsidiaries.  
Future research on taxes and M&A activities could deal with the relocation of real economic 
activities in contrast to shifting of taxable profits in the presence of effective anti-avoidance 
rules. In addition, international tax planning opportunities could also affect multinationals’ 
group structures.  
  
In the second study I test if a purely M&A-related tax rule also exerts further detrimental ef-
fects on investment decisions. I analyze the effects of “anti-loss trafficking” regulations on the 
relative frequency of firm entries and the rate of firm exits. According to my initial tests, none 
of the examined anti-avoidance rules significantly reduces the number of loss-acquisitions. 
The subsequent analysis of the investment effects delivers mixed results: On the one hand the 
findings suggest that the entry decision is not adversely affected by restrictions to loss trans-
fers. On the other hand, the base case results indicate that the frequency of terminated loss 
firms increases after newly introduced limitations.  
The results could be helpful for policy makers in two ways: First, the effectiveness and design 
of anti-avoidance rules can be best evaluated in the light of real world statistical results. Con-
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sequently, possible shortcomings of individual tax rules can be more directly addressed.  
Second, the results might draw more attention to formerly neglected economic effects of “an-
ti-loss trafficking” rules and help to sensitize tax legislators for future tax policy endeavors.   
Future research could further examine the economic meaning of loss-acquisitions in general 
and analyze what groups of investors pay attention to “loss trafficking” restrictions. Such an 
in-depth analysis of the investment effects would require a more detailed classification of ini-
tial investments and access to confidential tax accounting data to reliably identify loss-firms.  
 
The third essay is an international study of the effect of capital gains taxes on stock return 
patterns. I test if the taxation of capital gains can be viewed as a cause of negative autocorre-
lation of stock returns over long-term investment horizons. The results suggest that domestic 
as well as foreign capital gains taxes influence the development of long-term stock returns in 
a systematic way. These findings correspond to results in numerous other studies suggesting 
an economically relevant effect of shareholder taxation on expected returns.  
Insights on how taxes determine asset prices can help policy makers to ensure financial mar-
ket stability. Moreover, the impact of taxes on prices and what information they contain about 
the future are helpful for investors to optimize long-term portfolio structures and engage in 
tax-efficient trading strategies. 
However, an intensified use of detailed shareholder level information would further contribute 
to the literature. Considering ownership data would help to differentiate between multiple 
groups of shareholders and to pinpoint the effect of taxes on asset prices. Furthermore, loss-
compensation rule offer another source of variation to be exploited to gain further insights 
into shareholder trading behavior and asset prices.    
 
The entire body of empirical evidence presented in my thesis rests on commonly applied lev-
els of statistical significance. Based on the usual test-statistics, hypotheses are either rejected 
or confirmative empirical evidence is found. These tests of statistical significance are a vital 
part of quantitative research. However, scientific problems of testing and measurement and 
interpretation should not be reduced to statistical significance. Researchers should primarily 
ask the question “How much?” and not the question “whether” in scientific inquiries that are 
concerned with the size and importance of relationships (Ziliak and MacCloskey (2008)). 
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